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Abstract 
This thesis explores transformations in South African NGOs in the Post-Apartheid 
era. It focuses on two areas in particular that are often neglected in the study of 
NGOs: auditing and partnerships are increasingly core activities of NGOs and impact 
on their logic of operation and their location in wider civil society. In applying a 
governmentality framework to the neoliberalisation of development in South Africa, 
this research investigates how development provides a context for governmental 
technologies and what forms of NGOs they produce. A multi-method, multi-sited 
research strategy was employed that included in-depth interviews, observation 
research and other ethnographic techniques. 
South Africa's democratic transition and subsequent funding crises gave birth 
to a new, more streamlined NGO model which can be characterised by flexibility, 
fluency in auditing techniques and the ability to maintain multisectoral partnerships. 
Partnerships transform the activities and values of NGOs and provide a cross-
sectoral context for the circulation of particular auditing technologies and types of 
expertise. Indeed, it is argued that the entanglement of NGOs in intersectoral spaces 
is not only heightened by the prevalence of the partnership agenda in global 
development and in the new South Africa's reconciliation project, but that NGO 
activity very much produces these kinds of intermeshing spaces. 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is shown to be a key demand of 
partnerships, thus further reinforcing an audit culture. NGOs, by acting as experts 
and translators of these apparently mundane techniques to other civil society 
organisations (CSOs), actively shape practices of development and may come to 
substitute for civil society. There is continuity between the partnership practices by 
which - contrary to their emancipatory claims - NGOs become more strategically 
and structurally embedded in the neoliberal order, and their own governing of CSOs 
such as the country's strong social movements. It is contended that this is 
particularly dangerous given the vast developmental challenges facing South Africa 
and the deeply felt betrayal of freedom's promises by the majority population. 
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Chapter 1: 
One Foot in the Shanty Shack, 
One Foot in the Boardroom 
1.1. Introduction: The view from Constitution Hill 
One Saturday afternoon a few weeks after arriving in Johannesburg for my fieldwork, 
a friend took me to Constitution Hill, one of the city's few landmarks. There is an 
amazing view over the city, taking in the shiny skyscrapers of the Central Business 
District and the leafy green suburbs stretching all the way north. The mine dumps in 
the far distance that scar the landscape serve as a reminder of what the city was 
built on. Con Hill at once signifies South Africa's past, present and future. The 
grounds today house the highest court of the country, which guards what is widely 
seen to be the most progressive constitution in the world. But the Constitutional 
Court is built on the foundations and incorporates some of the walls of the Old Fort, a 
high security prison erected by the Boers in the 19th century. During the Apartheid 
era the prison tracts were used to detain political activists and criminals but also 
many ordinary people, under notoriously inhumane conditions. Most notably, the 
Rivonia Trial defendants were held here when they were accused of treason in 1963/ 
1964. The court building itself is beautiful: there are lots of windows, sculptures and 
open spaces. It showcases the work of South African artists and it uses a traditional 
African system for cooling. Its huge doors are decorated with wood carvings 
depicting constitutionally guaranteed human rights in all the eleven South African 
languages 1; the stairs are covered with tiny bronze ornaments, each individually 
designed. 
It is quite indicative of the new South Africa to build this symbol of democracy 
and equality on a site that stands for some of the country's most notorious history 
and its gravest violations of human rights. Old sites, memories and identities are 
allowed to stand side by side with new, Post-Apartheid ones, seemingly without an 
attempt to revise or erase history. On the contrary, Con Hill shows how architecture 
and public history are purposely being refashioned to forge a new democratic 
1 See appendix 6. 
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identity. Yet, from the height of Con Hill the inequalities that persist after more than a 
decade of freedom are also clearly visible. The overcrowded inner city 
neighbourhoods, the empty buildings downtown deserted as capital has fled 
elsewhere; the tower of Sandton City that dominates the 'new' business district, the 
suburbs of Parktown and Westcliff with their gated communities of faux-Tuscan 
houses guarded by electric fencing and privatised security. Right ahead is Hillbrow, 
its crumbling facades telling a familiar story about immigration, destitution and crime, 
and the progression from 'whites only' to brief cosmopolitan heyday to current decay. 
The legacy of Apartheid is ever present in Johannesburg's geography; 
residential segregation is inscribed into the psyche of the city. Post-Apartheid urban 
development seems only to have increased the city's spatial, racial and class 
contradictions, some calling it the 'quintessential neoliberal dystopia' (Bond 2007a). 
Like the rest of South Africa, Johannesburg remains deeply unequal and 
exclusionary 15 years after the country's transition to democracy. In addition to the 
legacies of the past, new inequalities have emerged. The restructuring and 
liberalisation of the South African economy have caused living conditions to be 
worse than under Apartheid for millions of black people, a fact that is almost 
impossible to grasp. For instance, South Africa performs very poorly in terms of its 
Human Development Index (HOI): it is placed 125 out of 179 countries, compared to 
its ranking in 76th place based on income (UNDP 2008). Unemployment stood at 
38.8% in 2008 (SAIRR 2008), with millions of people unemployable due to the skills 
gap. The HIV pandemic and the belated response of the democratic Government 
have severely affected all sectors and have reduced life expectancy at birth to 50 
years. In addition to these developmental challenges, xenophobia is rife and reached 
a violent climax in 2008 when tens of thousands of immigrants fled their homes in 
Gauteng and elsewhere. Post-Apartheid race relations also continue to be troubled. 
In short, the challenges the new South Africa faces are huge, both in terms of 
development and poverty reduction and in terms of the consolidation of its 
democracy. In each instance, 'civil society' is seen as absolutely central. In 
particular, national NGOs provide a window not only on to the country's civil society 
sector or the field of development, but constitute a way of exploring the juncture at 
which this no-Ionger-so-young democracy finds itself today. 
This thesis explores transformations in the organisational form of South 
African intermediary NGOs in the Post-Apartheid era. It analyses the significance of 
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partnerships and auditing practices as two central elements of NGOs' infrastructure 
that impact on their positioning in civil society and in the transnational development 
domain. My analysis is situated in the wider political economic context of South 
African democracy and of what can largely (but certainly not exclusively) be termed 
neoliberal development. In using South Africa as a case study, the research 
investigates how development provides a context for governmental technologies and 
what forms of NGOs they produce. 
This thesis thus focuses on areas that are usually neglected in the study of 
NGOs - namely the impact of partnerships and audit culture on such organisations. 
Conversely, this work aims to contribute new knowledge to development sociology 
by critically examining partnerships and auditing as essential activities of NGOs in 
the contemporary era. As such, it argues that the study of NGOs' logic of operation 
can provide insights into contemporary forms of power and governance in the 
development domain. The thesis also seeks to advance theoretical debates on 
govern mentality in development by applying the framework to the analysis of civil 
society dynamics and relations of power. 
1.2. The importance of NGOs in Post-Apartheid development 
NGOs are key actors in the development industry of most Majority World countries. 
They may provide services in lieu of weak states, carry out lobbying and advocacy 
and fulfil a 'watchdog' role keeping government in check. Despite a crisis of 
legitimacy in recent years, they are still seen by international agencies, governments 
and an increasingly ethically-oriented private sector as the preferred agent to deliver 
pro-poor development. This is due to their supposed advantages over governments, 
typically including greater flexibility and efficiency, informality, commitment and 
proximity to communities. Accountability practices have emerged as ways of dealing 
with their crisis of legitimacy whilst seeking to make them more efficient. 
Notwithstanding, NGOs remain largely unaccountable to the constituencies they 
work with and are often highly dependent on their funders or partners. 
South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994 has brought about substantial 
transformations in the role of non-profit organisations. Most obviously, NGOs' 
relations to the state have changed from an adversarial to a potentially collaborative 
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mode. South African democracy has thus provided an environment in which to 
investigate how state-NGO relations change when there is a transition of 
authoritarian to democratic regimes. Formally, the Post-Apartheid legislative 
environment is now very favourable to the existence of a vibrant civil society. But the 
NGO sector has been in crisis for some time: international donor funding, initially 
abundant after the transition, has shrunk dramatically, both as a consequence of a 
global decline in development funding and due to the re-classification of South Africa 
as a middle-income economy. Accordingly, the state provides the majority of funding 
to the NGO sector, effectively outsourcing services it does not have the capacity to 
deliver. 
South African NGOs are moreover involved in increasingly complex 
relationships and governance arrangements with international funders, civil society 
partners and Governmenf agencies. As such, the NGOs in this research are located 
between different types and scales of actors. Being at least in part funded by 
international development agencies, they remain closest to their 'global' agendas, at 
times performing governance functions. This positioning between 'local' and 'global' 
actors attributes them a role as broker and bridge-builder. This location provides a 
fascinating window from which to research the modalities and technologies 
characterising NGO-Ied development in South Africa and to examine their 
relationships with other development actors across multiple sites and scales. The 
interplay of 'local', 'national' and 'transnational' spheres in the development domain-
and often within one organisation or project - is a central issue in this research. At 
the same time, the essentially multi-level and trans-scalar character of the 
development domain implies that labels such as local and global are insufficient on 
their own to meaningfully situate NGOs and other development actors. 
Yet, progressive South African NGOs have also experienced a crisis of 
identity. Developmental challenges continue to be huge whilst the state has taken on 
an ambivalent role. On the one hand, it can be described as developmental with 
welfare programmes having been extended to the poorest; on the other hand, it 
marginalises and often represses popular resistance to its policies. Many NGOs 
seem to be caught in the middle, claiming alignment with social movements that 
protest neoliberal policies and the persistent inequality in South Africa whilst needing 
2 A note on spelling: I have followed the convention of capitalising 'government' only when I refer to a 
specific government, for instance the South African Government. 
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to access government funds and corporate monies for survival - a location captured 
well by the image of having 'one foot in the shanty town shack and the other in the 
boardroom', as one NGO professional described it. This metaphor seems to me to 
point to some of the key issues surrounding NGO-Ied development in the 
contemporary era. Accordingly, researching national NGOs can provide insights not 
just into the South African civil society sector and the neoliberalisation of its 
development domain; it is also one way of exploring the state of South African 
democracy 15 years after the transition. 
Indeed, the story of NGO transformation in South Africa cannot be told 
without reference to South Africa's rapid move to neoliberalism after liberation. The 
speed with which processes of neoliberalisation have taken hold is breathtaking and 
the consequences clear to see, not least in the fierceness of resistance they have 
provoked. How NGOs have reacted - or failed to react - to these consequences has 
called into question their very role and legitimacy. Moreover, on the level of 
organisations, neoliberal techniques have impacted on the way NGOs are organised, 
what work they carry out and how they relate to their partners. Calls for increased 
NGO accountability have necessitated the adoption of a range of technologies and 
types of expertise broadly in line with neoliberal forms of organisation. Chapter 6 
addresses the way in which auditing procedures such as Monitoring and Evaluation 
(M&E) render organisational models more alike. Adherence and proficiency in 
homogenised formats are considered an indicator of improved capacity of NGOs. 
Carrying these concerns over to chapter 7, I specifically explore how the resultant 
technologies and hierarchies of expertise impact on NGOs' relations with other civil 
society actors. 
Partnerships are integral to a new development consensus that sees 
cooperation and harmonisation as the most effective way to ensure broad-based 
growth (Craig and Porter 2006, Abrahamsen 2004). I refer to partnerships in this 
thesis as collaborative arrangements of NGOs with other actors in the development 
domain, my definition reflecting the language that was used by my informants and in 
NGO documents. My analysis considers partnerships as one way in which 
development is talked about, thought about and often practiced. It asks what mode 
of governance of development such partnerships bring about and what 
understandings of civil society, democracy and development this mobilises. The 
focus of this research on partnerships as an essential characteristic of NGOs thus 
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reflects their emblematic status in terms of a reflexively neoliberal project of global 
development: a subtler neoliberalism that understands the importance of governing 
through consensus-building whilst further extending the reach of the market into 
social areas (Harrison 2005). I demonstrate in this thesis that what might be called 
NGOs' essential form has changed in conjunction with these above-described 
transformations in their role and identity. NGOs' modes of operation can be seen as 
an effect of power relations that are characteristic of the practices of governing in 
development (Sending and Neumann 2006). In the following section, I summarise 
the objectives of this research and the methods chosen to explore the research 
questions. 
1.3. Overview of research aims and methods 
This thesis explores transformations in the organisational form of NGOs in the Post-
Apartheid era. Whereas many critical studies ask how NGOs can be made more 
accountable or effective, this work centres on NGOs in order to analyse modes of 
governance in development. I take the partnership idea and auditing culture as two 
discursive elements which are central to the operation of NGOs in the present era. 
Both are governmental in that they produce certain types of NGOs that are 
appropriate to a specific kind of power in development. They employ certain 
technologies, assume or enable particular roles for NGOs, shape values and impact 
on organisational structure. Despite this focus on rationalities, technologies and 
vocabularies of governmental power, the analysis presented here is sensitive to 
dimensions of exclusion and inequality that characterise South Africa and structure 
the very field in which NGOs operate. Moreover, this thesis draws attention to 
processes of marginalisation and homogenisation in civil society. Ultimately then, the 
research aims to reveal processes at the heart of the governance of development 
and civil society, both in Post-Apartheid South Africa and with respect to modes of 
governmentality in transnational government. 
Accordingly, my research questions were concerned firstly with the 
partnership discourse and its impact on the practices of the NGOs in this research, 
and secondly with the impact of auditing demands and techniques. What are the 
global and national referents of the partnership agenda? What are the conditions 
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under which the discourses of multisectoral partnerships or accountability can 
flourish in South Africa and how do they structure NGOs' relations with their 
partners? How do NGOs frame these discourses and how are they reworked in the 
context of civil society relationships? How are auditing technologies understood, 
negotiated and contested? How have they discursively impacted on each 
organisation's structure and activities? More broadly, what is the organisational 
perspective on the role of NGOs in South African development? 
I addressed these questions by employing a mixture of qualitative research 
methods, primarily in-depth interviews (see chapter 3, which discusses my research 
strategy and methodological approach in more detail). I interviewed 32 NGO staff at 
23 different organisations, as well as carrying out 8 expert interviews with other 
development practioners and 3 biographical interviews. I took the interpretations of 
NGO leaders and development practioners as central to my enquiry because they 
gave me an understanding of how discourses were understood, negotiated and 
circulated by people in the field. Moreover, getting a sense of individuals' histories 
and experiences through in-depth interviews illuminated in rich and complex ways 
the way their work and life had changed over the past decade and a half. This data 
was supplemented by carrying out some observation research in organisations, 
participation at events and the analysis of documentary sources. These methods 
provided a different perspective on NGO practices and helped me to develop a more 
holistic understanding of the research problem. 
Much of the research into NGOs in development has been carried out by 
NGO professionals. Consequently, it is often characterised by a utilitarian reading of 
projects' intended effects or by micro analyses of their successes or failures (Bryant 
2002). Contrary to research dealing with the effectiveness and efficiency of particular 
NGOs, this thesis uses a discursive-analytical approach and explores how South 
African NGOs situate themselves in relation to regimes of development governance 
and which forms and modalities may distinguish them. In-depth ethnographic studies 
have also examined how development discourses and accountability practices are 
negotiated and adopted within a single organisation (Ebrahim 2003, Hilhorst 2003). I 
draw on such scholarship but believe that a multi-sited study, exploring how the 
partnership mode and impact measurement requirements impact on NGOs across 
multiple sites, can illuminate wider social and political issues. 
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Carrying out multi-sited research into NGO practices requires an ongoing 
sensitivity to the heterogeneity of the South African NGO sector and the great 
diversity of NGOs considered in this research (also see appendix 2 and the narrative 
account of participating NGOs in chapter 3). Organisations have different and often 
contradictory policies, both internally and compared to one another - this 
acknowledgement of differentiation being precisely the point of a multi-sited research 
strategy. While the partnership agenda or monitoring and evaluation procedures may 
be experienced negatively by some NGOs, they may lend certain types of capital to 
others. For example, particular technologies and vocabularies were being adopted 
strategically and indeed 'empowered' some of the NGOs in this research. 
My research focuses on a subset of national NGO that I refer to as 
'intermediary NGOs' (Sanyal 2006, Carroll 1992).3 Within this set, my selection 
criteria were broad because I wanted to consider as wide a range of NGOs as 
possible. The criteria in narrowing my choice were that NGOs had some international 
linkages, and that they identified partnering as one of their activities or strategies. It 
is easier to explain what I mean by the term 'intermediary NGO' in the negative: they 
are not service delivery NGOs, nor survivalist CBOs, nor activist social movements. 
They are active in the fields of organisational development, capacity building, 
research, advocacy, training and so on; they provide a link between national or 
transnational actors, and organisations directly serving communities. The term 
importantly directs attention to their location between various types of authority (often 
the state, but it may also be other actors in the international development system) 
and the citizen or community. 
This is not to assume a self-evident verticality. On the contrary, I take 
intermediary NGOs to occupy what is a trans-scalar development domain (Gould 
2004b). This assumption draws on the scholarship on transnational governmentality 
which has been very relevant for my reading of the development terrain in South 
Africa. James Ferguson (2006a) for instance rejects what he calls a vertical 
topography of power, arguing that it is not only important to study NGOs and their 
interrelations with the state but also how modes of operating within civil society and 
3 Sanyal (2006) uses the term differently; I find it useful because of the structural location it evokes but I 
do not fully go along with her usage of the term. Carroll's (1992) study assessed the performance of 
thirty Latin American national NGOs in the late 1980s; his definition of intermediary NGOs as national 
organisations that support the grassroots is more similar to the selection criteria for the subset of NGOs 
in this research, but nonetheless describes a very context-specific type of organisation at the end of the 
Cold War. 
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state reconfigure relationships of power and governance (also see Walsh 2008, 
Ferguson and Gupta 2005). I will speak more directly to the theme of civil society 
below. Here, it is important to emphasise that this research is concerned with 
national NGOs, as opposed to international ones operative in South Africa. This 
focus differs from the scholarship on global development that has otherwise 
influenced my work. The latter conceives of international NGOs (INGOs) as actors in 
transnational governance regimes that are capable of penetrating national 
development arenas, but sometimes bypasses national non-profit organisations as 
though they were not a part of transnational development networks. The question of 
how national NGOs are involved in development partnerships that are implicated 
with but also transgress the level of the state is less frequently posed. One of the 
original contributions of this research therefore lies in charting how particular 
discourses and practices in global development map onto national concerns in South 
Africa. As such, this work begins to develop a contribution to debates about how 
political power operates across different scales, providing insights into contemporary 
forms of power and governance. As Sinha (2008) has shown, transnationality itself is 
not a new phenomenon but rather has been present from the beginnings of 
developmental modernity. The focus of this research is to explore some of the 
technologies and discourses that enable and enhance such transnational regimes in 
the context of national Post-Apartheid development. 
The following section discusses Johannesburg as a powerfully evocative 
setting for the project I have undertaken. The city encompasses vast contradictions 
of poverty and wealth, joy and despair, and the almost unbearable tension between 
the hopes for a democratic new South Africa and the realities of the Post-Apartheid 
globalised economy. 
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1.4. I heart Jozi4: Place of contradictions 
Given the aim of this research to produce an analysis of Post-Apartheid NGOs that 
takes into account the political economic context they operate in, I understood 
immersion and interaction as central to my methodological strategy. My research 
design has encompassed multiple sites, but I was physically located in 
Johannesburg for most of my fieldwork. 2007 was an interesting year to be carrying 
out fieldwork. It was a time of change, even given the 'short' history of Post-
Apartheid South Africa. The presidential succession race in the ANC had begun to 
come into full swing and dominated the news; the policy proposals for the ANC's 
52nd National Conference were finalised and seemed to denote a further commitment 
to a developmental state, with some commentators noting that the proposals were 
revealing a party that had 'jumped from centre to left' (M&G March 23 to 29 2007); 
tensions in the Tri-Partite Alliance were rising in the run-up to Polokwane where 
Jacob Zuma was eventually voted ANC president, spectacularly defeating Thabo 
Mbeki. The corruption charges against Zuma were dropped; the biggest public sector 
strike in Post-Apartheid history brought the country to a virtual standstill in June and 
July; Freedom Day was marked by riots in Khutsong, where a community had fought 
integration into the poorer North West Province from Gauteng for a year, reminding 
some of the 1976 Soweto uprising; a song about the Boer leader De La Rey had 
become a hit single. 
I was initially extremely anxious about moving to a place that is so often 
portrayed as synonymous with crime and violence. Johannesburg is regularly 
proclaimed the most dangerous city in the world, so the paradox of my choosing to 
come to a place to do research that many South African (if they had the right kind of 
passport) were leaving was ever-present. Accordingly, in preparation for my 
fieldwork I did not need to learn another language, the traditional training for 
ethnographers, as much as I needed to become fluent in the 'rules' of my new 
temporary home. Negotiating access was as much about researching which model 
of hire car would have the least potential to be carjacked as it was about making 
4 There is a bright-red banner on the top of a building in down-town Johannesburg, declaring boldly: 'I 
heart Jozi' (see Appendix 6). I It was the first landmark I recognised - especially important in a city like 
Johannesburg, which has no river or sea front to provide a point of orientation for new arrivals. I felt as 
though it followed me around; I could see it from my friend's rooftop across Mandela Bridge, and 
through the window of an NGO office where I was interviewing. From the 'glass bowl', the visitors' office 
space at WISER, I could see most of the skyline just ahead of me, with the sign perfectly placed in the 
centre of my vision. 
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contact with NGO staff. Whilst I may have been fascinated by being encouraged to 
run red lights at night or having a panic button on my key ring, there was a genuine 
urgency to familiarise myself with these peculiarities: an average of 50 people are 
murdered in South Africa every day, robberies, break-ins and carjackings are 
extremely commonplace. These sobering crime statistics need to be seen in the 
context of entrenched and deepening inequalities, massive job losses and rising 
poverty. 
In the event, my anxieties dissipated very soon after my arrival and I became 
infatuated with the city's constant sense of emergency, its palpable energy and the 
way everything seemed in flux, on edge. I was lucky because I quickly met a 
heterogeneous group of writers, academics and artists who shared a love for Jo'burg 
and its incessant creative buzz. They introduced me to the city beyond its 
'architecture of fear' (Ellin 1997) - high walls, electric fences, barbed wire, armed 
security personnel - and undoubtedly impacted on the knowledge I have produced 
with this research. Nevertheless, Johannesburg is a place of immense 
contradictions, where many of the problems at the heart of Post-Apartheid 
development are plainly visible. 
Egoli (the city of gold), as Johannesburg is also known, was founded in 1886, 
when gold was discovered in the Witwatersrand where there were previously only a 
handful of homesteads and a few white-owned farms. Only 9 years later, the gold 
fields were producing 27% of the world's gold, supporting a population of 100,000 
from all over Southern Africa and the world. The ever-expanding city quickly became 
the most cosmopolitan in Africa, containing a huge cultural mix and giving it a unique 
character and energy that it retains to this day, still attracting a great diversity of 
people seeking to make their fortunes. But the city does not just retain the character 
of the gold rush; its geography continues to reflect colonial and Apartheid residential 
segregation. Back then, racial mixing was considered dangerous, black 
neighbourhoods were constructed both as sites of degeneration and disease and of 
political mobilisation and resistance. Still, the Apartheid regime needed a constant 
supply of cheap labour near Johannesburg's Central Business District and its 
residential neighbourhoods. The townships in and around Johannesburg are a result 
of this 'dilemma' of Apartheid urbanisation. 
15 years after the transition, these geographies of segregation have not 
vanished but have arguably been further augmented by the second, neo-liberal, 
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gold-rush of the 1990s and the associated effects of privatisation. A striking image 
that is often evoked is the juxtaposition of Sandton's 'world class' glitzy malls, 
skyscrapers and office blocks with the neighbouring Alexandra, an overcrowded and 
impoverished township with a considerable percentage of informal settlements, poor 
services and exposure to flooding. These binary oppositions can distract from the 
fact that considerable progress is being made by Government in terms of housing 
and improving of access to services. However, it is also true that these steps have 
been contradicted by the adoption of cost-recovery measures for service provisions, 
leaving township residents unable to pay water, electricity or rent. 
Significantly, whilst the Government seems formally committed to poverty 
reduction as part of its recent discovery of a developmental state framework, the 
townships and shantytowns, which clearly played a central role in the crumbling and 
eventual demise of the Apartheid regime, are seen as eyesores that trouble the 
Government's new South Africa success story (Gibson 2008). Keeping the 'second 
economy' outside of the cities (or, as has been the case in Johannesburg, moving 
the city out of the city) maintains this official story of the world class location, the 
poor presumably serving as an unsightly reminder of the failed promises of the 
transition. As during Apartheid, they appear to be seen as uncivil and dangerous 
elements by the current elites. A far cry from the rainbow nation, that official narrative 
of reconciliation, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world, with 
Johannesburg one of the most unequal cities. 
In addition to my fieldwork in Johannesburg, I also carried out some 
interviews in Durban and Cape Town and attended academic conferences in 
Pretoria, Mafikeng and Durban. I travelled in Limpopo, KwaZulu Natal and the 
Eastern Cape, encountering areas that were far removed from Johannesburg city 
life, despite the relatively heterogeneous spaces I moved in. Such journeys and 
encounters provided perhaps the most poignant reminder of the issues at the very 
heart of NGO activities. A weekend in Polokwane, intended to be a fun time away 
from the city with friends, had to be cut short because of the intimidating racism of 
some locals, clearly not used to a group of black and white men and women out 
together in public. My friends laughed about my shocked reaction - did I think South 
Africa was like our own little rainbow nation bubble? On a journey through what used 
to be called the Transkei, I was equally taken aback to see so many men, women 
and children on the streets in the middle of the day - apparently neither being able to 
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find work nor attending school. This was not the squalor of some of the urban 
townships, but it was the same poverty of infrastructure, education, employment and 
life chances. These were the forgotten provinces, too far from the centres of power in 
Gauteng or Cape Town to matter yet strategically evoked whenever necessary. 
1.5. Civil society, govern mentality, neoliberalism: introducing key 
concepts 
NGOs and civil society 
The South African non-profit sector is very large, with one study estimating it at 
100,000 organisations (School for Public and Development Management 2002). It 
therefore encompasses a great variety of organisations that differ in size, scope, 
activities, political orientation, location and so on. I have found useful the typology 
brought forward by Habib (2003), who suggests that Post-Apartheid civil society is 
made up of three blocs: formalised NGOs, 'survivalist' community organisations 
(CBOs) and social movements. Whilst CBOs which numerically dominate civil 
society are concentrated in areas of service delivery at a local level, larger and more 
formalised NGOs are involved in intermediary activities and are structurally equipped 
to benefit from funding. An influential South African study of the non-profit sector 
further distinguishes between development non-profit organisations (NPOs), 
survivalist NPOs and oppositional NPOs (School for Public and Development 
Management 2002). According to that typology, all the NGOs in this research can be 
described as both oppositional and developmental: they are involved in lobbying and 
advocacy as well as in the direct improvement of social, cultural or economic well-
being. As I will show, this may however not be how they think of or speak about their 
roles. Self-representation in relation to the state is an important way in which NGO 
leaders mobilise authenticity and legitimacy (see chapter 5 on NGO-state relations). 
The above studies that classify civil society do so in relation to the state and 
to state power, employing the same state/ civil society division that much of the 
scholarship on Post-Apartheid development uses. On the contrary, the field of 
development in which NGOs are engaged is structured by a complex set of relations 
between state and non-state authorities and global, national and local networks of 
power. Likewise, the construction of civil society in much of the critical literature as a 
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site of struggle against the state oversimplifies what are in South Africa intricate and 
often highly personal relationships and interlinkages between state and civil society. 
On the level of staffing, NGO work can represent a stepping stone for a professional 
career in the public or private sector, and much of the capacity of NGOs continues to 
be absorbed by these two sectors. Moreover, the ruling ANC party is a powerful 
agent in articulating a particular vision of the liberation struggle and the goals of the 
national democratic revolution. NGOs are tied into these networks of power in 
complex ways, not least through a shared history of the struggle. 
Whilst the present research does examine relationships of NGOs to the state 
(see chapter 5), it rejects a binary understanding of the two and situates the analysis 
in the context of the governmentality of state, NGOs and social movements. The 
research thus argues that, much like the state they are supposedly directly opposite 
to, civil society organisations govern, in Michel Foucault's well-known phrase, 
through the 'conduct of conduct' (Gordon 1991: 2) - they shape conduct by working 
through desires, aspirations and beliefs. In this way, NGOs, CSOs or the public 
sector all have to be understood as agencies of government. The following section 
and chapter 2 will discuss my usage of a govern mentality framework. 
Perhaps one of the most astonishing aspects of the literature on civil society 
is the frequent conflation of civil society organisations with highly formalised NGOs. 
This is not coincidental but rather reflects the language and policies of many funders. 
Nonetheless, as with NGOs themselves, there exist different and contradictory 
policies and discourses amongst the donor community active in South Africa. This is 
perhaps a reflection of the essentially contradictory notion of civil society itself. The 
global development concern with civil society has been integral to the legitimation of 
a contemporary version of neoliberal discourse and has arguably been constituted 
by neoliberalism. At the same time, real challenges against neoliberalisation 
continue to emerge from other forms of civil society (Sinha 2005). 
Partha Chatterjee (2001) points to the problem at the heart of civil society: if 
civil society organisations are to conform to the normative model of western 
societies, they must exclude from it the vast majority of the population. He therefore 
defines as civil society in postcolonial societies 'those institutions of modern 
associational life set up by nationalist elites in the era of colonial modernity, though 
often as part of their anti-colonial struggle' (Chatterjee 2001: 174). Political society, 
on the contrary, captures parties, movements and non-party political formations. 
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Whilst I have chosen not to adopt the term 'political society' in this thesis, it is an 
productive distinction to bear in mind in terms of what Chatterjee describes as the 
framing question in debates over social transformation. In political society, the 
framing question is that of democracy; in civil society of the colonial period, it is 
modernity. As he observes: 'in the context of the latest phase of the globalization of 
capital we may well be witnessing an emerging opposition between modernity and 
democracy, i.e. between civil society and political society' (ibid: 178). This to me 
sums up well the contradictory meanings attributed to 'civil society' and the tensions 
between its different elements. 
These essential contradictions that characterise civil society are a central 
concern of this thesis. There are clearly conflicting approaches to democracy and 
development within civil society, and NGOs' positions on these issues are structured 
by the multisectoral partnerships they increasingly form. For instance, chapter 7 
charts the relationships between NGOs and social movements, and asks how NGOs 
might try to 'conduct the conduct' of their civil society partners. The present research 
differs from other studies of the South African civil society sector and contributes to 
the critical literature on NGOs in that it explores internal relations within civil society. 
The interest of this work in processes of power and governance beyond the state 
moreover necessitates a theoretical framework that can account for multiple forms 
and agencies of power in development. 
Government and the governance of development: a theoretical framework 
Development, wrote Pierre Bourdieu in Algeria 1960 is 'the process by which 
dispositions and ideologies are adopted to imported and imposed economic 
structures, i.e. the reinvention of a new system of dispositions under the pressure of 
economic necessity' (cited in Jenkins 2002: 12). Bourdieu's definition precedes later 
scholarship that applies the Foucauldian framework of govern mentality to 
development studies. Nonetheless, it directs attention to how agency links up with 
structure and shows how development projects aimed at the transformation and 
improvement of the citizenry encompass both economic growth and a transformation 
of mindsets. I already cited Foucault's definition of government as 'conduct of 
conduct'. Dean expands this by defining government as 
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any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity 
of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of 
knowledge that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, 
aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a 
diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, efforts and outcomes 
(Dean 1999: 11). 
Governmentality studies hence acknowledge the existence of complex sets of power 
relations between state and non-state authorities and the plurality of governing 
agencies, authorities, effects and outcomes. They provide a framework that captures 
the intersection of technologies of dominating others and technologies of constituting 
the self. For that reason, some argue that the concept of governmentality itself 
represents a departure from Foucault's early, more radical view of power, in that it 
re-introduces the agency of the subject (Lukes 2005). I am less concerned in this 
thesis with Foucault's original formulation and the many ongoing debates about his 
theoretical legacy. Rather, I have drawn on the now substantial body of scholarship 
that applies the framework of Foucault's late work for a critique of development. 
Using these theoretical tools, I have employed the notion of governmentality 
to examine South African NGOs in the context of transnationalised development, 
exploring their modes of operation and central practices, and how these have 
configured their relationships with other state and non-state actors. A 
governmentality perspective can transgress the binary of state and civil society that 
was encountered above, as well as the analytical separation between local and 
global. As Nikolas Rose has written, 'the force field with which we are confronted in 
our present is made up of a multiplicity of interlocking apparatuses [ ... ] that cannot 
be understood according to a polarization of public and private or state and civil 
society' (Rose 1993: 286). This theoretical perspective allows capturing the power of 
civil society actors in development in relation to state actors, not as replacing or 
transferring it. 
In line with this conception of power, NGOs are understood in this thesis as 
one amongst a multiplicity of actors that apply various forms of knowledge and 
expertise to shape behaviour, although not always consciously or intentionally. On 
the level of NGOs themselves, the notion of government also encapsulates 
practioners' genuine 'will to improve' (Li 2007), which cannot be reduced to class 
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interest alone. Likewise, power in development is often understood in terms of 
domination but this does not capture well the dynamics of NGO partnerships for 
development. A govern mentality framework of power enables a conception of 
partnerships as form of rule that governs through inclusion (Abrahamsen 2004). 
Partnerships and impact measurements as the two elements of NGO operation that 
constitute the main focus of this research accordingly appear as political 
technologies that can reveal something about the changing logic of government in 
the development domain. 
A governmentality framework has mainly been applied to development with 
an interest in what subjects are being produced by particular interventions. Where 
my approach differs from these studies is in the way I have engaged the above-
defined theoretical framework to explore what kinds of organisations the partnership 
agenda produces, and through which channels, practices and technologies this 
occurs. My analysis emphasises how development relations provide a context for 
governmental practices across different levels. I am also not aware of any research 
that deals specifically with the impact of multisectoral partnerships on South African 
NGOs. 
But I also recognise the limitations of such a perspective on its own to 
understanding the configurations of power in Post-Apartheid development. 
Governmentality studies explore technologies of rule and afford a view of 
neoliberalism in terms of tactics and practices of governing. Therefore they are not 
ideally suited to an analysis of the social exclusion processes of neoliberalism. 
Particularly, due to their focus on political discourse, they have a tendency to neglect 
experiences of material realities and of actors' ways of making sense of them. I draw 
in this thesis on what may be called non~dogmatic readings of Foucauldian 
govern mentality, which are in fact troubled by the ignoring, in more orthodox 
versions of governmentality studies, of the 'messy processes of implementation' 
(Hart 2008: 19) - the fact that projects of rule are not necessarily accomplished in 
practice (see chapter 2). Even so, the govern mentality framework is not primarily 
interested in the social exclusion effects of the power it investigates, but rather in its 
rationalities and modalities. I would find this perspective alone an untenable position 
given the devastating consequences that specific development policies - many of 
which can be called neoliberal, whereas others cannot - have had in Post-Apartheid 
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South Africa. Moreover, these policies cannot be fully understood without reference 
to a global political economic system of uneven development. 
Reflexive Neoliberalism and Partnerships 
As I have written, the story of NGOs in South Africa's young democracy - and of the 
tensions in its civil society - cannot be told without reference to neoliberalism. After 
the negotiated settlement, the South African Government quickly adopted a set of 
macroeconomic policies that embraced the neoliberal agenda of the Washington 
Consensus: trade liberalisation, a shift to investment spending, export-oriented 
manufacturing, flexibility of the labour market and so on. Critique of and practical 
opposition to neoliberalism is probably stronger in South Africa than anywhere else 
on the continent. This is witnessed for instance by the high degree of popular 
mobilisation and social movement activity against neoliberalisation. At the same 
time, the term neoliberalism, whilst looming large in South Africa's political lexicon, is 
far from uncontroversial. 
Firstly, since the adoption more than ten years ago of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), South Africa's 'homegrown 
structural adjustment programme' (Desai 2004), there have been significant changes 
in the way the Government has framed its poverty reduction strategy, most notably in 
shifting to a developmental state discourse that seemingly acknowledges that the 
growth-focused strategy of the immediate Post-Apartheid era has failed. Secondly, 
how is South Africa's mix of neoliberal and developmental policies comparable to 
what may be referred to as Neoliberalism with a capital N? Is it possible to read the 
local of the global in this way? Thirdly, is there such as thing as a universal 
'N'eoliberalism in the first place? In practice, neoliberal policies have drawn on a 
combination of elements such as 'individualism, choice, market society, laissez faire, 
minimal government intervention in the economy, strong government in non-
economic domains, social authoritarianism, disciplined society, hierarchy and 
subordination, and a cult of the nation' (Overbeek and van der Pijl, cited in Sinha 
2005: 164). Focusing on international institutional discourse, I will argue that 
development has become more about participation of and consensus-building with 
civil society and the allocation of a large role to the state in enabling inclusive 
development. Is it then still justified to frame the discussion in terms of 'neoliberalism' 
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at all? These are complex issues which are elaborated in the next chapter in relation 
to a typology of theories of neoliberalism. 
My understanding of the term is as reflexive, locally specific and contingent. 
Neoliberalism encompasses a range of development policies concerned with the 
shaping of the economy, the state and social relations and with the very re-
articulation of the socio-political and economic spheres. This definition also draws 
attention to the fact that neoliberal programmes have renewed themselves in 
important ways since the doctrine began to become influential in the 1970s and that 
this reflexive neoliberalism plays itself out differently in different places. As Hart 
argues, 'the challenge [ ... ] is coming to grips with how identifiably neo-liberal projects 
and practices operate on terrains that always exceed them' (2008: 4). In South 
Africa, a neoliberal ideology is differentially articulated with various other political 
projects, for instance African nationalism and the developmental state. In this respect 
my research, by using South Africa as a case study, aims to contribute to theoretical 
debates on the geographies of neoliberalisation, exploring how neoliberalism 
behaves in a particular setting but how it is also exceeded (Larner 2000, 2003). 
One of the ways in which neoliberal forms of governing have affected the 
relationships between individuals and governmental agencies has been through 
what Burchell (1993) has called a new form of responsibilisation. Individuals and 
collectives are to be actively involved in issues that were previously the responsibility 
of the state or other governing agencies: 
The price of this involvement is that they must assume active responsibility 
for these activities, both for carrying them out and, of course, for their 
outcomes, and in so doing they are required to conduct themselves in 
accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action (Burchell 
1993: 276). 
This conception of 'technologies of agency', to use Dean's (1999) phrase, is integral 
to my understanding of the significance of the partnership agenda as denoting a new 
modality of power in the development domain. 
In the existing academic literature on NGOs, partnerships are typically 
understood as North-South partnerships between NGOs. In policy terms, on the 
contrary, multisectoral partnerships are sometimes seen as synonymous with 'hard 
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development' (such as infrastructure) or health interventions (particularly in the field 
of HIV/Aids). But the language of partnership has come to encompass the whole 
spectrum of development institutions precisely with the claim of reversing the power 
differential present in the structures, institutions and practices of global governance. 
Development relationships have been redefined in terms of the participation of poor 
countries in 'owning' development strategies, thereby making states responsible for 
their development. Responsibilisation is a key aim of neoliberal government in the 
development domain that is not limited to states or individuals. Rather, through 
partnerships at all levels, it is individuals, organisations, communities and states that 
are to be made efficient, responsible and entrepreneurial. In the present research 
context, I focus particularly on their potential to produce appropriate civil society 
organisations that can be enlisted into government or corporate agendas as 
partners. I therefore examine the partnership discourse in terms of transformations in 
the logic of governance in transnational development: partnerships ensure the 
inclusion of disparate development actors into shared projects. 
However, how the language of partnerships has been understood, employed 
and contested by the NGOs in this research also provides a way of exploring issues 
at the heart of Post-Apartheid democracy, such as nation-building and political 
mobilisation, and must be understood in the specific context of South Africa's history. 
1.6. Outline of the thesis 
To recap from the above, the subsequent chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
discussing the evolution of neoliberalism in more detail and outlining the theoretical 
framework I have applied. Chapter 3 gives an account of research strategy, 
methodological issues, selection and research methods. Chapter 4 explores how the 
democratic transition and the subsequent shift to more streamlined operating 
principles were framed by NGO staff and what sustainability strategies they have 
given rise to. The chapter introduces the discussion of partnerships as one amongst 
these sustainability strategies, examining the usage of the language of partnership in 
policy and by the NGO professionals in this research. Chapter 5 fully explores the 
partnership theme by discussing its modalities, analysing how various partnerships 
with different sectors were understood to have impacted on the form and structure of 
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NGOs. The partnership discourse is understood as a political technology that 
ensures that key actors in the development domain are complicit with particular 
policy regimes. The specific techniques it makes use of, such as monitoring and 
evaluation which align with neoliberal rationalities and are shown to contribute to a 
harmonisation of modes of operation of diverse sets of actors, are discussed in 
chapter 6. Chapter 7 focuses on NGO activity in relation to the govern mentality of 
civil society because, crucially, it is partnerships that shape the positioning of NGOs 
to social movements and community struggles. This thesis thus draws attention to 
areas frequently overlooked by other studies of NGOs - the effect of NGOs' 
partnerships and auditing on their organisational form and on practices of governing 
in civil society. 
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Chapter 2: 
Situating Post-Apartheid NGOs 
and Neoliberal Development 
2.1. Introduction 
This literature review chapter has several functions: it elaborates the historical and 
political economic context within which South African NGOs operate in terms of 
development theory, practice and policy (parts one and two), develops key issues in 
relation to the literature on NGOs (part three) and attempts to synthesise these two 
within a theoretical framework that applies governmentality studies to the 
neoliberalisation of development (part four). The literature on which I draw in this 
chapter reflects the interdisciplinary character of development sociology and, 
theoretically and methodologically, the fact that no overarching framework is 
presented - the complexities of Post-Apartheid development have led me to engage 
with diverse theoretical influences. 
The first part reviews, very briefly, the origins of development studies and 
highlights the ongoing relevance of the modernisation and dependency paradigms. I 
go on to argue that dependency theory's contemporary variants provide an important 
lens through which to grasp the processes of exclusion and marginalisation that 
have accompanied both the most recent phase of global capitalism and Post-
Apartheid development. In discussing alternative development, structural adjustment 
and good governance, I consider the major themes in development practice over the 
same period of time, here emphasising the interface between the emergence of 
neoliberalism in Africa and the rise of the NGO as the preferred agent of international 
development. The development policy initiatives that Africa experienced in the 1990s 
were building on structural adjustment but moved reforms to a broader development 
agenda, concerned with rebuilding the state though governance programmes, 
capacity building and public sector reform. I will refer to contemporary Post-
Washington development as 'reflexively neoliberal' in order to draw attention to the 
reformed character of international development policies that seek to govern through 
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partnerships, accountability and responsibilisation, but essentially retain their focus 
on liberalisation and privatisation. 
Recent years have seen global changes in funding modalities towards budget 
assistance and sector-wide support. This entails a reversal from direct funding of the 
civil society sector to funding governments, who in turn rely on CSOs to deliver 
services. If, as Gould (2004a) puts forward, the predominant operational instrument 
of the aid industry of the 20th century was the development project, donors still exert 
vast influence on the management of health, education or civil society reform in 
Majority World countries under the current focus on policy and governance. Budget 
support has moreover led to an increasingly dualistic conception of NGOs' role as 
either active in advocacy or service-delivery. The aid effectiveness agenda, as 
embodied in the 2005 Paris Declaration (OECD 2005), further threatens to 
marginalise the critical role of CSOs by eroding their space for voicing dissent. 
Part two traces South Africa's transition from Apartheid to neoliberalism. In 
this section, I contextualise my later analysis of NGO activity and popular 
mobilisation by providing a brief account of the effects of Post-Apartheid 
development in terms of growth, poverty and inequality. The Government's recent 
shift to a developmental state discourse is discussed through Mbeki's concept of the 
'two nations', as this provides an excellent example for the coming together of 
various discursive processes at work in contemporary South Africa. The 'two nations' 
thesis identifies and targets specific populations as subjects for intervention, 
marginalises those not in line with the nation-building objectives of the 'new South 
Africa', and leaves intact the neoliberal premise that global integration leads to 
development, whilst drawing on an Africanist or Third-Worldist rhetoric. 
In part three, I shall review the literature dealing with NGOs in development 
and define the term NGO for the present research context. In discussing the 
legislative and structural developments that have impacted on the South African 
NGO sector since the transition, I argue that there has been an attempt to formalise 
and sanitise civil society. Partnerships and civil society strengthening have been 
funding priorities for South African NGOs in recent years; the literature pertaining to 
these will be discussed in chapters 5 and 7 respectively. My evaluation of the main 
studies of South African NGOs finds that there is a tendency to analyse NGOs as 
dichotomous to the state. I then provide an overview of procedural, structural and 
ethical critiques and highlight accountability as a technology of power that gives rise 
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to particular NGO knowledge practices and technologies. Accountability provides the 
theoretical link between the good governance agenda discussed in part 1 of this 
chapter, and current regimes of NGO funding and management. 
This critique leads me, in part four, to discuss more explicitly the wider 
theoretical framework I have employed. The two seemingly contradictory theoretical 
traditions of Marxian development studies and govern mentality studies are engaged 
throughout the present chapter. Government here encompasses a whole continuum 
of power relations between donors, NGOs, their target populations and other 
organisations of civil society. It is individuals, organisations, communities and states 
that are to be made efficient, flexible and responsible - responsibilisation thus 
constituting one of the prominent themes of this chapter. Contrary to some studies in 
this vein which focus on the production of the subjects of development, I am 
interested in what type of NGO is produced in partnership with other development 
actors in South Africa, and how NGOs come to define and transfer the meaning of 
civil society. However, I also draw attention to the limitations of a governmentality 
studies approach, arguing that whilst it provides an important tool to analyse the 
present research questions, alone it is insufficient to grapple with the complex 
configurations of power in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Particularly, challenges to 
expertise and the partial failures and unintended outcomes of specific projects of rule 
are not well accounted for. I conclude the chapter coming full circle, by returning to 
contemporary variants of dependency theory and their relevance to capturing the 
dimensions of exclusion and inequality that characterise the field in which NGOs 
operate in South Africa. 
I will not discuss the literature specifically pertaining to partnerships and to 
civil society in this chapter, having chosen to review this in the appropriate analysis 
chapters where these concepts are engaged (chapters 4 and 7, respectively). 
2.2. Neoliberalism in Africa and the rise of the NGO 
The relevance of dependency theory: a very brief history of development studies 
The origins of development studies in the 1940s and 1950s can be traced to the 
central problem of how European powers could transform their fonner colonies, 
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govern them and make them more productive (Leys 1996). Social sciences were no 
longer seen as relevant for Majority World countries, and the changed post-war 
international context had made underdevelopment a foreign policy concern for 
industrialised countries. Prior to this, the disciplines of classical political economy, 
and later of sociology and anthropology, had been tracing the progression of 
European societies from 'traditional' to 'modern' through industrialisation (Hettne 
1990). Most early contributions to sociology are thus types of modernisation theory, 
with Marx's stages theory or Durkheim's division between mechanical and organic 
solidarity being obvious examples. The modernisation paradigm was central to post-
war development theories and has remained influential in development practice to 
the present day, describing 'a structural change process whereby the traditional and 
backward Third World countries developed towards greater similarity with the 
Western, or rather the North-Western world' (Martinussen 1997: 38).5 
Alternatives to the modernisation paradigm evolved in the 1950s and 1960s 
in the form of theories of dependency and underdevelopment, themselves drawing 
on earlier Marxist studies concerned with the effects of imperialism in peripheral 
countries (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Frank 1978, Frank 1996, Wallerstein 1993). 
Most significant for the present context amongst these forerunners is Rosa 
Luxemburg's (1971) assertion that capitalism can only exist in conjunction with non-
capitalist systems. Her theses about accumulation by dispossession provide an 
important lens through which historical and contemporary processes of exploitation/ 
superexploitation (and struggles motivated by them) in South Africa have been 
analysed by political economists (Harvey 2005b, Bond 2000). Development and 
underdevelopment, from the perspective of dependency theory, are constituted by 
the same historical processes inherent to the world capitalist system (Frank 1969). 
An exploitative chain of metropolis-satellite/ core-periphery relations links the global 
to the national scale and to regional and local centres, each of which involves 
unequal exchanges of commodities and wages.6 
5 Modernisation theory dominated development economics, as well as sociological and political theories 
of development, see Martinussen's (1997) two-chapter overview. Different theories, dependent on 
which aspect of modernisation they focused upon, highlighted the need of underdeveloped countries to 
develop democratic governments and media systems, exposure to mass media, a highly specialised 
economy and extensive division of labour, high productivity, or an active state apparatus (see Rostow 
1960, Lemer 1958, Inkeles 1966, Gusfield 1967). 
6 The influential theory of 'colonialism of a special kind' that was adopted by the Communist Party 
(SACP) during Apartheid represents a version of dependency theory: 'From its birth through to the 
present, South African capitalism has depended heavily on the imperialist centres ... It was within a 
colonial setting that the emerging South African capitalist class entrenched and extended the racially 
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Dependency's contemporary relevance lies in the perspective it affords on 
the selective regional and sub-national integration/ marginalisation of Southern Africa 
into the global economy. Political economy approaches can also account for the 
rising inequalities that characterise the economy of South Africa itself, showing them 
to be clear outcomes of neoliberalism's internal systems of capital accumulation 
(Harvey 2005b, 2006). Dispossession or exclusion as the consequences of global 
capitalism in South Africa has produced new political challenges and alliances which 
can be understood from such a perspective. At the same time, the uneven effects of 
globalisation and other projects that attempt to extend elite power cannot be grasped 
in terms of class-based models and theories alone (see in particular Hardt and Negri 
2000, Barchiesi 2006, Hart 2008). Critique of and practical opposition to 
neoliberalism are stronger in South Africa than anywhere else in Africa, but such 
challenges no longer simply come from the traditional left, neither can they be 
understood in terms of class mobilisation alone. 
In the 1970s, the focus and aims of development practice and theory began 
to shift. On the level of policy, the recognition that two decades of top-down 
development economics had failed to contribute to real development demanded a 
rethinking of the notion of development as growth. Decolonisation was reconfiguring 
global relations of power, whilst postcolonial movements in the South and new social 
movements (NSMs) in the North were challenging the political and intellectual status 
quo. In terms of theory, the cultural turn in the social sciences brought about an 
epistemological shift through which knowledge acquisition and transmission were 
radically re-conceptualised. With culture entering development theory in the context 
of postcolonialism, the ethnocentric and culture-specific value premises of 
development research and practice were called into question. Development theory 
became more agency-oriented and spatialised, emphasising local factors and social 
and cultural differentiation (Schuurman 1993). Alternative development advocated 
development 'from below', that is, participatory, pluralistic and starting from Southern 
communities. 
exclusive system to increase its opportunities for profit' (SACP, cited in Bond 2007e: 7). See Wolpe's 
articulation of modes of production argument for a different kind of Marxist analysis (Wolpe 1980, also 
see Hart 2007). 
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Alternative development and early neoliberalism 
These Southern communities were however not to be directly represented, but rather 
to be embodied by grassroots organisations (GROs) or NGOs. NGOs began to be 
seen as a panacea for a more just and participatory way of achieving development. 
The confiation, in development theory and policy of the time, of indigenous 
grassroots movements on one end of the spectrum with the emerging large Southern 
and international NGOs on the other, is itself indicative of the intertwining of the 
official rhetoric of participatory development and what I describe below as the 
neoliberalisation of development. The proliferation of supposedly bottom-up 
approaches to development that led to the channelling of development funds to 
NGOs must be understood in conjunction with particular International Financial 
Institutions' (lFI) aid conditionalities and their anti-statism. As far as IFls were 
concerned, NGOs provided a third sector alternative to what was increasingly 
perceived as 'failed' developmentalist states in the global South. 
The immediate postcolonial period in Southern Africa is in fact characterised 
by a dynamic of increasing external agency involvement and a parallel weakening of 
civil society internally (F. Manji, personal conversation, Sept 06). The emancipatory 
mass movements supporting independence on the African continent had been swept 
up by the postcolonial governments and became, over the next two decades, partly 
attached to the development agenda as embodied by NGOs.7 Moreover, the 
consolidation of neoliberalism in the early 1980s in large parts of the Western world, 
and its effects on the African continent through structural adjustment, contributed to 
the deteriorating of public sector capacity in lower-income countries. 
The set of (locally-specific and heterogeneous) economic and social policies 
that is commonly referred to as neoliberalism was first applied in Chile in the late 
1970s and quickly became dominant in the US, UK, continental Europe and China. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, neoliberal economic policies were coercively introduced 
through aid conditionalities under the IFl's structural adjustment agenda. With 
African countries heavily indebted due to the economic crisis of the 1970s, 
multilateral lending agencies had the leverage they needed to impose neoliberal 
policy demands (Manji and 0 Coill 2002). Structural adjustment programmes 
typically involved cutting public expenditure, deregulating labour markets, trade 
7 The role of NGOs in the post- independent period was marginal, as development agencies regarded 
the state as having the overarching responsibility for this role. This was to change with the spread of 
neoliberalism. 
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liberalisation, privatising of industries and services, conservative fiscal policies and 
increasing export outputs (see Berg 1981 for one of the central texts legitimating 
neoliberal policies in Africa). By the end of the cold war, 42 African states had 
undergone structural adjustment, with devastating results for populations at large, 
but particularly for the poor.8 
As an economic doctrine and political project, neoliberalism worked also by 
discrediting alternatives to the devaluation of the developmental state. In the anti-
statist climate of the 1980s, Southern governments were uniformly portrayed as 
corrupt and ineffective. The rhetoric of the failed African state clearly remains 
pervasive, and is a central tenet of the good governance agenda that has dominated 
international development policy in the last decade. However, weak states are a 
result of the effects of structural adjustment on state capacity. Where public levels of 
service delivery had already been limited by a lack of financial resources, the 
neoliberal mantra - that services are more effective if provided by NGOs or the 
private sector - further shifted resources from state to non-state entities and 
provided a rationale for external service provision and development interventions. 
Contrary to the argument that neoliberalism involves a 'rolling back of the 
state' early neoliberalism entailed a shrinking of social spending, with the state 
becoming more centralised. Power in the transnational domain should not be seen 
as a 'zero-sum game' (Sending and Neumann 2006) where power is transferred 
from the state to non-state actors, as the global governance literature tends to do.9 
Rather than denoting less government, neoliberalism describes 'a new modality of 
government predicated on interventions to create the organisational and subjective 
conditions for entrepreneurship' (Hart 2006: 22) - a 'rolling out' and reconfiguring of 
state formations (Peck and Tickell 2002). This becomes apparent in my empirical 
data, although I contend that two related processes are at work. Particular NGO 
projects seek to produce entrepreneurs (of Soweto teens, for instance), but these 
NGOs are themselves subject to governmental interventions that seek to instil 
entrepreneurial or managerial qualities.10 
8 It goes beyond the scope of this review to discuss the effects of SAPs on the African continent. There 
is ample country-specific literature in economics and sociology; for more general reviews, see Harrison 
(2005); Petras and Veltmeyer (2001). However, even as taken on its own terms, Le. that development is 
about economic growth not equity, there is scarce evidence of structural adjustment 'working'. 
9 Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) and Held (1995) are good examples of this literature. 
10 This argument is broadly in line with a govern mentality understanding, which I discuss properly in the 
last section of this chapter. The work of some of the case study NGOs in terms of creating 
entrepreneurial dispositions is analysed in chapter 6. 
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This transformation under neoliberalism - of policies being used to shape 
individuals into entrepreneurial citizens - is related, on the global level, to changing 
patterns of governance, which I will turn to next. In other words, the understanding of 
neoliberalism advanced here sees it not merely in terms of the restructuring of the 
state, but as a project concerned with reconfiguring the relations between people 
and things, often in terms of responsibilisation and autonomisation. In the broadest 
sense then, neoliberalism is understood as 'a project to expand and universalise 
free-market social relations' (Harrison 2005: 1306), which highlights the integration of 
an economic set of policies into a much broader developmental agenda. In other 
words, neoliberalism encompasses a range of development policies directed at 
shaping the economy, the state and social relations and concerned with the very re-
articulation of the socio-political and economic spheres. As such, it is reflexive, 
locally specific and contingent. In South Africa, a neoliberal ideology is differentially 
articulated by different actors with other political projects, for instance with versions 
of African nationalism or the African Renaissance. 
Moreover, policy discourse has increasingly shifted to the language of the 
developmental state, with the Government making the case for South Africa to 
become a progressive, activist developmental state in order to advance growth and 
pro-poor development. As I will discuss below, this has not been seen as a genuine 
shift by all; Bill Freund for example argues that the developmental state model so far 
is a superficial one in South Africa in which the deep social interventions typical of 
the East Asian tiger states is missing (Freund 2007). 
(Good) governance and reflexive neoliberalism 11 
The above definition echoes theories of neoliberalism as govern mentality, in which 
context it becomes important to underline the distinction between neoliberal and 
advanced liberal, the latter denoting the context within which Anglo-Foucauldians 
such as Nicholas Rose and others (Barry et al. 1996a) have located their analyses. 
Neoliberal rationalities exist in complex interrelations with other multiple rationalities 
11 Semantically, the term 'reflexive neoliberalism' has echoes of both Beck's (1992) reflexive 
modernisation and Dean's reflexive government. As I carry on to argue in the next section, by 
describing neoliberalism as reflexive, I want to firstly highlight the continuities and discontinuities with 
the earlier neoliberal development policies in Africa; and secondly to draw attention to the fact that IFI-
led ideologies and policies have been reformed to govern through inclusion and consensus. Dean's 
(1999) reflexive government goes further in that he describes it as the outcome of the 
governmentalisation of government. 
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of government, and with a plurality of varieties of neoliberalism (Dean 1999). A quick 
typology of theories of neoliberalism may additionally identify theories of 
neoliberalism as hegemony (for instance Peck and Tickell 2002) and as a class 
project (Harvey 2005a). Ward and England (2007a) similarly outline four different 
ways of conceiving of neoliberalism: 
• as ideological hegemonic project (concerned with people and places behind 
its origins) 
• as policy and programme (concerned with agencies, institutions, audiences 
of policies and their logic) 
• as state form (concerned with state formations and reconfigurations) 
• as governmentality (concerned with changing relations to coordinate at a 
distance). 
Whilst the above typologies highlight methodological and ontological 
differences between theories, there is increasingly an engagement between different 
schools. Beyond the broad definition I have given above which does not neatly 
adhere to any of the above schools, it is important for the present context to 
acknowledge that there are many varieties of neoliberalism. Ong writes: 
As an array of techniques centred on the optimization of life, neoliberalism 
migrates from site to site, interacting with various assemblages that cannot 
be analytically reduced to a uniform global condition of "Neoliberalism" writ 
large' (2006: 14). 
It is the work of a number of geographers in particular (Larner 2003, England and 
Ward 2007b, Hart 2002a, Li 2007) that has added to my understanding of the hybrid 
nature of contemporary South African policies and programmes, including but not 
limited to multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal technologies. Moreover, 
locally specific neoliberalisms operate at multiple scales, for instance as a 
supranational project ('neoliberal globalisation'), as well as on the level of the nation-
state and in local, often urban, projects, producing states, spaces and subjects in 
complex ways (Larner 2003). Indeed, as this research aims to show, NGOs 
themselves contribute to new forms of government that produce but sometimes also 
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challenge neoliberal programmes, technologies and values. Below, I first turn to a 
redefinition of neoliberalism in the context of global development policy as 'reflexive'; 
I then discuss the establishment of a 'neoliberalism of a special kind' in South Africa. 
I mentioned above that the notion of good governance, transposed to the 
level of states, reflects the neoliberal vision of making individuals responsible for 
their own development. The good governance agenda emerged in the wake of the 
fracturing of the Washington consensus and was partly caused by a crisis of 
development and the legitimacy of development institutions, and by mass protests 
against SAPs across the African continent. The Asian crisis and the changing 
security concerns of the post 9/11 world further gave rise to calls for consensus-
building and more inclusive, responsive and participatory institutions, replacing the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility with the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility in 1999.12 The 2004 World Bank Development Report (World Bank 2004) 
made that need for consensus for poverty reduction even more explicit by 
recommending neoliberal market integration and commitment to social services and 
empowerment of poor people to become involved. 
The crude policies of structural adjustment were thus slowly being replaced 
by a more inclusive 'Post-Washington' orthodoxy that rejected the development 
blueprints of the 1980s as a 'grand narrative'. The massive protests across Africa in 
reaction to the effects of structural adjustment certainly contributed to the rise of 
good governance as a mainstay of development policy. This promoted NGOs as 
efficient and responsive alternatives to the state, in the process 'rediscovering' civil 
society and hailing it as a benign area through which to improve the democratic 
performance of Southern governments: 
The concept of civil society was being shaped by global ruling class power to 
support anti-statism, and to separate politics from welfare and economics 
(Greenberg and Ndlovu 2004, cited in McKinley Unpublished Book 
Chapter).13 
12 The IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility specifies a collaborative model around IFI -led 
development and attached it to national Poverty Reduction Strategy papers which were to be owned by 
recipient governments. Based on creating economic opportunity through global market integration, they 
seek to enhance economic and social security as well as empowerment through 'innovative govemance 
arrangements for local delivery of health, education and poverty-reducing services' (Craig and Porter 
2006: 4). 
13 Literature specifically addressing African debates on civil society is dealt with in chapter 7. It goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss in detail the broader literature or provide a genealogy of the 
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Mainstream economic thinking now recognised the centrality of institutions in the 
efficient functioning of markets and in ensuring broad-based growth and poverty 
reduction. The state was reconceptualised as an enabler, building and supporting 
institutions. 
The Post Washington Consensus also draws on other 'positive liberal' 
approaches, such as building human capital via services, empowering and protecting 
the rights of the vulnerable through legal access and engendering moral obligations 
to community and work (Craig and Porter 2006). Yet, whilst acknowledging that 
social factors and relations are decisive for development success, a conservative 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy approach has been retained, favouring privatisation 
and free trade (Fine et al. 2001). Capacity building for governance and partnership 
are central to this vision, as they enable multi-stakeholder participation and the 
inclusion of countries and people in global and local markets (see for example 
Commission for Africa 2005).14 The vocabulary of participation and local ownership 
directly mirrors the demands of the good governance agenda, coupling responsibility 
and accountability with institutional reform to provide more equitable development. 
One recent example is provided by the G8's position on Africa: the report Growth 
and Responsibility in Africa (G8 Summit Declaration 2007) frames development in 
terms of partnerships with 'responsible stakeholders in the international system' 
(World Bank 2002, World Bank 2004). 
Recent initiatives to make aid more effective through harmonisation, as 
embodied for instance in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005), 
similarly highlight the role the state has to play in new forms of development 
cooperation. The declaration specifies 12 effectiveness targets as part of the broader 
partnership commitments of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for 
results and mutual accountability. Together, they seek to reduce transaction costs 
arising from reporting and evaluation procedures by using common arrangements, 
term. Key debates in the field can be divided into a 'alternative and a 'libera\' lineage, the former 
covering Marx, Gramsci and Habermas, the latter Tocqueville and Putnam. See Comaroff and Comaroff 
(1999) who provide an excellent overview from Adam Ferguson via Hegel, Marx and Gramsci to the 
dissident struggles in communist Eastern Europe and its usages today. Also see Edwards (2004) and 
Elliott (2003). 
14 The Commission for Africa (CfA) whose report Our Common Interest I have referred to here in itself 
makes an interesting example for the inclusionary character of Post-Washington development I have 
described. The CfA was convened by Tony Blair in the run-up to the Gleneagles Summit and prided 
itself on its far-reaching consultation with African civil society groups and other stakeholders. It included 
17 Commissioners, drawn from international politics, the private and voluntary sectors in Africa. 
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improve the public administration of aid, and employ results-oriented frameworks 
(OECD 2005). As part of a 'new architecture of aid' (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003) 
involving budget support and sector-wide approaches, the rediscovery of the state in 
development displays a trend towards a technocratic view of development aid. This 
architecture relegates the role of civil society, itself a recently revived and reified 
concept, to ensuring that the state is formally accountable and to filling the gaps left 
by state and markets. 
The establishment of Africa's own development framework, the New 
Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), serves as an interesting 
example of the institutional adaptation of African states to produce specific neoliberal 
policy agendas under the banner of good governance and ownership. The text is 
significant because, whilst it does address the 'historical impoverishment' of the 
African continent, it offers no structural critique of its marginalisation in the current 
global order and advocates African integration into the world economy. 
Responsibility for the African economic crisis is attributed squarely to African 
leadership. Although the language of ownership and participation is dominant in the 
text, NEPAD has been criticised heavily by civil society groups for not taking into 
account the concerns of broader interest groups (Coalition of African Civil Society 
Organisations 2002). 
Harrison (2001) has employed the notion of 'post-conditionality' to describe 
these new, less coercive relations between African states and external agencies 
after structural adjustment. Internal and external interests are harder to differentiate; 
intervention is exercised through close involvement with state institutions rather than 
through conditionality alone; funds are used to promote reform programmes. 
'Reflexive neoliberal' projects are then not just pursued by IFls or Western 
governments, but also by a wide range of African elites, including some NGOs. The 
question of elite interests in South Africa's transition to Post-Apartheid neoliberalism 
will be picked up in the next section; suffice to say here that the democratic transition 
hinged not only on political liberation but on economic liberalisation, with the final 
rejection of Apartheid by corporations, capitalists and the business elites tied to the 
latter. Similarly, the adoption of a neoliberal development framework such as NEPAD 
by the new political elites of the country has arguably advanced South Africa's 
position on the continent and beyond. NGOs have potential gains from these and 
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similar developmental arrangements, as my analysis of NGOs' 'expansionism' into 
the Southern African region in chapters 4 and 7 demonstrates. 
2.3. South Africa: from Apartheid to the developmental state, via 
neoliberalism 
The negotiated settlement and GEAR 
South Africa, due to the particularity of the Apartheid economy, is in some ways the 
exception to the familiar story of how neoliberal globalisation came to dominate 
Africa. Yet today, it serves as a 'textbook example of how globalisation plays itself 
out in the semi-industrialised world' (Ballard et al. 2004: 9). This section seeks to 
trace some of the policies and processes that have contributed to this 
transformation. The negotiated settlement was a compromise between old and new 
powers, the latter achieving the political aims of one-person-one-vote in exchange 
for the continuity of an economic system that essentially left capitalist power intact 
and did not address momentous issues determining development and poverty 
reduction such as land reform.15 Indeed, some argue that one of the primary 
objectives of the transition was to bring about a market economy that could be 
inserted into the global system.16 Marais' (2001) pOint of departure is that the 
transition was based on a need to modernise and accumulate capital. 1994 therefore 
marks the 'dissolution of the dominant alliance of social, economic and political 
forces in South Africa' (ibid: 4), which has been followed by the struggle to reshape 
the state and capital relations despite the political ascent to power. 
The adoption in Post-Apartheid South Africa of economic policies broadly in 
line with neoliberalism is often interpreted as a 'radical shift' from the 1994 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment 
and Reconstruction strategy (GEAR) of 1996 (Gumede 2005, Peet 2002). The RDP 
framework, itself drawing on the principles of the 1955 Freedom Charter, still 
15 'What the [new Post-Apartheid] constitution did was to entrench the right to private property' is how 
Cosmas Desmond sums up the class-bias of the new South Africa (cited in Pilger 2006: 271). The 
SACP has consistently argued that whilst the national liberation movement has ascended to state 
power, the economy still remains firmly in the hands of the white, domestic and colonial-type 
bourgeoisie. 
16 Witness the recalling of US capital from the mid-1980s onwards that forced the De Klerk regime to 
follow through with the transformations South African white capitalists had begun to seek through their 
secret negotiations with Tambo and Mbeki in Zambia. 
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features in the ANC policy discourses from time to time; in the Strategy and Tactics 
document preceding the Polokwane Conference it has transformed into the The 
RDP of the Soul' which includes the familiar rhetoric of 'the dictatorship of capital' 
and 'the Western imperialist empire' (African National Congress 2007). Emphasising 
poverty alleviation, basic needs provision, employment creation and human 
resources development, the RDP encouraged grassroots participation in the 
development process and democratisation though the empowerment of historically 
disadvantaged groups previously excluded from participating in decision-making 
processes (Bek et al. 2004, African National Congress 1994). 
Conversely, GEAR has been heavily criticised by the Left as South Africa's 
'homegrown structural adjustment programme' (Desai 2004). Leading to reductions 
of Government spending in education, hospitals and housing and the 
commodification of basic services, it focused on poverty alleviation through 'trickle-
down' which, given the inherited levels of poverty and inequality, was at best a 
contested strategy. But the programme fitted perfectly into the international 
consensus of sound economic policy - trade liberalisation, a shift to investment 
spending, export-oriented manufacturing, wage control and flexibility of the labour 
market in order to foster higher economic growth and investment - as one Financial 
Times writer noted: 'the ANC emerged with as powerful a commitment to budgetary 
discipline and fiscal conservatism as white South Africa could have wished' (cited in 
Williams and Taylor 2000: 34). 
Some disagree with the assessment of a radical shift from RDP to GEAR, 
arguing that the transition was already characterised by domestic and international 
elites pushing for liberalisation. The economically inexperienced ANC leadership was 
continuously exposed to the mantra that there is no alternative to free trade, as 
Patrick Bond describes: 
'Reconnaissance missions' from Washington-based financial institutions were 
[ ... J undermining the integrity of domestic policy formulations and ambitiously 
promoting the interests of international financial and corporate capital (2001: 
vii). 
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The fact that a 1992 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report17 was followed by a 
letter of intent to go alongside a $850 million loan agreement which even the IMF 
thought to be rather conservative, provides an alternative explanation: that the ANC 
leadership was itself actively pursuing economic liberalisation. Contrary to narratives 
focusing on the external imposition of a neoliberal agenda or a co-option of 
leadership, several other elements characterised the transition period: the 
inexperience of the ANC, the conflicts and contradictions inherent in the Tri-Partite 
Alliance, but particularly the convergence of ANC leaders with the business 
community and class interests.18 McKinley's (1997) analysis, for example, focuses 
on the essentially petit-bourgeois nature of ANC leadership, especially the 'exiles', 
that determined the outcome of the economic negotiations.19 He argues that contrary 
to romanticised or deeply politicised narratives, the ANC had never articulated a 
socialist agenda. His account enables an understanding of the formal adoption of 
liberal macroeconomic policies as 'steady maturation of a modernized class project 
of considerate sophistication and likely longevity' (Marais 2001: 4, also see Bond 
2000).20 
Even judged on its own terms, GEAR has not been successful; growth has 
been constant, but not high enough to make a significant impact (Cassim 2006, 
Bhorat and Kanbur 2006).21 But GEAR also marked another break: the RDP had 
been written in consultation with NGOs, social movements and organised labour, 
17 The IMF's occasional paper Economic Policies for a New South Africa had stated, in 1992, that 
redistributive policies were not sufficient to tackle the magnitude of South Africa's economic problems 
and eradicate poverty, instead recommending an economic growth strategy which was to trickle down 
to the poor through employment and an increase in government revenue (Padayachee 1994). 
18 Also see Sinha (2008) on the limits of metaphors of coercion and exiernal imposition in 
understanding power in development. 
19 Also see Gumede (2005) on the different cultures that developed in the ANC during the liberation 
struggle. 
20 In addition to these remarks, a binary understanding of the RDP as a 'socialist programme' and 
GEAR as 'purely neoliberal' needs to be carefully assessed (S. Gelb, Interview, 10 May 07). Gelb 
argues that even in 1996 there were a number of initiatives that were undertaken by the Government 
that were not 'purely neo-liberal' but broadly developmental. This indicates that many universalised 
readings of neoliberalism are not capturing the mix of policy discourses and approaches that 
characterises Post-Apartheid South Africa. Notwithstanding these complexities, it is taken as read here 
that the ANC's economic position is in conflict with the material struggles and freedom's promises. It is 
also important to bear in mind the huge role that the neoliberal discourse played in delegitimising 
alternatives and stifling debate during the transition. 
21 The economic legacy of GEAR and how to interpret more recent economic indicators have been 
subject of considerable debate, which goes beyond the scope of this review. See Bhorat and Cassim 
(2004) for an overview of the literature on growth, employment and poverty in the first Post-Apartheid 
decade. See Seekings (2007) and the special issue of Africanus (2007) for more recent discussions on 
South Africa's political economy, with a particular focus on the developmental state and two economies 
debate. In the latter volume, see Meth (2007) on the large differences in published poverty research 
(and the pro-government bias of some of them). 
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reflecting the ANC's traditional style of policy-formulation. GEAR on the contrary was 
the product of a small group of experts and technocrats, including representatives 
from international institutions, and was never openly debated. Washington elites, and 
later the ANC leadership itself, portrayed key sectors of economic decision making 
such as trade policy or the central bank as 'technical' or 'administrative'. 
The strong opposition to the lack of consultation and content of the GEAR 
framework by the ANC's alliance partners SACP and COSATU indicated a rupture 
inside the Tri-Partite Alliance that has since intensified (also see Andreasson 2006). 
Indeed, GEAR came to symbolise the loss of union power and the marginalisation of 
the traditional Left (Barchiesi 2006). Yet, to date there has been no alignment of 
COSATU with the constituencies involved in various community movements and 
protest actions. Despite their radical rhetoric and Congress resolutions, COSATU 
and the SACP have time and again shunned any meaningful support for, and 
solidarity with, the new movements whilst consistently affirming their loyalty to the 
ANC (McKinley 2007). On a number of occasions COSATU-affiliated trade unions 
have actually united with the Government against striking workers (Desai 2002). 
These events provide an important backdrop to the class relations embedded in 
Post-Apartheid civil society. Arguably, GEAR's other legacy may be the shift to a 
developmental state rhetoric that has emerged in response to the left's critiques of 
the Government's economic course, as I will outline subsequently. 
South Africa's 'two nations' 
The pro-growth strategy that dominated the first decade of Post-Apartheid yielded 
moderate but 'unequalising' growth (Gelb 2006 :1): South Africa is ranked 76 in 
terms of GOP but performs worse in terms of HOI, where it is placed 125 out of 179 
(UNDP 2008). Capital was the primary beneficiary of these increases in productivity 
and profitability. The Government has consistently argued that integration into the 
global economy offers developing countries development and growth opportunities. 
However, when new jobs have been created, it has predominantly been in capital or 
skills intensive sectors, such as mining or the services sectors respectively. Within 
manufacturing, labour-intensive sectors grew far slower than capital-intensive sub-
sectors, which has in part been due to trade liberalisation (Gelb 2007). For instance, 
industries such as clothing, textiles and footwear have been decimated as the 
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domestic market was lost to imports and local industries struggled to find markets 
abroad. Unemployment was at 38.8% in 2008, according to the South African 
Institute for Race Relations survey (SAIRR 2008); StatsSA estimates it at 23.2% in 
the third quarter of 2008.22 There have been clear gains for, and benefits allocated 
to, specific classes - namely the organised working classes, existing and emerging 
middle classes and aspirant African bourgeoisie (Marais 2001). 
Skills shortages and the low levels of education that were inherited from 
Apartheid are important factors impacting on employment growth. Whilst education 
spending per pupil is now equal across races, there is a strong correlation between 
pass rates and pupils' ethnicity; 40% of schools are inadequately supplied with 
classrooms and/ or electricity, while 49% are without textbooks (Gelb 2007). The 
vast inequality between rich and poor is witnessed by South Africa's Gini coefficient 
of 57.8 (down from 0.72 in 2006) (UNDP 2008); meanwhile, South Africa's cities 
remain the most unequal in the world (UN-HABITAT 2008). If the Gini coefficient was 
to be calculated on specific sections, such as amongst the Black population, it would 
be considerably higher.23 It seems difficult to imagine, but as COSATU's Vavi puts it, 
'[m]any of the millions who are unemployed, or whose jobs have been casualised, 
are even worse off than under Apartheid' (also see Bhorat and Kanbur 2006, 
Seekings 2007, Meth 2007).24 
As elsewhere in the world, the neoliberal restructuring of the economy has led 
to a commodification of basic services. Budget cuts in education, health and housing 
led the state to devolve responsibility for service delivery to local government which 
in turn adopted a cost-recovery model for water, electricity and other services. As 
Ballard et al. observe, 'these forces amount to a "pincer movement" on the poor, with 
the state insisting that people pay for their services, housing and land while 
simultaneously eroding livelihoods' (Ballard et al. 2004: 14).25 Government has not 
introduced a comprehensive safety net for the poor, although social grants provided 
22 The great disparity between the two figures is a reflection of the fact that poverty and unemployment 
statistics in South Africa are calculated in inconsistent ways and their reporting is sometimes skewed 
(see Meth 2007). Moreover, official Government figures use a measure that only includes those 
unemployed that are actively seeking work. 
23 Small sections of workers have done well in Post-Apartheid, for instance skilled black personnel, 
especially given the corporate obligation to meet BEE targets. These have created a black elite, a 
category often referred to by South African sociologists as 'black diamonds'. The gap between these 
and the 20 to 25 million poor blacks is vast (Butler 2007). It goes beyond the scope of my thesis to 
discuss Black Economic Empowerment. See Mangcu et al. (2007) and Andreasson (2006). 
24 27 October 2007 Vavi: Unemployed were better off under apartheid. Mail & Guardian. 
25 I discuss the commodification of basic services and the community struggles it has given rise to in 
more detail in chapter 7. 
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to special groups have been massively expanded in the last decade. A basic income 
grant (BIG) has been discussed but was never adopted. One economist contends 
that if Government 'were to announce it will spend R100 billion on the poor, 
international credit bureaus would downgrade South Africa's ranking for adopting 
populist policies' (Sampie Terreblanche, cited in Butler 2007). Gillian Hart advances 
another argument: The reason why the ANC Government rejects the BIG [ ... ] is 
precisely because it is a universal grant - and therefore lacks points of leverage for 
instilling in its recipients the 'correct' attitudes and aspirations' (2007: 54). 
In recent years, there has been a shift in policy discourse to a developmental 
state rhetoric. In his 2005 State of the Nation address, Mbeki made the case for 
South Africa to become a progressive, activist developmental state, in order to 
overcome the country's massive socio-economic challenges. This shift certainly 
mirrors the changing global development policy environment I outlined earlier, giving 
the state a more interventionist role. Yet, probably more significant were the internal 
pressures from within the Tri-Partite Alliance and the continuous protests and 
struggles country-wide over the failures of GEAR. The policy vehicle for the 
proposed developmental state framework is AsgiSA (Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa). AsgiSA aims to raise economic growth to 6% and 
to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014 through 'interventions to accelerate 
growth in a shared manner [that] surgically target weaknesses unique to South 
Africa's economy and government' (Mbeki 2003).26 
Acknowledging that there really exists a disjuncture between the Government's 
growth strategy and its nation-building and poverty reduction objectives, Mbeki 
stated that bold steps were required to 'end the "two nations" divide': 
The successes we have scored with regard to the 'first world economy' also 
gives us the possibility to attend to the problems posed by the third world 
26 The initiative proposes: 
- A massive investment in infrastructure 
- Targeting economic sectors with good growth potential 
- Developing the skills of South Africans, and harnessing the skills already there 
- Building up small businesses to bridge the gap between the formal and informal economies 
- Beefing up public administration 
- Creating a macroeconomic environment more conducive to economic growth (The Presidency 2006). 
The phrase 'surgically target' itself is an interesting choice of words, since it conveys a sense of 
technical and seemingly politically neutral solutions to socio-economic issues. 
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economy, which exist side by side with the modern 'first world economy' (2003: 
para. 16). 
The two economies thesis is central to the Government's poverty reduction 
discourse, claiming that first and second economy are 'structurally disconnected' and 
growing further apart. Whereas the former is 'modern' and 'becom[ing] ever more 
integrated in the global economy', the latter is 'poor and underdeveloped', populated 
by the unemployed, unskilled, and 'unemployable'. Isobel Frye writes: 
This 'first' economy is set to realise the 'rainbow' nation's goal of true racial and 
economic integration, as any advertising billboard will show you, with be-suited 
young men and women of all hues seated behind one boardroom table. The 
'second economy' does not feature much on billboards, but is present in most 
government papers and speeches, generally in a short paragraph towards the 
end entitled 'Second Economy Interventions' representing in effect, the surplus 
people, the lump en proletariat (2007: 159).27 
Some have accused the Government of harbouring a technicist understanding 
of the developmental state or maintained that AsgiSA alone is an insufficient pro-
poor growth strategy (Seekings 2007, Bhorat 2006). Others argue that the 
developmental state model has only been employed superficially and has not 
included the deep social interventions that made the East Asian miracle possible 
(Freund 2007). This is echoed by Stephen Gelb, commenting here on the ANC's 
policy proposals ahead of the 2007 National Conference: 
I think that basically all the rhetoric around the developmental state is a signal 
that Government wants the state to playa much bigger role in various ways. 
The state-owned enterprises, in particular this infrastructure spending 
approach. That was not a centrepiece of policy in the past. On the other hand I 
don't think there's much agreement, or understanding, of what the 
developmental state is, or how it can be constructed in South Africa (S. Gelb, 
EDGE Institute, Interview, 10 May 07). 
Rather, from within the official first! second economy discourse, state 
intervention in the second economy becomes imperative, whereas the first economy 
27 Italics in the original. 
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presumably is best left to regulate itself. Concepts such as the two economies must 
be analysed in terms of what kinds of citizens or subjects they create, and to what 
ends and in what ways they are being employed (Hart 2007). The recent shift to a 
developmental state discourse is, as posited above, at least partly a strategy to 
contain the challenges from oppositional movements and community organisations. 
The concept of the second economy involves the identification, targeting and treating 
of a backward, 'Third World' element of society as a subject for intervention. It 
enforces the drawing of 'uncivilised' communities into social security nets. At the 
same time, these strategies of containment have been accompanied by the 
marginalisation of protesters and those sympathetic to them as the 'ultra-left'. I 
discuss such processes of in- and exclusion in chapter 7. 
Significantly, the discursive division of South Africa leaves intact the neoliberal 
premise that global integration will lead to development, whilst accounting for those it 
marginalises by relegating them to a separate space or 'nation'. By maintaining that 
first and second economies are disconnected, this model ignores the link between 
growth and inequality and justifies the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
infrastructure spending is aimed at reducing 'the cost of doing business' in the first 
economy, rather than extending infrastructure services to those in the second 
economy (Gelb 2007). The concept of the second economy then presents one way 
of dealing with the broken promises of the liberation struggle. 
2.4. NGOs in development 
Definition of NGO for the research context 
The term NGO itself is deeply contested - even, as some commentators have 
asserted, practically meaningless (Edwards et al. 2000, Hilhorst 2003). I have 
adopted Salamon and Anheier's (1997) definition which characterises NGOs as 
organised and possessing some institutional reality, private, institutionally separate 
from government, non-profit, self-governing and involving a degree of voluntary 
participation. I distinguish NGOs from membership organisations such as grassroots-
or community-based organisations which are formally accountable to their members 
(see Robinson 1997, Edwards and Hulme 1997 for similar definitions). Whilst CBOs 
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which numerically dominate civil society in South Africa are concentrated in areas of 
service delivery at a local level, more formalised NGOs are structurally equipped to 
benefit from funding and are involved in intermediary activities. 
In South Africa, what I conceive of as NGOs are mostly registered Section 21 
organisations, which identifies them as having a higher degree of formalisation due 
to more complex procedures of registration, auditing and reporting. All of the NGOs 
whose staff participated in this research were registered Section 21 organisations. 
The above evaluation criteria are also used by one of the largest studies of the South 
Africa non-profit sector to date (School for Public and Development Management 
2002), which estimates the number of non-profit organisations in South Africa at 
100,000. The figure included CBOs, social movements and trade unions, with 53% 
classified as less formalised NPOs. In terms of formalised organisations, the Prodder 
directory of NGOs and development organisations lists 4,000 entries in 2008. 
Mathoho (2006) classifies established CSOs in terms of four categories of activity: 
political and democracy-enhancing, economic and developmental related; health, 
welfare and social justice; education and training, or human resource development. 
The above-mentioned Wits study further distinguishes between the not 
necessarily exclusive domains of development NPOs, survivalist NPOs and 
oppositional NPOs, the term NPO here arguably reflecting the shift in South Africa 
towards a depoliticised language that transcends the NGO-CBO divide and 
delineates the sector from the private sector (School for Public and Development 
Management 2002). If one is to adopt this later definition, almost all of the case 
NGOs28 can be described as oppositional and developmental, in that they are 
involved in lobbying and advocacy as much as in the direct improvement of social, 
cultural or economic well-being - although they may not think of their own roles in 
this way. 
NGOs in South Africa: historical reflections 
In Africa, NGOs often came out of the independence movements and were 
concerned with overthrowing the remnants of colonialism, with new, technocratic 
28 I use the phrase 'case NGO' throughout this thesis to refer to the NGOs whose staff were interviewed 
or observed for this research. 
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NGOs emerging since the 1980s.29 Mawdsley, Townsend et al. define these as 
'acquiescent NGOs' which are not driven by specific ideological commitments, but 
set up in response to the massive increase in funding opportunities in the 80s and 
90s: 'they acquiesce to working only or mainly as their paymasters rather than their 
clients demand' (2002: 5). With closer ties to governments and resembling less the 
historical grass-roots movements, they frequently mirror the form and practices of 
the international NGDOs (Fowler 2000b). Feldman (1997) is concerned that many of 
these new NGOs primarily serve the interests of non-state actors aiming to 
commodify and individuate social relations under conditions of economic insecurity, 
rather than providing arenas for mobilising democratic movement from below. The 
growth of indigenous NGOs has been less pronounced in Southern Africa, where 
civil society has historically been relatively weak. Michael (2004) attributes this to the 
fact that postcolonial African socialism reduced the space available to civil society 
groups. Moreover, formalised NGOs need specific material and organisational 
resources which are scarcer in Southern Africa. 
South African forms of state and civil society organisation constitute a unique 
case, with the intensity and length of colonial and settler involvement leading to the 
development of 'a thick network of state structures' (Greenstein 2003 :12). The later 
Apartheid state tended to work in mutually beneficially relationships with white civic 
organisations involved in service delivery, whereas progressive organisations 
provided a shadow welfare system to the majority of the population neglected by the 
policy of separate development. It was ironically the refusal of the Apartheid state to 
deliver services to black South Africans that gave rise to a powerful and highly 
organised Anti-Apartheid civil society that to a large extent enabled the final demise 
of the system (Mathoho 2006). 
However, besides the objectives of a non-racial democracy, the values of the 
various parts of the Anti-Apartheid movement were not clearly defined. In fact, 
relationships within civil society had always been diverse and frequently confiictual, 
such as between ANC-affiliated movements and other actors in the mass movement. 
The internal tensions in the movement against Apartheid were at best temporarily 
cast aside, rather than resolved. Some argue that the bourgeois middle-class identity 
of the ANC had always been in necessary tension with the socialist objectives of the 
labour movement (McKinley 1997). Moreover, in the Apartheid era, it was not just the 
29 See Fowler (2000b) for a history of Southern NGOs in the postcolonial era. 
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Apartheid state that suppressed dissent: it also existed within the Anti-Apartheid 
movement where resistance became increasingly violent and disorganised. These 
historical complexities have left a legacy and provide a lens through which 
contemporary struggles within civil society can be understood, as I will argue in 
chapter 4. The cracks in the relations between the Tri-Partite Alliance partners ANC, 
COSATU and SACP that began to show with the secretive adoption of GEAR has 
further intensified to the extent that the SACP announced in 2007 that it considered 
campaigning separately in the next elections. However, relations between the 
alliance partners and with other actors in the public sphere respectively are complex, 
fluid and highly political. 
The negotiated settlement had an enormous impact on state-civil society 
interactions: Apartheid service organisations had positioned themselves outside of 
the state, whereas NGOs were shifting from 'an "oppositional" mode to a 
"developmental" mode' (Walters 1993, cited in Pieterse 1997: 158), with increasing 
numbers involved in policy development, training, networking and implementation.3o 
In the RDP, the state committed itself formally to fostering institutions of participatory 
democracy and the Government was quick to set up national structures to give 
institutional form to these commitments. For instance, the National Economic, 
Development & Labour Council (NEDLAC) was formed, in which civil society was 
represented by a development chamber that consisted of chosen NGOs or CBOs. 
The Non-Profit Act of 1997 defined the role of NPOs as involved in governance and 
delivery, the Directorate of Non-Profit Organisations required CSOs to officially 
register with the state, and the National Development Agency was formed. By 
assigning to NGOs a role in line with official Government programmes that did not 
give space to contest the fundamentals of such programmes, this institutionalisation 
led to a 'sanitising of civil society', as McKinley (Unpublished Book Chapter) argues. 
With the discourse of reconciliation fostering consent and initially limiting 
resistance, the 1990s were thus marked by a demobilisation of popular organisations 
- a 'wilting of civil society' that can be seen as typical for societies that undergo 
democratic transitions (Marais 2001). As Chapter 4 shows through empirical data 
gleaned from interviews with NGO leaders, this period can be characterised by a 
30 Note the shift of terminology from 'service organisations' to 'NGOs' here, which mirrors global 
development concepts such as 'governance' and 'civil society' entering the policy lexicon through an 
influx of Western experts and development knowledge. It was the civil society! democratisation 
discourse that also, as Pieterse (1997) pervasively argues, served to mediate the potential conflicts 
arising from the proximity of the relationship between NGOs and the ANC. 
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continuous depletion of organisational capacity at the grassroots, as former activists 
and civic leaders began to be integrated in the state bureaucracy or in some cases 
into the business sector. Indeed, the ANC absorbed - and in some cases dismantled 
- some of the women's and youth movements that had emerged organically during 
the 1980s into the ANC structures or into the newly-established South African 
National Civics Organisation (SAN CO) during the transition period, although this 
process was largely accepted consensually. The staff of these civics was usually 
part of the UDF and therefore committed to an ANC-Ieadership, but the 
strengthening of the ANC was also reinforced by the priorities of international donor 
governments and agencies, which saw the party as a stabilising and economically 
relatively orthodox power. As Marais (2001) has argued, the ANC has been highly 
successful at a key aspect of any hegemonic project: it managed to deploy 
ideological symbolism and render it relevant to the lived realities of many South 
Africans. 
These processes led to a lack of political direction, mission and leadership in 
the non-profit sector. After 1994, many of the radical NGOs disappeared due to the 
funding crisis - again, this will be discussed in reference to empirical data in chapter 
4 - whereas those that survived re-oriented themselves towards the new 
Government or international donors. NGOs and state institutions were now seen as 
partners in a national project, contributing to state building (Fakir 2006). This led to 
increasing dependence on international development funding and its associated 
knowledge regimes, and crucially to co-dependent relationships with the ANC. It was 
the (largely transnational) civil society/ democratisation discourse that also, as 
Pieterse (1997) argues pervasively, served to mediate the potential conflicts arising 
from the closeness of the relationship between NGOs and the ANC, particularly in 
view of the latter's hegemony. 
NGOs gained power in relation to the communities they were meant to serve 
and increasingly grew distant from their constituencies and community-based 
partners. These processes left a vast gap in terms of social movements, community-
based organisations and more progressive NGOs which only closed at the end of the 
1990s. However, this background has shaped the relationships between NGOs and 
the state, and those between NGOs and social movements (see my discussion in 
chapters 5 and 7, respectively). It has also constituted as dividing line in South 
African civil society the issue of whether an organisation is pro-government or anti-
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government. The increasing alignment of the ruling party with various elites, but also 
their historical relationships with the NGO sector, have formed the complex context 
in which the NGOs in this research must operate. It is the conceptualisation of their 
relationships to the state and ruling party that I turn to next. 
NGOs and the state 
Much of the literature on Post-Apartheid NGOs is therefore framed in terms of their 
relations to the state (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2004, Mathoto 2006, 
Fakir 2006, Habib 2003, Ranchod 2007). Some of these demonstrate South Africa's 
case study potential to investigate the significance and challenges of NGOs in newly 
democratising societies and trace how state-NGO relations change in transitions 
from authoritarian to democratic regimes (Bond 2000, Habib and Taylor 1999, 
Pieterse 1997, Seekings 2000). According to one study (Husy 2002, cited in 
Greenstein 2003), NGOs saw their main advantages vis-a-vis Government as 
possessing greater ability to coordinate relations with communities and CBOs, a 
focus on empowerment to enhance community ownership of projects, better 
response time to development needs, less bureaucratic procedures and the ability to 
offer cheaper and more cost-effective services. These 'comparative advantages' 
(Beloe 2003) mirror those in the literature on NGOs and development elsewhere. 
NGOs are perceived as more innovative than governments and less restricted by 
bureaucratic structures.31 Edwards, Hulme et al. (2000) for instance argue that the 
lasting relevance of NGOs is the capacity to innovate on all levels, that is in terms of 
theory, policy and practice; their innovative potential is considered important in the 
areas of alternative development strategies (e.g. microfinance, participation), 
methods (e.g. Participatory Rural Appraisal) and awareness raising (e.g. regarding 
gender inequalities). 
Flexibility and efficiency are seen as key benefits, as the following 
assessment indicates: 
31 The argument of 'less bureaucracy' is hard to sustain in the face of increasing institutionalisation of 
the NGOs, as I explore in chapter 6. The framing of NGOs' significance and roles in terms of 
comparative advantages, such as in Seloe (2003), is itself indicative of the ubiquity of corporate 
management terminology in some of the literature concerned with NGO organisation. 
55 
[NGOs are] able to respond quickly on a small scale, partly because they are 
not hampered by bureaucratic structures, and partly because they are often 
close to their constituencies and in a better position to understand the 
influences on a local level (Dejong 2003: 7). 
A number of studies identify the paradox of Post-Apartheid NGOs' 'twin roles' 
(School for Public and Development Management 2002) of service deliverer and 
critical watchdog, with a chasm sometimes identified between the two. The funding 
crisis, professionalisation and commercialisation have forced NGOs to tender for 
government and donor money, blurring the distinction between for-profit and non-
profit agencies: 
Anti-Apartheid NGOs were seen clearly as agents of change. Today, formerly 
progressive NGOs face the danger of being seen as agents of control, of 
being co-opted to neoliberal agendas, becoming the "community face" of 
neoliberalism (Habib and Taylor 1999: 80).32 
The growing convergence between voluntary and private sector organisations is also 
evident in phenomena such as ethical corporatism, Corporate Social Investment 
(CSI) and public-private partnerships - all of which are commonplace in South 
Africa's development sector. 
The dichotomous reading of the literature on NGOs' relations to the state 
(whether as antagonistic or engaged) constitutes an oversimplification of the 
complex relationships and frequent collaboration between the two actors.33 It is 
however consistent with a (neo)liberal discourse that sets NGOs up against a straw 
man state in order to then highlight its comparative advantages. South African NGOs 
in particular are bound up with the state in a number of ways, for instance through 
partnerships, tendering for Government money and, ideologically, through a shared 
history of the struggle. This is further complicated by the fact that in a 
'developmental' middle-income economy like South Africa, the state itself is the 
32 These processes and their impact on the NGO sector are discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, 
including an assessment of their positioning between service deliverer and watchdog in chapter 5. 
33 Chapter 5 discusses the case NGOs' relationships to the Government, but treats them as one 
amongst a number of relationships that impact on NGOs' positioning in civil society. The notion of civil 
society and the state as diametrically opposed is rejected in this research, as I indicated in the 
introduction. 
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biggest donor and commissions NGOs as providers of services. Some informants 
estimated that 50% of all services are outsourced to NGOs and other private entities 
(D. Marshall-Smith, Starfish, Interview, 23 Mar 07). 
Critiques: procedural, structural, ethical 
NGOs have increasingly come under attack by everyone from World Bank officials 
and the business sector to academics and grassroots activists, albeit for different 
reasons. Firstly, some criticisms address procedural limitations whilst being positive 
about NGO impact. These betray a tendency to focus on NGOs' roles in relation to 
their intended effects, such as their track record as service providers or partners (cf. 
Bryant, 2002) - perhaps owing to the fact they are often written by development 
practioners in the field. The constraints of funding arrangements and a lack of co-
ordination and communication can lead to duplication of programmes which in turn 
results in poor service delivery for other communities. Short-termism is an issue 
which is also related to NGOs' dependency on donor funding: the lack of 
sustainability in the NGO sector means that programmes do not always have 
continuity and indeed that they may be diverted from their particular strengths 
towards areas of increased funding (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2004, 
School for Public and Development Management 2002). 
Secondly, there is a set of radical or structuralist critiques of NGOs. These 
often revolve around NGOs' positioning as agents of neoliberal development (in the 
case of South African NGOs) or of imperialism (in the case of INGOs).34 The 
following is a fairly typical assessment: 
[NGOsj have taken the 'missionary position' - service delivery, running 
projects that are motivated by charity, pity and doing things for people 
(implicitly who can't do it for themselves). albeit with the verbiage of 
participatory approaches (Manji and 0 Coill 2002). 
Kamal's (2002) ethnography of an Indian grassroots organisation concludes that 
NGOs are organically connected with capitalist social relations therefore making 
34 Similar critiques have been advanced by scholars studying 'civil society' in various geographic 
contexts, often with reference to the NGO-isation of social movements (see for instance Lang 2000, 
Smith 2007). I will further discuss this literature in chapter 7. 
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them incapable of challenging the authority of the state and transforming unequal 
social relations (also see Petras and Veltmeyer 2001, Kamat 2003). Whilst my 
objective in this literature review is also to tease out the connections between 
particular forms of governance and 'their' preferred development agents by focusing 
on neoliberalism and the rise of NGOs, it is vital that Post-Apartheid NGOs be 
analysed from the specific perspective of South African development and the various 
global spaces and practices that domain connects to. 
A third set of critiques deals with the ethics of NGO practice. The three 
interconnected aspects of representativeness, independence and accountability 
have been given particular attention under the rubric of NGOs' crisis of legitimacy 
(Lister 2003, Webb 2004, Jordan and Van Tuijl 2006, Ebrahim and Weisband 2007). 
Turning to representation first, critics have pointed out that NGOs frequently do not 
reach the poor, and certainly hardly ever the poorest of the poor (Streeten, 1997; 
Kamat, 2002). NGOs are also likely to operate where there is a constituency willing 
to take advantage of new resources provided by the NGO, which tends to exclude 
the most disadvantaged (Feldman 1997). Crucially, if an NGO loses legitimacy in the 
community, it may still not lose donor support, as evaluations rarely consider long-
term trends. Also, NGOs can be elitist, exclusionary or serving only particular 
interests, for instance by having a faith base or a base in trade unionism (Streeten 
1997). These are significant arguments given the conflation of NGOs and civil 
society in donor funding practice: the strengthening of NGOs can then be seen as 
precisely weakening civil society and democracy.35 
The fact that NGOs are dependent on external funding, be it from members 
of particular communities, government or multilateral donors, has been discussed 
extensively in the literature, and the question of their autonomy has increasingly 
. entered the public domain (Howell and Pearce 2003, Martens 2005, Lister 2000, 
Brehm et al. 2004, Michael 2004, Hearn 2000). Issues around funding and 
relationships of the case NGOs to international donors, government and private 
sponsors are explored throughout this thesis, with chapter 5 addressing funding 
dynamics through the lens of partnerships. Concerns about independence and 
accountability, coupled with a decline of donor funding, have forced NGOs 
35 The relationship between development and faith-based development agencies is particularly 
complex: due to the importance of religion in many Majority World countries, faith-based NGOs can 
have a potentially huge impact on development, whilst there is an uneasy historical connection between 
the two. 
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everywhere to address their sustainability prospects (Beloe 2003, Hira and Parfitt 
2004, Fowler 2000c); South African NGOs are no exception as I contend in 
subsequent chapters. Fowler's (2000c) framework has been useful for my analysis of 
case NGOs' sustainability strategies, addressing three aspects of sustainability: 
development impact and enduring change; resource mobilisation, both human and 
financial; and the adaptive viability of organisations. 
Accountability as a technology of power 
Accountability has emerged as a set of practices dealing with these concerns of 
independence, representativeness and legitimacy in the non-profit sector. Hulme and 
Edwards define accountability as 'the means by which individuals and organizations 
report to a recognised authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their 
actions' (cited in Roberts et al. 2005: 1850). They and others refer to accountability 
in its older meanings either as a moral concept or financial practice. For instance, a 
distinction is made between upward and downward NGO accountability, the former 
being directed towards donors or networks, the latter internal to projects. Although 
upwards accountability is required by donors, this is not necessarily the case with 
downward accountability (to eBOs or directly to beneficiaries), raising issues of 
in (equality) in development partnerships. Literature on North-South NGO 
partnerships has highlighted that inequality in terms of accountability mirrors 
inequality of resources and a lack of transparency (Brehm et al. 2004, Mawdsley et 
al. 2002). 
However, as for instance Power (1997) and Strathern (2000) have shown, 
accountability has come to carry a whole range of practices, procedures and values. 
'Rituals of verification' (Power 1997) such as auditing are global phenomena, 
affecting diverse domains and institutions. One way of theoretically grappling with 
the issue of accountability is through an understanding of its associated practices as 
technologies of power. From this perspective, ever-more sophisticated forms of 
auditing, monitoring and evaluation form part of a paradigm of knowledge which, 
concerned with quality control, good practice and economic efficiency, is specific to a 
neoliberal form of government. These new forms of accountability contribute to a re-
organising of public institutions and not-for-profit organisations according to a 
financial rationality, thus constructing calculable spaces and making them 
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governable through experts and expertise (Miller 1994, Rose 1999). As Rose writes, 
'[o]rganizations had to be rendered accountable, and the terms of that accountability 
were not professional but those of accounting' (1999: 152). What were previously 
extra-economic domains are now made to be economic and 'colonised by criteria of 
economy efficiency' (Lemke 2001: 202). 
As a dominant norm in international development, accountability gives rise to 
specific audit practices such as Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and specific 
assessment tools such as Logical Framework Analysis (also see appendix 5). 
Systems of reporting, monitoring and organisational learning play central roles in 
shaping what NGOs do, how they talk about what they do and how they conceive of 
future projects. Ebrahim (2003) argues that information flows and systems are 
therefore one of the mechanisms by which funders shape NGO behaviour. Roberts 
et al. (2005) illustrate how 'buzzwords' like transparency, accountability, 
participation, efficiency and practices like strategic planning, evaluation and 
organisational self-assessment are specifically Western modes of managerialism 
that have transformed the day-to-day practices of NGOs in the South since, in order 
to be eligible for funds, NGOs must increasingly demonstrate that they understand 
and apply managerial and evaluation practices. 
Accountability links the discourse and practices of good governance on a 
global level with those of NGO governance; both are arguably concerned with 
efficiency and good practice rather than democratisation or transparency. Adherence 
to these accountability practices has the effect of inclusion. For instance, 
development partnerships encompass multiple levels of accountability that operate 
as channels for the circulation of particular managerial practices and neoliberal 
values. Accountability practices such as M&E run through multisectoral networks, 
connecting eBOs, NGOs, public sector, donors and INGOs (Roberts et al. 2005). As 
I put forward in chapter 6, accountability understood from the perspective of its 
associated knowledge practices and technologies transforms NGOs on the level of 
data, staffing and developmental objectives. These technologies favour highly 
formalised sections of civil society and marginalise others. However, contrary to the 
assumption of certain strands of governmentality studies, I contend that such 
technologies are also actively shaped through NGO practice, adaptation and 
resistance, rather than NGOs passively being at the receiving end. 
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2.5. Theorising NGOs and power in Post-Apartheid development 
Governmentality studies and neoliberalism 
Some of my arguments in the previous sections have drawn on governmentality 
studies as a broader theoretical framework, and it is this body of literature and its 
applicability to the present research questions that I discuss in this section. 
Governmentality approaches focus on how governmental power in modern societies 
operates in a de-centralised fashion, through a multiplicity of sites and authorities. 
They acknowledge that development usually operates through a productive power 
that wins legitimacy and empowers actions whilst putting into place regimes of truth. 
Such regimes structure the possible field of action, with individuals constituting 
themselves in terms of norms through which they are governed. It is the work of a 
set of Anglo-Foucauldians that is probably best known for their development of the 
governmentality framework (Rose 1999, Barry et al. 1996b, Burchell 1993, Miller and 
Rose 1990). I will only briefly address this body of literature, as there are a number 
of writers whose work - in specifically addressing questions of development and 
seeking to move beyond the framework established by the former - is more 
significant to the present analysis (Li 2007, Watts 2003, Hart 2008, Corbridge et al. 
2005, Gould 2005b). Others have sought to overcome govern mentality studies' focus 
on the Western liberal state (see the volumes edited by Larner and Walters 2004, 
Mosse and Lewis 2005) and trace what is perceived as an emerging system of 
transnational govern mentality composed of state and non-state actors in African 
countries and elsewhere (Ferguson and Gupta 2005, Ferguson 2006a).36 
The British school addresses neoliberalism in the setting of Western 
advanced liberalism, i.e. as a property of late capitalism. This has prompted critics to 
doubt its applicability to the study of development in Africa.37 Having already set out 
the important distinction between advanced liberal and neoliberal above, I do not see 
this criticism as valid for the present research for two reasons. Firstly, the framework 
within which much development funding, language and practices takes place is 
36 There has also emerged in recent years an interest in 'spatial governmentality', concerned with the 
study of spatial politics and the production of governable spaces. See Appadurai (2002), Chatterjee 
F004) and Roy (2009). 
7 See for instance Gould (2005b) who points out that most African scholars would not characterise 
African societies as late capitalist. An analytics of governmentality is moreover predicated on the 
identification of governmental practices which create compliant subjectivities, something he argues the 
state or any other public actor in Africa simply does not have the authority to do so. As I will put forward 
below, I do not agree with this and other similar critiques. Indeed, several works look at social 
programmes in South Africa as disciplinary techniques (see Ruitgers 2007, Hart 2007 for examples). 
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transnational. Secondly, South Africa presents a special case in Africa where a 
strong state co-exists with relatively powerful transnational non-state actors in the 
development domain to form an assemblage of governance, a situation of 
'overlapping sovereignties' (Ong 2006: 7). Like the Asian states Ong describes, 
South Africa is characterised by neoliberal strategies that interact and compete with 
other forms of state-led and community-centred development. Correspondingly, I 
believe that the Government's rhetoric makes use of a mixture of often contradictory 
approaches that encompass neoliberal, Africanist, social democratic and 'new South 
African' discourses (Bond 2001, Greenstein 2003). In short, neoliberal ideology, 
whilst having a discernible intellectual genesis as I have described it earlier, is 
differentially articulated with various other political projects and takes multiple forms 
(Larner 2003). However, as I will outline below, I agree that a governmentality 
framework alone is insufficient in grappling with the complex configurations of power 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Foucault understood government as the 'conduct of conduct', that is to say as 
'systematic ways of thinking and acting that aim to shape, regulate, or manage the 
comportment of others' (Inda 2005: 1, Foucault 1991 a). He highlights the correlation 
between the rise of the self-regulating subject of liberalism and the increasing 
penetration of the mechanisms of power and governance into both the social and 
individual body. In this analysis of power, the state is but one element 'in multiple 
circuits of power, connecting a diversity of authorities and forces, within a wide 
variety of complex assemblages' (Rose 1999: 5). Social programmes relating to the 
security, health or economic development of populations can be mobilised to shape 
the desires, aspirations and interests of individual subjects, so that they themselves 
contribute to achieving the desired social order. Government therefore works both on 
and through the agency and subjectivity of the individual (Burchell 1993). This 
practice of responsibilisation - of making individuals or communities responsible for 
their own change - links processes of subjectification with wider programmes. 
Responsibilisation enables the monitoring and surveillance of conduct, making vital 
the role of what are seemingly non-political technologies and expertise. M&E, and 
the expertise, technologies and languages it gives rise to, are analysed as an 
example of this in chapter 6. As was discussed in relation to accountability above, 
techniques of calculation are central to government rationality and have a role in 
subjectification: 'they turn the individual into a calculating self endowed with a range 
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of ways of thinking about, calculating about, predicting and judging their own 
activities and those of others' (Rose 1999: 214). 
Foucault's work has also influenced a group of theorists who, sometimes 
grouped under the label of post-development, have questioned the legitimacy of the 
'developmental professional gaze' and have tried to push Foucauldian notions of 
governance beyond the nation state (Sachs 1992, Esteva 1992, Escobar 1995, 
Munck 1999, Latouche 2004, Rahnema and Bawtree 1997, Rist 1997). These critics 
employ the Foucauldian concepts of power/knowledge and discourse analytics to 
deconstruct development as a system of knowledge. Escobar (1995) emphasises 
the historically constituted character of development and its embedded power 
relations, showing how expert knowledge about the Third World shapes the practices 
of development actors and consolidates a (Northern) consensus about (Southern) 
poverty and underdevelopment. Representations are 'places of encounter where 
identities are constructed and also where violence is originated, symbolized, and 
managed' (ibid: 10). 
This theoretical body is relevant to a critique of the paternalism of North-
South relations, shedding light on the bias towards Africa's failure to develop or, in 
the present context, her failure to count, manage and audit.38 This, and the portrayal 
of African states and societies as failed, rogue, deficient or criminal, thus legitimates 
development interventions. Post-development here provides an important 
perspective on the way knowledge is produced and circulated in the international 
NGO community, and more broadly on how Southern Africa has historically been 
produced by discourses and practices of development. More specifically, it offers a 
lens through which to analyse the impact of NGO essentialism and reductionism in 
their relations to other sectors of civil society that I address in chapter 7. 
Aside from these insights, post-development's understanding of civil society 
seems to me to be consistent with (neo)liberal conceptions of development, for 
instance in attributing a necessary negative role to the state in development by 
setting up a dichotomy with civil society, in which the latter tends to appear as more 
benign. It also takes for granted what I call the 'indigenisation argument', in which 
Majority World NGOs are equated with work that is inherently more participatory, 
appropriate and pro-poor. Undoubtedly, indigenous organisations are (often) better 
placed to effect more appropriate and participatory development, but a romanticised 
38 See chapter 6 for a critique of a Western paternalism towards 'indigenous' monitoring and evaluation. 
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notion of Majority World NGOs as a priori delivering these type of democratic, 
emancipatory and bottom-up activities turns a blind eye to the potential shortcomings 
of large-scale 'indigenous' projects such as the emerging public-private-voluntary 
partnerships.39 
Governmentality in development studies 
Turning now to the development domain, the governmentality framework has been 
employed to analyse how development relations provide a context for disciplinary 
practices, aimed at regulating social life by producing citizens, rather than to repress 
or exert overt control. Thus for instance capacity building initiatives, as they are 
regularly sponsored by donors and implemented by NGOs in South Africa, are also 
political interventions that are designed to produce modern economic subjects. 
Kamat (2003) for instance argues that microcredit programmes are well suited to the 
neoliberal economic context, as risks are shifted to the individual entrepreneur -
often poor women - who are forced to compete in a restricted, uneven and 
fluctuating market environment. Governmentality literature provides a way to think 
about how spaces, states and subjects are constituted by both state and non-state 
processes and helps explore practices through which communities and NGOs come 
together as partners for development, becoming responsible for decisions as active 
and self-reliant subjects. Examples of applying governmentality theory specifically to 
the operation of NGOs are provided by Bryant (2002) who examines the outcome of 
NGO activity in the Philippines as a facilitation of government, Sending and 
Neumann (2006) on the international campaign to ban landmines, and Postero 
(2007) on NGOs and new subjectivities amongst indigenous people in Bolivia (also 
see Richter 2006 on civil society in Russia). 
Li draws attention to the important fact that government operates through 
freedom: 
39 Moreover, from a post-development perspective earlier 'alternative' approaches to development such 
as Women in Development, rural development or sustainable development have contributed to the 
systematic production of knowledge and power much like development economics or modernist 
development discourse; all of these discourses are equally developmental and thus rejected. Whilst it is 
possible to accept this argument both on a level of discursive formations and of project outcomes, one 
is left wondering how it can accommodate the fact that such disparate discourses may be negotiated 
differently on a local level. Anthropological studies of development such as Rossi (2004) on the contrary 
serve to show how development 'recipients' negotiate, or resist, development projects and practices. 
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For the transnational development apparatus (donors, development banks, 
consultants, and non-governmental agencies), acquiescence is crucial. 
Lacking access to the means of violence, they can operate only by educating 
the desires and reforming the practices of their target populations (2007: 16) 
To improve populations requires a distinct government rationality that relies on 
problematisation and calculation to be translated into concrete development 
programmes. The notion of problematisation is central to Foucault's work: 
Problematization doesn't mean the representation of a pre-existent object, 
nor the creation through discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It's the set 
of discursive or non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the 
play of the true and false, and constitutes it as an object of thought (whether 
under the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, 
etc.) (Foucault 1989). 
Calculation or 'rendering technical' (Li 2007, Rose 1999) confirms expertise and 
ensures that problems are diagnosed in a way that is amenable to technical 
interventions and solutions (also see Ferguson 1990). Experts are therefore vital to 
an analysis of power in development: expertise is a channel for governmental 
practices, particularly because to govern involves the autonomy of the subjects of 
rule to choose freely how they conduct themselves. 
My usage of this theoretical framework extends beyond the effect of 
development projects on the individual or on populations. Government in the 
development domain encompasses a whole continuum of power relations between 
the state, donors, NGOs, target individuals or groups, and other organisations of civil 
society. It is not just the individual, but also states, organisations and communities 
that are to be made responsible, efficient and entrepreneurial. I am interested less in 
the constitution of development subjects as citizens, entrepreneurs or the poor40 
(although this is clearly an absolutely central effect of NGOs' work in development), 
but in the constitution of appropriate development organisations (which produce 
certain subjects). These in turn attempt to transfer the appropriate meaning, forms 
and practices of development and social change within civil society at large. 
40 On microcredit as a governmental strategy, see Rankin (2001) and Brigg (2006). 
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This understanding allows for an analysis of partnerships as a mode of global 
governance, as I seek to put it forward in chapters 4 and 5: partnerships ensure the 
inclusion of disparate development actors into shared projects with consensual 
agendas such as capacity building or empowerment. In the context of NGO 
partnerships, one of the key questions then becomes whether, and to what extent, 
NGOs are enlisted into CSI projects or government agendas, assuming responsibility 
for external policies (also see Abrahamsen 2004). 
Beyond govern mentality 
There is no space here to discuss in detail the limitations of govern mentality studies. 
In addition to the aforementioned, the most relevant critiques for the present context 
are: Gupta and Ferguson (2005) who describe the Anglo-Foucauldian conception of 
neoliberalism as Eurocentric; Mosse (2005), that govern mentality studies are too 
precise about the effects of ordering power and too abstract about their location; and 
Hart (2008), that Anglo-Foucauldian conceptions of neo-liberal governmentality are 
incapable of accounting for the constitutive role of contestation. In the same vein, 
O'Malley finds that the governmentality approach privileges official discourse 'with 
the result that it becomes difficult for it to recognize the imbrication of resistance and 
rule' (O'Malley 1996: 311). The latter pOint is particularly relevant in light of popular 
mobilisation against neoliberal rationalities in Post-Apartheid. O'Malley et al. (1997) 
crucially identify some of the difficulties in the governmentality literature regarding 
the realisation of its political potential. Again, many of the authors I explicitly draw on 
have since addressed the above shortcomings. 
Li (2007), Watts (2003) and others have countered some of the criticisms 
levelled against governmentality studies by emphasising that it is an 'accurate guide 
to development as a project of rule' (Li 2007: 295), but not to its practical 
accomplishment or implementation. Closure is indeed a feature of expert discourse, 
as some Foucauldians would have it. This is for instance evident in the near-
complete exclusion of political-economic issues in the funded civil society domain. 
But there are always challenges to expert discourses, and efforts need to be made to 
sustain the boundaries between those who have expertise and those who do not. 
The limitations of govern mentality as an analytic is thus in-built, since '[t]o govern 
means to act on the action of subjects who retain the capacity to act otherwise' (Li 
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2000: 17). There are always boundaries to government, because it precisely does 
not aim to exercise total control and there are many ways in which people resist 
neoliberal restructuring. This implies that attention must be paid to questions of 
political economy, social struggles and class power. As Li, who employs a 
govern mentality framework but supplements it with Gramscian theory, writes: 
Rule and its compromises are enabled and constrained by the sediment 
histories, contemporary social forces and international resource flows 
configuring a particular national arena (1999: 299). 
So whilst I analyse NGO practices, expertise and technologies from the 
perspective of a (modified) understanding of power as govern mentality, the issues at 
stake in chapter 7 - strategies of containment and contestation - also show the limits 
of such an understanding, for instance by typically viewing rule as a secure 
achievement rather than as a project that continuously needs to be struggled for. 
South Africa's case study potential of how globalisation plays itself out in the 
semi-industrialised world further necessitates an analysis that is sensitive to the 
concrete and often disastrous outcomes of Post-Apartheid development. Moreover if 
it is true, as some assert, that South Africa has replaced racial Apartheid with class 
Apartheid (Bond 2004a), a discussion of the processes of inclusion and exclusion 
that characterise Post-Apartheid is paramount. Whilst being suited to exploring the 
mechanisms and technologies of rule, a governmentality framework does not 
account well for the effects of neoliberal policies, and for the movements challenging 
them. 
In grappling with the broader socio-economic issues that frame my analysis 
of Post-Apartheid NGOs, I have therefore been influenced by accounts that capture 
the uneven structural effects of globalisation. Throughout this chapter, I have 
highlighted the influence of political economy analyses on my reading of the Post-
Apartheid development terrain. In particular I have sought to emphasise the 
relevance of a theory of uneven development, which assumes that - both on a global 
scale and within South Africa - wealth is always produced in tandem with poverty, 
and development with underdevelopment. Whilst this thesis does not pose political 
economy questions and cannot analyse the development domain in terms of 
economics, I nonetheless acknowledge the impact that this theoretical tradition has 
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had on my thinking, providing me with a broad guiding framework that captures vital 
dimensions of Post-Apartheid politics. 
There are theoretical challenges that arise from drawing on such diverse 
bodies of literature. I have justified this, firstly, by employing them strategically, i.e. to 
illuminate different dimensions and levels of analysis in the Post-Apartheid 
development domain. I am drawing here particularly on the above-discussed work of 
Li (1999, 2007). Kamat (2002) also blends her Gramscian analysis of grassroots 
organisations in India with a Foucauldian approach to development discourses in 
order to examine how NGOs might come to control and regulate radical popular 
initiatives. Different theoretical traditions pose different questions and provide 
different tools. Governmentality studies have offered an important perspective to 
grapple with NGO practices, technologies and vocabularies, and the forms of 
expertise, knowledge and identity they produce. Marxist critiques emanating from a 
number of disciplines (development studies, political economy, sociology and 
geography) have informed my understanding of the broader issues impacting on 
NGOs. Secondly, my understanding of the governmentality literature has been 
shaped by theorists who themselves acknowledge the influence of Marxian accounts 
on their writing, thus providing a departure from the Anglo-Foucauldian school. My 
analytical focus on discourses and technologies necessarily implies less focus on 
resistance, but I highlight throughout this thesis the strong critiques from some NGO 
professionals and recognise that the technologies of rule examined are themselves 
often modified or sometimes neglected altogether. 
2.6. Conclusions 
This review chapter has highlighted two historical processes: firstly, the 
neoliberalisation of global development and the shift towards a subtler, more 
inclusive neoliberalism; and secondly, the changing role for NGOs in South Africa's 
transition from Apartheid to a Post-Apartheid setting. This setting, I have argued in 
drawing on the work of human geographers, is characterised by a locally specific 
neoliberal ideology that is articulated in conjunction with other social and economic 
projects. Regarding the global level, a more inclusive style of development is 
captured in the twin agendas of good governance - or more recently, simply 
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governance - and partnerships, both turning on a conception of development as 
consensual and participatory, necessarily including NGOs, financial institutions, 
companies, state agencies and donors. The recent aid harmonisation agenda ties in 
with such homogenised versions of development and may curtail the space available 
to NGOs, although these harmonisation projects do not necessarily succeed. 
However, in this move, the reach of markets is extended far beyond that of earlier 
structural adjustment programmes into areas previously not liberalised. NGOs 
themselves can play a central part in the extension of market models into extra-
economic areas. 
This research positions itself in the vicinity of recent work on govern mentality. 
As I have contended, there are problems with the post-Foucauldian literature on 
government, partly because of its focus on projects, not outcomes or resistance, and 
partly because of its focus on Western liberal democracies. Many of the authors that 
have informed my reading of the Post-Apartheid development terrain in this field 
have already provided answers (or at the very least raised more questions) to these 
issues. However, there are certain 'in-built' limitations, which have meant that whilst 
the approach is useful to answer research questions on the level of the NGO, 
broader issues impacting on the NGO field have been left open. It is here that I have 
turned to political economic accounts of neoliberalism, which are sensitive to the role 
played by social power dynamics and class relationS in determining capitalist 
dispossession. 
Whilst this research takes a discursive approach to the govern mentality of 
South African NGOs, future research of an ethnographic may expand on the themes 
explored here, attending in greater details to the struggles over projects of rule and 
to the successes and failures of audit culture and associated technologies. Perhaps 
most importantly, in South Africa neoliberal ideology is articulated together with other 
political projects, most evidently a racial nationalism, a populist Africanism and a 
third way social democracy. In other words, whilst theories of neoliberalism are 
important, this context is also always exceeded. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3: 
Researching 
Post-Apartheid NGOs 
Chapter 1 has already summarised the research problem and my research motives 
and objectives. Here, I provide an in-depth discussion of how I designed this 
research, which methodological strategy and methods I employed and which issues 
my approach has raised. 
I began desk research in London in October 2005, reviewing literature and 
developing a conceptual framework. In the summer of 2006, I carried out semi-
structured expert interviews with staff at four UK-based development NGOs (see 
appendix 7). These were intended to form a pilot study, identifying themes and topics 
which would then be examined through more detailed work in the subsequent year of 
fieldwork in South Africa.41 The four organisations were chosen because they all 
focused on one or more central aspects of my research, for instance capacity 
building in North-South partnerships or multi-stakeholder partnerships in Southern 
Africa. The interviews covered the topics of partnerships and funding, project 
management and project development and technologies and norms. My thematic 
analysis particularly highlighted the themes of proposal writing as a language skill, 
the practice of translation and interpretation in partnerships and NGOs' 
institutionalised reflexivity. 
The pilot study was useful in terms of honing my interview technique and 
getting a sense of the language and concepts professionals employed to speak 
about issues in the development domain. However, my research questions and 
objectives changed considerably between this initial research and my departure to 
South Africa in early 2007. I decided to focus on South African NGOs as opposed to 
INGOs operative in South Africa as I had originally planned. This involved a shift of 
41 Whilst these interviews contributed to the development of a conceptual framework and helped me to 
refine my research questions, the data provided a view on issues specific to African development 
organisations operating in the UK, and how they negotiate, are constrained by, and actively contribute 
to discourses and practices of international development. 
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focus from the international development domain to that of Post-Apartheid, itself 
constituted by various local, national and global discourses and flows. The change 
reflected my evolving understanding of the South African development field where 
'indigenous' civil society organisations are relatively powerful and the state 
represents the largest donor. 
Before commencing my overseas fieldwork, I had also carried out a critical 
analysis of development policy documents in order to gain knowledge of policy 
agendas and language. This enabled me to identify the continuities and breaks in 
development discourses across various development spaces and scales. In line with 
my research questions, I focused on partnership and governance as two central 
elements of recent development policy. This documentary analysis further informed 
the development of the conceptual framework and the refinement of the research 
questions. 
The majority of the data was generated in two periods of fieldwork, during 
which I was based in Johannesburg; one from January 2007 to August 2007 and a 
second one for 6 weeks in January and February 2008. I had decided to live in 
Johannesburg during my fieldwork as this is where most of the intermediary NGOs 
that I focus on are based. It is also the home of most development funders, which I 
thought to be important in terms of the city being a development industry hub (it later 
turned out that a number of case NGOs and their funders were even clustered in the 
same building in Braamfontein). As a centre of cultural and intellectual life, it also 
gave me the opportunity to attend conferences, talks and cultural events. However, I 
also carried out some inteNiews in Durban and Cape Town and attended academic 
conferences in Pretoria, Mafikeng and Durban. 
Before my departure in January 2007, I secured an affiliation as a visiting 
researcher with the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER) at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, providing me with office space, library access and 
the opportunity to participate in weekly research seminars. WISER is an 
interdisciplinary research centre carrying out work concerned with the Post-Apartheid 
social order. Prior to my departure, I had also established some preliminary research 
contacts with NGO leaders and other development practioners, which led to some 
initial meetings and expert inteNiews and helped me to gain access to NGOs. I 
discuss the selection of case NGOs and my choice of research methods in detail 
below (see sections 3.2. and 3.4.). 
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My research was approved by Goldsmiths' Sociology Department Ethics 
Committee in 2006. It was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and conducted in adherence to the Council's Research Ethics Framework 
and the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical Practice. In 
accordance with these, I explained to informants what my research was about, who 
was funding it, why I undertook it and how it was to be disseminated. I also sought 
consent to record interviews and explained how I was planning on transcribing and 
storing data. I sought permission from participants to be named in the study where 
they acted in an official capacity, and obtained written permission for the use of 
direct quotations. Furthermore, I offered to send the interview transcript to each 
interviewee, which was taken up by about half of those cited directly. Consent was 
given by all participants to be named and for their institutional affiliation to be given. 
I interviewed individuals at 23 different organisations as well as carrying out 
some expert interviews with other development practioners and activists (see 
appendix 1). I recorded interviews on a MiniDisc recorder and kept MiniDiscs 
separate from other data until final consent was given. I transcribed roughly one half 
of the interviews myself and had the other half transcribed by Phineas Riba, a 
postgraduate student who was recommended to me by one of my colleagues at 
WISER. Whilst the transcription process is often said to form an initial element of the 
data analysis, I did not feel that my reading of the second set of interviews was in 
any way less in-depth since I listened back to the interviews several times to check 
through the transcripts for mistakes. Moreover, the number and length of interviews 
called for a pragmatic decision about whether I wanted to curtail my interviewing for 
the sake of transcribing them myself. 
I kept a field diary in which I recorded my observations, providing descriptions 
of settings, people, situations and conversations. This was accompanied by virtual 
and hard copy folders of clippings from newspapers, leaflets, NGOs' information 
materials and documentary materials. During the first period of fieldwork in 2007, I 
also blogged regularly, which provided me with a different kind of writing space and 
which, during writing up in the UK, has helped me to connect with the inspiration I 
had felt when living in Johannesburg. The visual data I produced, such as 
photographs, was important in terms of bringing ideas and observations back to life 
once I began my data analysis. 
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I came back to the UK in August 2007, planning to return at the end of the 
year for an additional 6 months to carry out observation research with two 
organisations. Mindset and Teboho were chosen because of their case study 
potential to illuminate two distinct modes of NGO organisations that had emerged 
from my research up to that point: the partnership model and the social 
entrepreneurship model. I also began the formal data analysis (see section 3.5.), 
although I regard data generation and analysis as dynamic and interactive and had 
begun an initial thematic analysis during fieldwork. When I became pregnant in that 
autumn I needed to adjust my plans, returning for a month-long observation at 
Mindset, additional interviews and a conference presentation in January and 
February 2008. By this stage, the data analysis was quite advanced, which impacted 
on the way I designed further interviews and planned and conducted the 
observational research. Indeed, the methodological approach I have chosen 
understands data generation, theory building and data analysis as intertwined in a 
developmental process. 
3.2. Research strategy, methodological approach and selection 
I have employed a multi-method qualitative approach, allowing for the production of 
rich, detailed and contextual data that is required to address the research questions 
posed here. Qualitative researching encompasses a wide range of philosophical and 
methodological positions and intellectual traditions, and this section discusses which 
assumptions underlie my project. 
My methodological approach has been broadly interpretivist, attributing 
meaning to people's actions and their interpretations of them. I understand people as 
agents that are both empowered and constrained by structures. This approach also 
assumes that social explanation requires depth, complexity and contextualisation. I 
have employed multiple methods of data collection and a discursive-analytical 
approach to data analysis. It was important for me to develop a flexible research 
design that would be able to accommodate multiple methods and a developmental 
relationship between theory building, data generation and data analysis. I began with 
concepts which had been informed by the theoretical perspectives that have been 
influential on my work. These were developed as field work progressed, so that data 
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and theoretical ideas were developed in conjunction. This approach was aided by a 
period of reflection and analysis between the two blocks of field work I undertook. 
My standpoint is critical in the sense that it situates the research in a wider 
socio-economic context, is focused on inequalities and understands the role of 
research to be linked to values and a political commitment. This necessarily involves 
an ongoing awareness of my own role as a researcher and the impact of my subject-
position on the knowledge that is produced. It is thus a theory-driven approach that 
produces constituted, positioned and context-specific knowledge (Lopez and Potter 
2001). Such a standpoint has echoes of a critical realist epistemology. Contra 
constructivism or a na"ive realism, a critical realist epistemology asserts that we have 
access to truths - although not a definite, finished truth - via fallible theories and 
accordingly that knowledge is always partial and positioned (Cruickshank 2003). I 
am not fully committed to a critical realist position, but it has enabled me to think 
through the relationship between discursive and material or extra-discursive 
practices whilst understanding knowledge as socially constructed. Language shapes 
social realities but these social realities are delineated by the conditions of the 
material world. 
Flexibility was also required in so far as I formulated research questions and 
methods at the start of the project that were modified during fieldwork, on account of 
immersion and engagement with informants. This is based on the recognition that, 
although I had developed a good understanding of the theoretical context within 
which my project was situated through secondary research, this was not sufficient to 
be able to formulate a definite and final strategy. Questions were being refined as 
the research progressed, for instance by accounting for my increasing interest in 
NGOs' relations to other civil society actors. Also, my initial research design 
proposed to analyse the effects of two elements of the global poverty reduction 
consensus on NGO practices, namely the good governance and partnership 
agendas. After some months in the field, I made a strategic decision to focus my 
attention primarily on the effects of the partnership discourse. This was due to the 
need to focus down the research; also, the initial data that I generated suggested 
that the partnership discourse had impacted on NGO practices in complex and 
interesting ways. 
Overall, whilst not carrying out a formal discourse analysis, this research has 
taken discursive analytical approach in the sense that it considers language as 
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having constitutive properties, and is concerned with its effects and consequences. A 
discourse is a specific, structured and historically produced way of representing and 
organising knowledge and practices about a topic or field (Hall 1997, Foucault 1972, 
Foucault 1977, Andersen 2003). As complex constructions of meaning, discourses 
become bound up with institutions to constitute regimes of truth that define what 
constitutes expert knowledge. As such, they are embedded within and reflects wider 
relations of power that manifest in development practices, operating procedures and 
forms of expertise of NGO staff, development professionals or researchers (Ebrahim 
2003). Development institutions and organisations generate their own form of 
discourse, which both constructs objects of knowledge and creates a structure of 
knowledge around these objects (Ferguson 1990). 
This interest in how language represents the relations, processes and 
subjects of development is combined with an understanding of people's 
interpretations of discourses as equally important. It is thus the meaning made by 
social actors that this research tries to explore. Therefore in-depth interviews were 
chosen as the principal method best suited to exploring how development discourses 
are actively constructed by development practioners. In other words, the effects of 
discursive structure on NGO behaviour need to be linked with the forms of agency 
exercised by them (Ebrahim 2003), for instance by asking how audit culture may be 
understood by NGO professionals, and how it impacts on their relationships with 
other actors in the field of development. 
Multiple methods 
Based on my flexible research design, I have employed a mixture of methods, 
primarily in-depth interviews (including life-historical interviewing), but also 
observation research and document analysis (Mason 2002, Atkinson et al. 2001, 
Berg 2001, Plummer 2001). There is a danger of a naTve view of triangulation, which 
assumes that by simply combining methods a more complete picture is produced, 
thereby failing to do justice to the situated nature of accounts (Silverman 2001). In 
choosing multiple methods, my aim has not been to produce data that converges 
and thereby establish validity, as this would not be concurrent with my research 
design. Rather than assuming a corroboration purpose, I understand multiple 
methods to fulfil an elaborative purpose: 'elaboration occurs when the variety of data 
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expands understanding of the phenomenon, perhaps by providing different 
perspectives' (Blaikie 2000: 267). Different methods tap different ways of knowing, 
requiring that the data be located carefully within their wider context (cf. Mathiason 
[1988], cited in Blaikie 2000). This speaks against triangulation as a technical 
solution and towards a more holistic perspective as is found for instance in many 
critical ethnographic projects (see below). It also implies that ambiguities of findings 
must be held onto as opposed to having to be resolved at all cost. 
Selection, Access and Positioning 
Despite the association of sampling with a statistical logic, qualitative research 
necessarily involves selection of data, albeit for reasons of focus rather than 
generalisation.42 I wanted to select as wide a range of South African NGOs as 
possible. The criteria narrowing my choice reflect the focus of my research on NGO 
partnerships and their function as intermediaries. Therefore, I wanted the chosen 
organisations to identify partnerships as one of their activities. I also only selected 
organisations with some amount of international funding. Beyond these wide criteria, 
I employed a combination of, firstly, snowball sampling and, towards the middle and 
end of my fieldwork, theoretical sampling. 
Specifically, I was aware of a number of organisations that fulfilled my criteria 
prior to commencing fieldwork. The Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (CSVR) and the Freedom of Expression Institute (FX/) were two of the 
first NGOs I contacted and was aware of due to their public profile and research 
activities. Early expert interviews with 'solidarity funders' such as the Luxemburg and 
B611 Foundations proved useful in the first month of so of fieldwork, as they gave me 
a clearer idea of some of the current issues for NGOs in South Africa and 
contributed to a refinement of the interview schedule. By way of snowball sampling, 
they led to contacts with NGOs they were aware of or had funded in the past (for 
instance the Wolpe Trust and ILRIG). I was also alerted to some NGOs that fitted my 
research focus through social networks that also facilitated access (Gun Free South 
Africa for instance). In addition, I used SANGONet's Prodder directory of NGOs and 
42 I have also chosen documentary data that has not emerged from my research of NGOs directly, such 
as policy texts. I will discuss my selection rationale for these below. The choice of Mindset as a case 
study for observation research likewise represents another selection decision that is addressed in 
section 3.4., under the heading of observation research (Yin 1994). 
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development organisations in South Africa which gives details of NGOs' activities, 
where they are based and often their web pages. 
Towards the end of my first fieldwork trip, and prior to the second one, I 
began to sample more theoretically, contacting people who I felt could highlight 
specific issues in relation to my research questions. This reflects a research design 
that allows for an ongoing theoretical logic to the selection process. Theoretical 
sampling is sometimes associated with grounded theory approaches, but I have 
employed it here in the more general sense of strategically selecting NGOs on the 
basis of their relevance to the argument I was developing, enabling me to make key 
comparisons (Mason 2002). The list of interviews in Appendices 1 and 2 shows the 
development of my thinking in terms of thematic focus areas. The more I became 
familiar with 'my' subsection of the NGO sector, the more I was able to take 
advantage of the considerable networks that span the sector, taking up practioners' 
recommendations or their offers to introduce me to colleagues or friends in other 
NGOS.43 
In all cases, I contacted the potential informant by email and provided a brief 
summary of my research questions, background and aims of the study (see 
appendix 3). Receiving a relatively high percentage of positive replies may just be 
considered lucky, but I believe that something at the very core of Post-Apartheid 
South Africa made access relatively easy. For a researcher or academic from 
Europe, boundaries between sectors or strata in South Africa can appear very fluid; 
everything constantly seemed in flux and open to contestation. It would be naIve to 
assume that the majority of the population shared this sense of permeability and 
renewal. Yet, an atmosphere of transparency and change are often invoked in the 
media, in official narratives of the transition and in personal stories. The young 
democracy South Africa references itself often. 
Ulf Hannerz writes that in multi-sited ethnographies it is important to 
'[establish] personal credentials, to place oneself as the ethnographer in the 
43 Needless to say, there were quite a few organisations that did not respond to my repeated attempts 
to contact them. With others, staff were willing to be interviewed but practicalities and logistics did not 
allow for a meeting. Although I made trips to Durban and Cape Town, I did not manage to arrange all 
the agreed interviews in the short time I spent in each city. Moreover, whilst intermediary NGOs are 
characterised by their metropolitan location, clearly not every NGO I may have been interested in 
contacting was located in one of these three cities. Lastly, there were one or two NGOs which seemed 
to fit my selection criteria according to preliminary research, but it became apparent in the course of the 
interview that they no longer received intemational funding (for instance the Workers Education 
Project). Notwithstanding, these interviews gave me an important insight into the struggle for 
sustainability or survival these organisations faced. 
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'translocal network of relationships' (2003: 209). Making personal politics explicit was 
certainly an important part of the recruitment process and I would not have been able 
to access organisations, places, and people without doing so. Likewise, I would not 
have been accepted into the social circle I was in if I had not shared much of their 
politics, their way of life and their assessment of the South Africa they were living in. 
For instance, a short-term work contract evolved from contact with a progressive 
funder. This acted like a letter of recommendation, faCilitating contact with other 
progressive NGOs, academic networks and social movement activists. These and 
the biographical interviews I carried out informed my understanding of issues of 
development, inequality and mobilisation in South Africa. Biographical interviews 
were carried out with people who had previously shared aspects of their life histories 
in the context of our friendship. The selection criterion here was the relevance of 
their narratives to my reading of recent social history and contemporary social and 
political issues. 
As should be clear from the above, sometimes my particular pOSitioning 
enabled access to informants that I would have not been able to gain otherwise. For 
example, being a foreigner seemed to open some doors, with people often being 
pleased that I had 'come all this way'. Other people were suspicious of me and my 
research because I am a foreigner. Yet others made it clear that they would not have 
trusted me if I was a white South African, leaving me with an odd sense that it was 
my having 'proven my worth' in debates about BBBE or a Post-Polokwane ANC that 
granted me access. The politics of race and class very noticeably permeate all kinds 
of relationships in Post-Apartheid South Africa, and the relationships of researcher/ 
informant, expert! student, expert! expert and so on, are no exception. 
3.3. The importance of being there and the 'field' 
I did not carry out an embedded, in-depth ethnography as this was not part of my 
research design and would just have given me knowledge of one site rather than of 
processes across sites. Rather, my concern has predominantly been with how NGO 
professionals have constructed and rendered meaningful notions of audit culture and 
partnerships. Nonetheless, I employed various ethnographic strategies, for instance 
the use of grey literature, participation at events and the collection of documentary 
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sources and visual material (see for instance Atkinson 1990, Coffey 1999, Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1992, Hammersley 2006). I felt that the research questions could only 
be addressed through gaining a holistic awareness of the social and economic 
context within which NGOs operate, how history and personal experiences of 
Apartheid impact on the NGO sector, and at the most general level what challenges 
South African democracy faces over a decade after the transition. 
I understand this use of ethnographic techniques as quite separate from the 
short period of observation research I carried out with the NGO Mindset in 2008 and 
which became very instructive for my thinking on the future of NGOs in South Africa 
(see section 3.4. below). Much of what I hope to convey about my perception of this 
juncture in South Africa was gained outside of, or in dialectic relationship with, 
working in an NGO or carrying out interviews; it developed from interacting with 'non-
designated' informants in everyday situations, from participating in academic life at 
WISER and from exploring the city. These contacts gave me access to spaces that 
would have otherwise been closed to me, or whose existence I would not have been 
aware of. Research contacts and friends helped me to navigate the Post-Apartheid 
city, putting places in the context of personal and political history. They also shaped 
my thinking in terms of helping me to steer the political landscape, often in ways 
unbeknownst to them. 
Multi-sited and trans-scalar ethnographies 
My methodological thinking has been influenced by contemporary development 
ethnographies. They apply ethnographic methods to global processes and multi-
sited phenomena, attending to the trans-scalar, transnational character of the 
development domain. They have in common an acknowledgement that communities 
are constructed through social relations and mostly conceptually bounded, as 
opposed to the conventional anthropological pursuit of describing discrete and 
bounded communities (Crewe and Harrison 1998). They problematise the idea of the 
single-site field as the staple of the ethnographic imagination. Burawoy (2000) for 
instance calls for a redefinition of fieldwork as detached from a single place and time, 
whereas Gould (2004b) proposes to distinguish between sites, localities and levels 
instead of the 'field'. 
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Mosse's (2005) work on global governance also tries to explore local-global 
relations through an ethnographic investigation of 'constructed communities of 
interest'. Hart's (2004, 2002a, 2002b) project of critical ethnography has 
commonalities with Burawoy's (2000) call for a global ethnography; both contend 
that attention must be paid not only to the impact and experiences of globalisation 
but also to its very production, from which vantage pOint globalisation seems much 
more contingent. All of these projects are concerned with the difficulty of developing 
a global sociological imagination (Back 2007) beyond local! global dichotomies. 
Governmentality offers one amongst a number of methodological strategies 
to deal with the issue of scale in development research, providing a framework for 
analysing the construction of authority across levels and for identifying the 
subjectivities associated with them. The idea of local! global itself rests on an 
assumption of verticality that also underlies the traditional conception of the state/ 
civil society binary (or of political struggle 'from below' and the state intervening 'top-
down') (Ferguson 2006a). However, NGOs are an element of what Ferguson and 
Gupta (2005) refer to as the transnational apparatus of governmentality. This 
apparatus overlaps and coexists with the system of nation states rather than 
replacing it, disrupting its technologies of power and producing new forms of 
spatalisation. Their notion allows for the spatiality of all forms of government in 
neoliberal globalisation, as opposed to assuming the frame of the nation-state as in 
some concepts of govern mentality. These insights have been important for the 
development of my research, for instance by providing an alternative framework to 
the dominant portrayal of social movements in South Africa as 'grassroots'. This 
framework enables the capturing of their community character and their fighting of 
transnational struggles. 
3. 4. Research methods 
Interviews 
In-depth interviews provided the principal method to explore my research questions, 
chosen because I took informants' active constructions of development, partnerships 
and civil society as central to my enquiry. Interviews are regarded as material 
evidence of discourses and therefore analysed in a discursive analytical method (cf. 
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Kamat 2002). The interviews afforded insights into how central issues and agendas 
in development were constructed by NGO professionals who I understand in turn to 
actively shape the social world they inhabit, despite being constrained by structures. 
In other words, my research has been primarily concerned with what NGO leaders 
say they do, and with how they have made sense of the processes and technologies 
that impact on the activities and organisational forms of the NGOs they worked in. 
I conducted 40 interviews, of which 32 were core interviews with senior NGO 
staff, and 8 were 'expert interviews' (see appendix 1). The core interviews were 
drawn from 23 case NGOs due to interviewing more than one individual in some 
organisations. Experts included social movement activists, individuals working for 
grant-making institutions or consultants working in the development field. Of the core 
interviews, the vast majority comprised conversations with leaders such as NGO 
directors or executive directors, although where this was not possible I interviewed 
senior researchers or other individuals that had been identified as suitable by the 
organisation's director. All interviews were semi-structured, with the expert interviews 
more informal in character than those with NGO staff. They each lasted between one 
and a half and two and a half hours. After each interview, I gave the interviewee the 
opportunity to ask questions or raise any issues that may have come up. I followed a 
topic guide which I modified for each interview according to preliminary research 
about the NGO and their field of activity. The topic guide covered the following 
themes (in brackets are prompts for sub-questions): 
• Organisational history and activities (links to development discourses and 
history) 
• Funding and sustain ability strategies (funders, changing modalities, ease, 
language and modalities of grant applications) 
• Relationship to Government! the state (definitions of the nation and the state) 
• Monitoring and evaluation (techniques, organisational impact, experiences) 
• Partnerships and partners (definitions, modalities, conflicts, shared 
objectives, hierarchies, experiences) 
• Civil society (definitions, roles of sector, their own role) 
• Model of NGO (indigenous v universal, roles, political vision, challenges) 
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In line with my research design and methodological strategy, the interview 
schedule changed and evolved continuously.44 The fact that there was a year 
between my first and last interviews - at the time of my second leg of fieldwork I had 
long began data analysis - moreover clearly influenced the way I designed and 
carried out my interviews. This gave me the space for data analysis but also 
provided me with the necessary distance for reflection on research practice and 
objectives. Theory building, data generation and data analysis were developed 
dialectically, allowing me to move back and forth between data, experience and 
concepts. 
Identities and positionings in the interview process 
Using interviews as a primary method produces particular outcomes that are related 
to my own positioning as an interviewer. Like in any other form of social interaction, I 
'connected' straight away with some interviewees and less so with others, which 
impacted on their (and my) openness. Secondly, my informants sometimes assumed 
things about my identity and politics, for instance that I knew little (or cared little) 
about South Africa's persistent inequalities. Being a woman academic further had 
implications for the interview data I generated and the access I got to organisations. 
South African society is officially very gender-equal, but in practice sometimes quite 
sexist. 
In the introduction to this chapter I outlined how formal issues of ethical 
practice have been addressed in my research. There are of course wider ethical 
issues that exceed the practicalities of obtaining consent by informants. The 
selection of data represents my authorship of the research but there is a 
responsibility to represent people's views appropriately, for instance by 
contextual ising interview extracts and by being aware of and transparent about how 
and when I am generalising to a broader issue. Likewise, the process of 
interpretation and critical analysis of the selected interview data represents my 
reading of their interpretations and discursive constructions, which they might not 
always agree with. 
44 For instance, as described earlier, my interest in NGOs' positioning towards popular movements grew 
out the insights gained during earlier interviews. It was also impacted on by a greater appreciation of 
the challenges facing the majority population which I only gathered through living in South Africa. Later 
interviews thus contain specific questions about social movements that my initial research questions 
were not concemed with in equal detail. 
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While I am often critical of NGO practices and their effects, I also believe that 
the interviewees felt that they are doing important work, and crucially that they are 
themselves conscious of the structural conditions - and critical of the discourses -
within which they operate. This tension lies at the heart of much NGO practice as I 
observed it, and is reinforced by issues of class location as Chapter 6 in particular 
demonstrates. Theoretically, I partly deal with this tension through the notion of the 
'will to improve' (Li 2007), which helps to draw attention to the gap between what is 
attempted and what is accomplished and highlights its parasitic relationship to its 
own shortcomings and failures. Failed projects necessarily call for more projects. 
Whilst development (or 'improvement') programmes usually serve the interests of 
particular groups, I believe that they cannot be solely explained in terms of tactics or 
a class project. But ambiguities remain over how to reconcile what I may know about 
informants' intentions with the critical analysis of NGO practices to which I am 
committed. 
The fact that informants were themselves reflexively pre-occupied with critical 
issues in development and indeed in the sociology of development is central to my 
analysis. They were knowledgeable not only about their conduct but also very often 
about the context within which they operated, including the intellectual expertise I 
may bring as a researcher, the conventions governing social science interviewing 
and so on. This knowledge partly stems from the overlaps of intellectual! academic 
and practical NGO expertise that characterise the South African NGO sector and 
that were evident in the biographies of many interviewees. For example, Jane 
Duncan and Imraan Buccus were undertaking Ph.D.s at the time of interviewing; 
Tracy was leaving her position with the Wolpe Trust to begin her Ph.D. shortly. 
Others had held positions at universities or academic centres in the past. 
The language that informants used in the interviews reflected this interplay of 
the two domains. When I asked Imraan how the CPP contributes to increased civil 
society participation, he told me: 'I am gonna try and avoid the theoretical aspect and 
maybe this whole Hegelian idea of the market being part of the civil society' (I. 
Buccus, CPP, 26 Jun 07).45 Or on the relationship of NGOs to social movements: 'A 
large number of social movements have disowned official spaces of engagement. 
45 When citing from interview transcripts, I provide the informant's name, the name of the organisation 
and the date of the interview in brackets. Appendix 1 provides greater detail on interviewees and 
organisations. Where no direct source is provided, a number of respondents have used the same 
terminology to describe a process, practice or object. 
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With this Gramscian idea of: this is about social control, why should we engage with 
the state on the state's terms' (ibid.). This throws up interesting questions about what 
it is that the sociologist is meant to produce and what expertise can be claimed to 
produce insights that the actors do not already have themselves. There are clearly 
overlaps of domains of expertise between development theory and NGO practice. 
Going beyond the issue of a shared language and theoretical set of tools 
between researcher and informant, NGO practioners were very conversant with, and 
had ingested, any critiques that may be brought forward against them. For instance, 
the following exchange with Shafika Isaacs from Mindset was typical in that 
interviewees often made reference to what it was they were supposedly 'meant to 
say': 
Natascha: Who do you think you see yourself accountable to, maybe both 
you personally and the organisation? 
Shafika: You know what I would like to say and what would be politically 
correct to say, and I certainly try and do this as far as I can, I'd say, to the 
learners and the teachers. I mean again the question, the sort of OD-speak 
interpretation of that question is who are your clients, and again it is a 
question we consistently ask ourselves, who are our clients (S. Isaacs, 
Mindset, 2 May 07). 
Imraan told me that as an organisation with 'fancy funding from Ford' they need to 
'construct a sort of ideological orientation about where do you locate yourself (I. 
Succus, CPP, 26 Jun 07). Others advanced a critique of NGOs 'academising 
everything' (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). Such self-critiques echo common criticisms 
of NGOs by the very social movements (and academics) Rama Naidu is talking 
about in the above extract. This had consequences for my data analysis, and the 
very process of writing up. For instance, it made it difficult to speak critically about 
the NGO practices involved, implying that there exists no vocabulary outside of that 
employed by NGO staff. These concerns relating to institutional and personal 
reflexivity are issues that I return to throughout this thesis. 
More generally, NGO professionals' usage of discourses, even if they were 
reflexively engaged with them, implies particular material effects on the formation of 
consciousness and the mobilisation of identities (Kamat 2002). For example, as 
NGO workers in the current dispensation the participants in this research necessarily 
spend their time talking and thinking about auditing, accountability and partnership in 
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a particular way which I argue to have real material and ideological effects. Although 
alternative constructions existed and development vocabularies were reflexively 
negotiated in the context of the in-depth interviews, my research also shows that on 
the level of the organisation, the vocabularies used were largely homogenised and 
often neglected larger socio-economic issues. 
Biographical interviews 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, I conducted biographical interviews with 
individuals who were part of my circle of friends and whose life stories I felt were 
illuminating on broader issues such as the liberation struggle, race, political 
mobilisation and the non-profit sector. Themba, Wayne and Thandi had each 
previously shared aspects of their life story with me in the context of our friendship, 
so that the later interviews represent a formalisation or extension of this interaction. 
Biographical interviewing and personal narratives give access to an informant's life, 
but the telling of a life history - that is, the life story as analysed by the researcher -
also places an individual life story into a social context (Plummer 2001). One way of 
thinking about the significance of this rich data to my project was to ask 'to what kind 
of question could this personal narrative be the answer?' (Alleyne 2002: 126).46 
Whilst each story is unique in terms of the specific life choices it encapsulates, it 
shows the intersections of that individual life with the historical events of the time, 
and how these events conditioned the choices that were exercised. Often, my 
informants themselves verbalised and made obvious the linkages between these 
two. This further contributed to my overall sense of history always being present and 
referenced in South Africa. 
Observation Research 
Recognising that in semi-structured interviews, respondents' experiences and 
understandings are constructed in and for the situational context of the interview and 
that not all knowledge can be (re)constructed in the context of an interview, I wanted 
46 Clearly the few biographical interviews I carried out do not amount to the writing of a life history and 
this was not my intention. However, I found the data I gained from these life stories very instructive, 
giving me a feeling of the present social and political juncture in South Africa that I could not gathered 
through other methods. 
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to observe first-hand how development policies and agendas were negotiated in the 
setting of the NGO. I was aware of the implications of interviewing NGO leaders too: 
NGOs are clearly not coherent wholes, but rather often internally divided, containing 
within them diverse attitudes towards the state, donors, movements and social 
policies. Specifically, I was interested in how M&E demands and other bureaucratic 
requirements affected the day-to-day running of the organisation and what forms of 
expertise they produced. What knowledges and processes are produced over and 
above what informants say they are doing? How does the NGO use research to 
monitor and evaluate their projects, how does this feed this back into their work and 
how is it communicated to funders and partners? Which monitoring and evaluation 
strategies are in place with different funders and how do these strategies impact on 
the implementation and management of projects? How are project proposals 
produced? 
The observation with Mindset constitutes a form of case study research in the 
sense that I understand it as a 'whole' within my data set. The knowledge created 
through the case study observation is local and specific, but I do believe that it can 
be used to illuminate wider aspects of NGO practice and the processes governing 
NGOs. Whilst my research has primarily explored NGO professionals' claims and 
how they actively negotiated a variety of development discourses, this period of 
observation has allowed me to gain a better understanding of what they do. 
Observation research is thus not intended to increase validity of the data in a 
positivist sense but rather to afford different perspectives on the research questions, 
enabling me to explore how projects of rule frequently have unintended outcomes, 
some of which are actively exploited by NGO staff. 
Observing at Mindset 
Mindset is a South African NGO that creates, sources and delivers quality 
educational resources to schools, health workers and communities. The organisation 
seeks to 'work holistically with regional and national Government, corporates, the 
higher education sector and other NGOs and supports government and civil society 
efforts to address the Millennium Development Goals' (Mindset, A Three-Year 
Strategy for Mindset Network 2008-2010). Its various health and learning channels 
offer video, computer-based multimedia, web and print content and equip schools 
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and clinics with the required infrastructure. I have been familiar with the work of the 
organisation since 2004 and did some research into their use of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) for educational development.47 
I had carried out some interviews with Mindset staff during my first fieldwork 
trip and had negotiated access then. My choice of the organisation as an observation 
case study emerged from an interest in their well-developed sustainability model. 
Partnerships have been central to the structure and organisational practices of the 
NGO since its inception in 2002. The case study was therefore chosen to illuminate 
more clearly this specific model and the effects of the organisation's range of 
partnerships across different sectors. Moreover, without wishing to generalise from 
this case, it allowed me to learn much about viable options for organisational survival 
and challenges to organisational identity that may be relevant to the wider NGO 
sector in South Africa. 
My observation with Mindset lasted from mid-January to mid-February 2008. I 
was given full access to the organisation's funding and M&E documents, strategy 
papers, partnership agreements, budgets and so on. I shadowed Kirston Greenop, 
the NGO's research manager (itself a position that it is quite indicative of changes in 
NGO practices, as I explain in chapter 6), attended meetings and conducted 
interviews with various staff, such as the heads of channels and the CEO. I also 
produced a strategic report for the NGO.48 In my observational notes, I tried to 
provide concrete descriptions of the setting, people I encountered, meetings and 
conversations (see for instance Lofland 2004, Atkinson et al. 2001). I noted down 
what language staff used to describe processes and objects and how different 
relationships (with funders, with civil society organisations and so on) were 
characterised. For instance, when was someone referred to as a 'funder' and when 
as a 'partner'? And by whom? I was also interested in types of roles and their 
descriptions that would give me insight into the meta knowledges that Mindset 
produces. 
The observation research added a further micro perspective to my analysis of 
the impact of the partnership mode on NGOs that had evolved from the interviews 
where the focus lay on individuals' active constructions. It demonstrated very clearly 
47 Mueller-Hirth, N. (2005) An African Solution to an African Problem? A case study of leT in 
Development. Unpublished MA Dissertation. Department of Sociology. Goldsmiths, University of 
London. 
48 Mindset's positioning in the South African NGO sector. Report for Mindset (February 2008) 
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the extent of individuals' awareness of the operation of power in bureaucratic 
mechanisms and also the 'threats' they posed to the coherence of NGOs' 
organisational identity. Morever, micro-level experiences in the NGO were far from 
uniform and often contradictory, underlining the diversity of ways in which 
organisational policy was contested and modified by individuals. For instance, 
Mindset's complex multiple-partnership model has meant that there are conflicts 
between different partners. As I show in chapter 6 this has resulted in restrictions of 
content provision, but there are also cases where the organisation has had to be 
creative and take 'a different angle' (C. Stevens, Mindset, 6 Feb 08), producing an 
effective modification of the auditing regimes that were in place. Whereas in the case 
of Mindset partnering has largely resulted in a depoliticised organisation, the 
constant requirement for auditing and data collection has also meant that the 
organisation was forever 'piggy-backing' on research which it subsequently used for 
its own autonomous purposes. 
Just as with interviewing, questions of identity and positioning are at the heart 
of observation research. The opportunity of producing a report on Mindsefs strategic 
positioning during my time there was telling of the changes I felt in my identity as a 
researcher, compared to the longer fieldwork period in 2007. Then, I had arrived as a 
student researcher whereas, coming back in early 2008, I was increasingly drawn 
upon as an expert by those I interacted with. One of my informants - rather ironically 
I felt - called me up and asked me to help with a funding proposal: to Erik Ntshiqela, I 
was fluent in the language of development and proposal writing that I thought I had 
merely spent a year exploring and critiquing. At Mindset too, I was seen as an expert 
on the South African non-profit sector. My role posed opportunities, challenges and 
dilemmas for me: on the one hand, I was critical of aspects of Mindset's and other 
organisations' work, on the other I had become very familiar with the language and 
knowledge practices of the industry. I repeatedly encountered this challenging 
threshold between observing and participating which I needed to remain very aware 
of. 
Documentary analysis 
I carried out a critical analysis of policy texts and donor documents which included 
South African policy documents and White Papers such as GEAR and the 2007 ANC 
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policy papers, the latter embodying the emerging developmental state rhetoric. I also 
considered strategic documents by major donor agencies and institutions such as 
the World Bank, USAIDI PEPFAR and DflD to understand different discursive 
constructions of partnerships and development. Lastly, I read funding guidelines by 
donor agencies and Northern NGOs acting as donors to further my knowledge of the 
context within which my case NGOs sought funding. These documents were 
selected on the basis of their relevance for the funding context that the case NGOs 
operated in. In addition, texts such as the NEPAD declaration and annual reports 
were chosen because I argue that NEPAD represents an example of the reflexive 
neoliberal agenda I describe throughout this thesis. Chapters 4 and 6 in particular 
draw on this data. In addition to these official texts, my documentary analysis has 
included materials given to me by NGOs, such as grant applications, budget reports 
and M&E strategies. These have provided an important lens on the procedures and 
systems in place in the organisations that were not always captured by interviewing 
their leaders. 
I understand policy texts as constituting a crucial element in the development 
landscape in their own right, and not simply in terms of how they are negotiated and 
put into practice. The data gained from the documentary analysis provides an 
understanding of policy agendas and themes and has enabled me to identify the 
continuities, as well as the breaks and ruptures, in development discourse and 
languages across time and space through the lens of the South African NGO sector. 
Focusing primarily on the concept of partnership, I assume that policy language 
plays an important part in the production of development discourses and in the 
production and representation of the subjects of development. Official 
pronouncements, as they occur in policy frameworks and mission statements, 
represent the normative narratives of IFls and aid agencies and legitimise their 
operations as well as their access to public resources (Shore and Wright 1997, 
Gould 2004a). These reports are thus important not because they represent an 
accurate guide to these institutions' economic policies, but because they are central 
texts in projects of ideological legitimation that impact on the vocabulary that is 
available in the development domain at a given time. Language represents and 
shapes social processes and relations over a distance - arguably crucial under 
conditions of globalisation and in the context of global development discourses 
which seek to maintain order as a set of shared representations. How such 
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discourses have been interpreted, modified or resisted by social actors, and how 
they interact with specifically South African vocabularies, concepts and ideas, is a 
clearly a different matter. 
3.5. Data analysis 
5.1 Use of NVivo for managing interview data 
I chose to use qualitative research software to help me manage the large amount of 
interview data I had generated. The use of NVivo is associated with particular 
epistemological assumptions that some argue rely heavily on grounded theory. 
Grounded theory methods are systematic guidelines for data collection and analysis 
to construct theories that are grounded in the data themselves so that the analysed 
data generates the concepts that are constructed (Glaser and Strauss 1968). I was 
aware of the fact that NVivo includes certain features that potentially support the 
logic of variable analysis which would not have been in line with the epistemological 
perspective I have chosen. However, it is important to bear in mind that since Glaser 
and Strauss (1968) sociologists have employed techniques like memo writing and 
coding which can be traced back to grounded theory but have combined these more 
eclectically with contemporary methodological approaches (Charmaz 2006). Gibbs 
also counters the assertion of NVivo's inherent bias, pointing out that 'as programs 
have become more sophisticated, they have become less connected to anyone 
analytic approach' (2002: 12). 
I used NVivo for storage of data and for the creation and manipulation of 
codes. The programme also provided a more convenient way of using memos than 
working in Word or on hard copy. However, being aware of the potential danger of 
becoming too distant from contextual data or mechanising the analysis, I periodically 
returned to hard copy versions of whole interview transcripts. For example, I would 
keep a coding report on the side whilst analysing pages of a whole interview 
transcript on the level of language. I did not use the software for modelling, 
classification or comparison because my qualitative, non-positivistic methodology 
would not have supported this strategy. I have also limited the use of NVivo to the 
analysis of interview data, allowing me to work with textual data from observations 
and documents, as well as non-textual data, outside of the cross-sectional indexing 
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system. In summary, I have employed NVivo as a tool for handling large amounts of 
qualitative data and in conjunction with more free-from styles of analysis. 
Thematic analysis of interview data 
Before beginning to index the interview data, I had read each interview several 
times, so that I was very familiar with the data already. Before coding in NVivo, I had 
done 'trial runs' of indexing on paper with the earliest transcripts. After this, I began 
developing categories though open coding in Word. Open coding involves a 
reflective reading of text to identify relevant categories. The initial categories were 
then identified by revisiting my research questions in the light of my fieldwork 
experiences. I subsequently started to develop a coherent set of categories from 
these initial themes that I could apply to the entire interview data set. These were 
refined through engagement with data from observational notes and documentary 
analysis. 
At first, themes were fairly broad and descriptive, such as roles of NGOs, 
funding, conceptions of development, relationship to the state and so on. I then 
trawled through the transcripts and looked for extracts that could either be coded 
under these categories or that related to the emerging themes, thereby refining the 
categories and creating sub-categories. After re-considering the relevant literature, 
the data was recoded and some of the categories were collapsed down to reflect the 
theoretical background to my analysis. I then trawled through the reports for nodes I 
had created, further refining my indexing scheme. For instance, within the very broad 
category of funding I distinguished between funding priorities, dynamics, processes, 
mobilisation, sources and long-term orientation. In this process, my categories slowly 
became more analytical and more detailed. 
I also began reflecting on the relationship between different themes by asking 
specific questions of the data, such as what the connections may be between my 
categories of development discourses, development priorities and language of 
proposals. To return to the above example of funding, by exploring the still fairly 
broad category of funding dynamics I developed further subcategories relating to 
competition, conditionalities, personal relationships, state bureaucracy, uncertainty 
about the future and skills. Refinement of categories and subcategories was also 
influenced by my knowledge of the literature, as was for instance the case with data 
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relating to social movements (for instance by categorising data relating to resource 
mobilisation, opportunity structure or symbolism). At this stage of the analysis, I 
began exploring the data in relation to macro-level discourses such as nation-
building, partnership, governance and neoliberalisation to see how individuals 
negotiated these and linked them to their own activities. Periodically, I would re-read 
the transcripts to see if there were any extracts relating to my categories that I had 
been missing (see Silverman 2001, Gibbs 2002, Seale 2004, Mason 2002 on 
thematic analysis). 
I accompanied these activities by working through whole transcripts on 
paper. Separately, I recorded my thinking about the emerging themes, why I had 
chosen them, how they were changing and any ideas I had for further analysis. I also 
noted thoughts about links with relevant literature or non-textual data. Given the 
large amount of data I had generated, these notes have proven very important in the 
data analysis process and throughout the writing up stage. Developing a coding 
structure in NVivo was one way of helping me to think through the relationship 
between different concepts and categories, but it certainly did not replace other 
forms of analysis and concept development. 
I also looked at interview extracts at the level of metaphors, using transcripts 
to explore discursive resources and strategies and noting significant terms and 
metaphors that stood out. Metaphors tend to reflect the cultural and social 
environments of their speakers, making significant the analysis of how they are used 
and structured (Gibbs 2002). They may be indicative of people finding it hard to 
express something or they may be an example for a shared concept. For instance, it 
was remarkable how often terms commonly associated with managerial or business 
language were used to describe extra-economic concepts or social processes. 
Analysis of other data 
I had developed a typology of South African NGOs, according to dimensions of 
funding, partnership model, relationships to the state, relationships to social 
movements, size and scope of activities. From this derived the concepts of 'new', 
'donor-based' and 'social entrepreneur' NGOs that I employ throughout this thesis. It 
was with the notion of a partnership-based NGO model in mind that I approached the 
analysis of observational data from my time with Mindset. I analysed my 
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observational notes with a view to gaining an understanding of types of expertise 
and their relative significance within the NGO sector. Documents also allowed me to 
explore the relationships between research, M&E, project targets/ management and 
funding in the context of multisectoral partnerships. 
As I described above, I was well into the data analysis by the time I returned 
to South Africa to carry out observation research and additional interviews. The data 
generated through observation is treated as case study material and I analysed it to 
confirm and refine the theoretical arguments I was developing. By analysing the 
NGOs' partnership model and M&E processes, I have sought to produce 
explanations of the processes that characterise Mindset. The organisation 
represents a case study and as such illuminates dimensions of partnership that are 
also relevant for other NGOs. In this regard, I have made some tentative arguments 
about the possible impact of these processes on the NGO sector at large, but 
acknowledge that there are great variations in terms of how they are understood and 
negotiated. 
Biographical interviews were analysed thematically; unlike my analysis of 
interviews with NGO staff, I did not transcribe these but rather chose to listen back to 
them, noting down themes that struck me as relevant. These included issues of 
national identity, experiences of the transitional period and the theme of betrayal. 
Parallel to their informal character - that of an in-depth and often very personal 
conversation with a friend - my analysis of these histories was much more informal, 
providing another though certainly not primary window to my research aims. 
3.6. Introducing participants and sites 
Here, I want to provide a brief narrative description of the named interviewees and 
the organisations they worked for. Appendices 1 and 2 provide this information in 
abbreviated form in a table, including expert interviews (in appendix 1) which I have 
not included here. I felt that, in line with my methodology, it was important to 
contextualise the analysis I provide in chapters 4 to 7 in greater detail, highlighting 
the Significant political and organisational differences between the organisations and 
situating them in terms of their positioning in the NGO sector. As discussed above, in 
order to highlight issues pertaining to audit culture and partnering as they applied 
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across sites as wide a range of South African NGOs as possible were selected. The 
participants are discussed in the chronological order of the interviews. 
The Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) is located in 
Braamfontein in central Jo'burg. A medium-size organisation, the CEPD was 
founded in 1992 on the initiative of the ANC in order to develop the policy framework 
for education and training in Post-Apartheid South Africa also known as the 'yellow 
book'. The organisation came close to shutting down in the late 1990s and is now 
involved in research and policy as well as occasional grants management for the 
Government. The director John Pampallis was in exile in Tanzania during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, teaching at an ANC school. 
The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), like a 
number of other NGOs, has its offices in the Braamfontein Centre on the corner of 
Jan Smuts Avenue and Jorissen Street. It is a research organisation but also plays a 
lobbying and advocacy role. Moreover, it is involved in direct trauma management 
and counselling, education and training and institutional change management with a 
view to promoting sustainable peace and reconciliation. Strategic partnerships with 
agencies of the state, NGOs, community organisations, individuals and international 
allies are seen as integral to these goals. The organisation started in 1989 at Wits 
University to provide psycho-social counselling to the victims of violence by security 
forces, but quickly developed a research unit to understand the nature and causes of 
violence. 
Connect Africa is a small project that delivers communication, business and 
Government services to rural communities in partnership with the Government and 
communications companies. Dion Jerling, its founder and director, labels the 
organisation a social enterprise rather than an NGO, due to the fact that they 
employed non-traditional funding and partnering strategies. 
Starfish is a well-known medium-size NGO working with Aids orphans. Acting 
as an intermediary between corporations and small CBOs, this organisation is 
sponsored by corporates and international donors but, unusually, individual 
donations make up a large chunk of their funding. My informant here, Dom Marshall-
Smith, represents a personality in the NGO landscape that I would occasionally 
encounter: a well-educated well-travelled white South African who had returned from 
overseas to give something back. As Dom told me, 'Starfish is staffed by people that 
are coming out of corporate jobs, looking to make a difference in this society which is 
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you know teetering on the brink. There is a hope within South Africa right now, 
particularly in the White 30-something generation, around making a difference' 
(Interview, D. Marshall-Smith, 23 Mar 07). 
The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) is one of the most visible, albeit 
small, NGOs in South Africa, researching and campaigning on a number of 
censorship issues. The history of the FXI is tied up with Apartheid-era anti-
censorship work and the campaign to establish an independent SABC board and 
broadcasting regulator ahead of the 1994 elections. The FXI is one of the only NGOs 
in this research that worked with social movements from the beginning. Jane 
Duncan, the director at the time (she has now taken a post as professor in the Chair 
of Media and Information Society at Rhodes University) herself is a public figure and 
well-known activist. 
Mindset is a large NGO that creates, sources and delivers educational 
resources to schools and the health community through ICT and other, more 
conventional media. The organisation was founded in 2003 and has always worked 
in multiple partnerships with the business sector, NGOs and donors, as well as with 
the provincial and national Governments. I carried out interviews with a number of 
staff here, from the CEO to the Head of Education and the Chief Fundraiser. In 
January and February 2008 I spent a month with the organisation, carrying out 
observation research and further interviews. 
IDASA is perhaps the most prominent advocacy NGO in South Africa today, 
working in the fields of democracy, citizenship and governance. The organisation 
was founded in 1986, and convened the Dakar meeting which first brought together 
ANC and National Party members. Richard Calland, the director of the Governance 
Programme, has written extensively on South Africa and appears regularly as a 
political commentator in the media, for instance with a column for the Mail & 
Guardian. 
ILRIG is a NGO that provides research, education and support to the 
traditional labour movement as well as to the new social movements. Medium-sized, 
it has developed out of an Apartheid-era service organisation that provided 
resources to labour organisations. Explicitly anti-neoliberal, ILRIG seeks to build 
capacity for alternatives to neoliberal globalisation. 
The Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust is a small Cape Town-based organisation 
that emerged after Harold Wolpe's death. It organises events and lectures in 
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partnership with academic centres and other NGOs, with the aim of fostering critical 
dialogue and debate on issues of democracy and democratic participation. I 
interviewed the outgoing national co-ordinator Tracy Bailey and her successor Vanja 
Karth, who had worked extensively in the non-profit sector. 
The EDGE Institute is a small research NGO, located again at the 
Braamfontein Centre. The organisation carries out research on economic policy and 
development issues and holds public seminars. Stephen Gelb is a well-known 
economist who has worked for the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 
and the South African Government, and is currently a professor for development 
studies at Wits. 
The Africa Foundation presents a different kind of NGO. Working in 
conservation, and based in the wealthy Northern suburb of Sandton, this 
organisation raises money from private donations, donors and corporates to facilitate 
the empowerment and development of people living in or adjacent to protected areas 
in Southern Africa. It does so by forging partnerships between conservation 
initiatives and communities, and works in partnership with other civil society 
organisations and provincial Government. 
Gun Free South Africa was established in 1994 as a campaign for gun-
control laws and gun-free zones. Turning from a campaign or movement into a 
formal NGO, GFSA is now entirely foreign-funded. The organisation collaborates 
with various civil society partners to ensure the implementation of the Firearms 
Control Act, which it helped create, and also carries out research on violence. 
The Media Monitoring Project (now Media Monitoring Africa) was established 
in 1993 to monitor the first democratic elections, and specifically to monitor the 
SABC. It now monitors the media more broadly and seeks to promote democracy 
and human rights. 
NANGOSA (National Alliance for Non-Government Organisations) was only 
established in 2006 as a national NGO umbrella body. At the time of interviewing, its 
president Eric Ntshiqela was trying to secure funding for its civil society capacity 
building activities. This, and my interview on the following day with the Workers 
Education Project (WEP), whilst giving me some insights into their particular 
situations (at the beginning and the end of their existence, respectively) were 
probably least useful in terms of shedding light on the effects of the partnership idea. 
The WEP, founded during Apartheid to provide education and training for the labour 
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movements, was struggling to survive at the time of interviewing, and had started to 
become involved in the SETA training programmes. 
Teboho Trust is a small Soweto-based NGO that was founded by American 
Jose Bright in 2001. It works with vulnerable, often orphaned, teenagers, 
accompanying them from secondary school through to university. This is done 
through mentoring and social and personal empowerment workshops, and by 
providing educational support and democracy and governance programmes for the 
children. I would characterise this model as a social enterprise model, although Jose 
called it an NGO which he wanted to export to other countries in a kind of 'franchise 
model'. 
Valued Citizens Initiative was founded in 2001 to strengthen civil society 
through the promotion of constitutional values and democratic citizenship in schools. 
Having established strong partnerships with public and private sectors, the 
organisation provides human rights training and civil education in secondary schools 
throughout Gauteng. The director Carole Podetti is from France and originally has a 
background in public relations and administration. 
The Durban-based Democratic Development Programme (DDP) was 
founded in 1993 on the initiative of the German conservative Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation and works in the areas of civil society capacity building, civic 
participation and voter education in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal. The NGO works 
with CBOs across KZN, and has partnerships with various municipal and provincial 
government agencies. 
The Centre for Public Participation (CPP), also in Durban, likewise focuses 
on strengthening public participation in governance, carrying out research, 
parliamentary monitoring, training and advocacy activities. Originally a part of 
IDASA, the organisation became independent in 1997. As the organisation's director 
Janine Hicks had just left to work for the Gender Commission, I interviewed Imraan 
Buccus, the research co-ordinator, on her recommendation. As with the next 
interviewee, this interview took place during the June 2007 SANPAD conference in 
Durban, providing quite a different environment to my other conversations with NGO 
leaders. 
Michelle Oyedan was the director of AGENDA at the time of interviewing her 
although she has now moved to human rights organisation Indiba-Africa. Agenda is 
a feminist media organisation that publishes a well-respected journal aimed at 
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academics, activists and gender researchers. Established in 1987, the organisation 
had also recently become involved in community radio broadcasting. Like many of 
the other NGOs I interviewed, Agenda struggled with developing a sustainability 
strategy and found the changing funding modalities of its international donors 
burdensome. 
Siyazisika Trust was established in 1987 to contribute towards small 
enterprise development in rural KwaZulu-Natal. Today the Johannesburg-based trust 
provides training and mentoring for communities across South Africa and works with 
a sister company Khumbulani which supports rural craftspeople to reach markets. 
Whilst working with the Department for Agriculture on specific projects, the NGO has 
suffered from the non-payment of government grants and is now (amongst other 
donors) funded by Tshikululu, the CSI umbrella agency acting for various large 
corporations. 
Operation Hunger is a typical Apartheid-era service organisation that dealt 
with the consequence of Apartheid policies, implementing broad-based feeding 
programmes and initiating self-help projects. Whilst continuing to work in this area, 
the NGO now provides training and capacity building programmes for communities, 
acting as an intermediary between agencies, government and CBOs. 
On my return to South Africa in 2008, I also interviewed Lauren Graham, a 
researcher at CASE, the Community Agency for Social Enquiry. This NGO produces 
research on social, economic and political issues for various clients, including 
government, international agencies and other CSOs. This interview represents an 
exception in the sense that Lauren contacted me after having heard a paper on 
NGO-state relations I presented at a conference at Wits. As a result, our 
conversation centred particularly on the issue of funding (in)dependence and the 
NGO's understanding of its role as a watchdog. 
3.7. Ensuring quality of research: 'validity' and transparency 
Despite using the term 'validity' in this subsection, quantitative measures of validity 
or replicability must not be employed uncritically in qualitative research given their 
positivist resonances (Kirk and Miller 1986, see Seale 1999, Flick 2002 for overviews 
of the debate). The qualitative approach I have chosen does not intend to produce 
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standardised results and, given the importance of my own positioning in this 
research, eschews conventional measures of reliability. Nonetheless, the quality of 
my chosen research methodology and interpretation needs to be established. 
I have already discussed triangulation as an alternative approach to validate 
qualitative research (Blaikie 2000). Guba and Lincoln's (1989) alternative criteria for 
judging the quality of qualitative research have been widely employed and provide 
another way of assessing the quality of qualitative research. Credibility is here 
introduced as an alternative to internal validity, whereas transferability refers to the 
degree to which research responsibly generalises to other contexts. I have 
demonstrated credibility and transferability by situating informants' accounts and 
have contextualised the research setting both through thick descriptions and the 
review of major debates in my field. 
The interpretivist nature of my research means that I have rejected the idea 
of a true reality that can be discovered with the right research tools (Mason 2002). 
Transparency and ongoing reflexivity however are important ways of achieving 
validity of interpretation (or dependability and confirmability, as Guba and Lincoln 
[1989] referred to the responsibility to account for the changing research context and 
to lay open one's choice of research methods and interpretation). Ensuring 
confirmability may also involve the building-in of a falsification strategy by searching 
for 'deviant cases' and by ongoing interaction with other researchers (Seale 2004). 
As I have shown above, the data analysis and development of analytical themes was 
undertaken alongside an ongoing engagement with contemporary debates in this 
field. At various points throughout the course of this research, I have given extracts 
of my work to colleagues and my supervisors. Preliminary ideas about Mindset were 
discussed with several staff at the organisation at the end of my observation period. 
All informants have been offered transcripts of their interviews and were invited to 
comment (although only a handful took up the offer). The fact that my informants and 
I were involved in an interpretative circle, in which they were knowledgeable about 
my discipline and expertise and which I have read to be instructive about their 
positioning and habitus, is a main constituent of this project. 
The quality of this research has further been addressed by making 
transparent my standpoint and identity, my choice of methods and logic of 
methodological strategy. In this chapter, I have explained why I have chosen 
particular methods and how they are appropriate to the nature of the research 
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questions and overall research design. I have also, in this chapter and throughout 
the thesis, made transparent how I came to my interpretation and how I have 
reflexively engaged with my own standpoint. I have sought to contextualise and 
situate informants' accounts and to give adequate space to contradictions and 
untidiness in the data. I have explained how and why informants and case 
organisations were chosen and have indicated some of the dynamics of my 
relationships with them. I have discussed how I carried out my analysis and how 
themes, concepts and categories were derived. The way I have used notes and 
memos also makes it possible to retrace the way my indexing of data has evolved. 
3.8. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have emphasised the importance of interaction with informants and 
spaces. However, this also means that my own position and motivations needed to 
be reflected on and questioned. I have discussed some of the implications of my 
positioning on the knowledge I have produced and how self-representation and 
identity have played a central role in the research relationships that I formed, but 
have found it harder to convey a sense of how profoundly my fieldwork experiences 
have affected me. Whilst I believe that qualitative researching necessarily entails 
awareness and critical reflection of how fieldwork and the very process of writing 
construct and implicate personal identities, I have perhaps worried too much about 
the danger of producing a highly personalised but not a more reflexive account 
(Coffey 1999). 
This question of identity work is quite separate from the need to produce 
transparent and reflexive accounts of the research process. I have demonstrated 
validity of methodology by outlining why my particular approach was chosen, how it 
matches the research questions and that it is consistent with the explanations that 
my chosen methods have generated. I have also sought to prove validity of 
interpretation by giving an account of the research and analysis process and of 
issues of positionality and authorship that I have grappled with. I have sought to 
make transparent throughout the present thesis my research process and practices 
(also see section 3.7 above). 
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Reflecting on my research design today, I feel that overall I have achieved 
what I set out to do. However, the project would certainly have benefited from having 
had more time in the field. Particularly, I would have liked to have included more 
organisations in my research, although this is not realistic in the space of the three or 
so years allocated to a Ph.D. project. My research could have moreover been 
improved by carrying out a greater number of expert interviews, for instance with 
social movement activists. If time constraints would not have been an issue this 
research could have hugely benefited from including a comparative dimension, for 
example by carrying out research into intermediary NGOs in another middle-income 
economy such as India or Brazil. I will return to these reflections in chapter 8. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the research could also have been improved by 
carrying out more observation research with different organisations (as was originally 
planned). My project sought to explore the discursive constructions of NGO leaders 
in relation to auditing and partnerships, but clearly there are gaps between what 
NGO professionals say they do and what actually happens in an organisation. This 
was partly addressed by my drawing on documentary sources and other 
ethnographic material. Indeed it has been one the biggest challenges of this project 
to be truthful to these messy and complicated outcomes and experiences in the 
context of a largely discursive-analytical research project. 
However, data gained from in-depth interviews can show how actors make 
sense of discourses which is not sufficient in fully exploring how impact assessment 
procedures and partnership demands play themselves out in practice. A extended 
period of observation research would have also allowed me to examine in greater 
detail the ways in which technologies of rule can be ineffective and what unintended 
projects they may give rise to. Whilst this research employs a discursive-analytical 
approach with its inherent strengths and weaknesses, it recognises that projects of 
rule are only ever projects and that they often fail. Moreover, there are projects within 
projects - class relations, historical alliances and geopolitics are just a few of the 
elements that together form the backdrop against which the South African NGO 
sector operates. Indeed, this research might be extended with future work that will 
explore the successes and failures of audit culture through in-depth depth 
ethnographies that can highlight the messy unintended outcomes of the new regime 
of auditing on intermediary NGOs. 
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The following chapter initiates the discussion of data by introducing the 
construct of the 'new NGO' and the theoretical framework for my analysis of 
partnerships in the context of both Post-Apartheid and global development. Chapters 
4 and 5 are closely linked, with the former discussing partnership as part of NGOs' 
overall sustainability model, and the latter in terms of its dynamics and associated 
practices. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 
The NewNGO 
We have very good relations with Government, 
Education, Health and the Department of 
Communications, with respect to their 
understanding of what we are doing. And so in 
that sense bringing the kind of public entity, the 
private sector entity and the not for profit entity 
together to work cooperatively, I think it's great! 
Now in South Africa it may be a kind of easier 
way to do that simply because of our history. 
(V. Naidoo, Mindset, 9 May 07) 
The power of partnerships is voluntary and 
coercive at the same time, producing both new 
forms of agency and new forms of discipline. 
(Abrahamsen 2004: 1454) 
This chapter introduces the construct of 'new NGO' to analyse practices that have 
characterised the NGO domain in South Africa since the democratic transition and to 
explore how they have been negotiated by the NGOs in this research. The term new 
NGO works as a shorthand to describe both new-generation NGOs that have 
emerged after the first funding crisis and those who have successfully navigated 
shifting Post-Apartheid development modalities. The concept emerged from my 
observation that many NGO staff described funding modalities, sustainability 
approaches and organisational practices in opposition to a more traditional NGO 
model. This older NGO model was defined in reference to South African service 
organisations during Apartheid and their role in the liberation struggle, as well as to a 
more universal understanding of donor-beneficiary relations. 
As I argue in this chapter, NGO staff often distanced themselves from what 
were portrayed as less efficient NGOs, sometimes invoking metaphors of death, 
survival or birth. If the changing funding modalities under Post-Apartheid that are 
charted in the first part of this chapter represent moments of crisis or the death of a 
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particular type of organisation, then what has come into existence in its place? One 
characteristic of the new NGO is its diverse sustainability model, which the second 
part of this chapter addresses with a view to their impact on NGOs' identity and 
mission. Importantly, NGOs may portray themselves as having the ability to form 
strong partnerships with diverse stakeholders and the corporate sector. The image of 
an 'all-singing, all-dancing' organisation comes to mind capturing the many roles, 
functions and tasks that the new NGO must be capable of fulfilling. The last part of 
the chapter initiatives my discussion of partnerships by exploring usages of the 
language and vocabulary of partnerships in NGOs in South Africa and in global 
development policy. This theme is then fully explored in the subsequent chapter 5. 
There are a few important caveats to the typology employed here. Firstly, all 
South African NGOs are currently forced to develop self-financing strategies; audit 
practices lead any donor-based NGO to corporatise to some degree (also see 
chapter 6). As a result, boundaries between what may be called a donor-based and 
a partnership-based model are far from secure. Secondly, international donors see 
multisectoral partnerships as a funding priority and actively encourage NGO 
collaborations. Some of the case NGOs have a whole range of different partnerships 
but still obtain their income from donors. Thirdly, the South African NGO sector is 
clearly highly differentiated and neither partnerships nor the partnership discourse 
have the same impact on all organisations. In short, the concept of a new NGO is 
ideal-typical: donor mode and partnership mode are typological devices employed to 
examine the important effects this development ideal has on the sector, for instance 
by increasingly imbuing it with a survivalist rhetoric and impacting on NGOs' way of 
being and of thinking about doing NGO work. 
International donor funding is in many ways the elephant in the room in this 
chapter and throughout the analysis. Funding flows run through the entire 
development domain, from international donors to the Government and to NGOs, to 
service-delivery CBOs and certain social movements, carrying with them not just 
resources but specific technologies and vocabularies, forms of expertise and 
calculation. Donors still have most of the power most of the time, circulating 
development priorities and techniques. However, partnerships constitute different 
kinds of mechanisms and technologies of exercising authority and legitim ising that 
authority. Moreover, 21 st century development is arguably more about policy than 
about distinct development projects managed by donors, given that aid is 
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increasingly channelled into direct support for national budgets or into basket funds. 
From these, donor agencies fund Government-run sectoral programmes in health, 
education or civil society reform. So whilst donor visibility has become more limited 
at the grassroots, they are more important than ever in the transnational policy 
community and therefore exerting considerable influence on the management of 
public affairs. Unlike service delivery NGOs that are more clearly dependent on 
Government, intermediary NGOs remain at least in part funded by international 
actors. It is hence these organisations that are the first link in a chain that carries 
donors' agendas and modes of development delivery. 
4.2. Transition, crisis and rebirth 
Looking back: from Apartheid service organisation to Post-Apartheid NGO 
Above, I introduced the idea of a new-generation NGOs. To understand what is 
meant by this term requires discussing what preceded this new NGO, not least 
because many of the successful NGOs in my research distanced themselves from 
an older model of civil society organisation, as for instance Richard Calland does 
here: 
What I do know is that some NGOs that I can name atrophied, they didn't 
wake up to the new terrain, they didn't have a strategic discussion within 
themselves, they didn't change their relationships and they lost leadership, a 
lot of them, and withered on the vine (R.Caliand, IDA SA, Interview, 23 Apr 
07). 
Felicity Gibbs recalls the changes in civil society in the transition period and the first 
years of democracy: 
Many NGOs folded. Yes, and the first ones to go were the ones who were 
incredibly politically oriented, were the ones who were waving their arms in 
the air and shouting and being arrested. They got lots of money then. But the 
minute the new Government came in, those kinds of NGOs got no money 
because donors, be they private or whatever, they said: you do not have to 
jump up in the streets anymore; you've got your own Government, you've got 
what you asked for. And then of course there were a lot of skills or skilled 
people in NGOs who went then into Government. And when they were no 
longer there the NGO came to the end of its lifespan (F. Gibbs, Operation 
Hunger, Interview, 4 Jul 07). 
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Under Apartheid, what were then called service organisations or civics worked 
explicitly against the state. Foreign governments and donor agencies channelled 
funds to fight the Apartheid regime through these organisations. Contrary to some 
contemporary narratives of Apartheid civil society, the values of the various parts of 
the Anti-Apartheid movement - besides the objectives of a non-racial society - were 
not always similarly defined. They differed on essential issues such as the form of 
democracy and economic system to be adopted after the end of Apartheid. Tensions 
were largely suspended with the formation after the Soweto Riots of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), which provided an umbrella organisation for hundreds of 
civics mobilising against National Party rule. Nonetheless there remained a clear 
ideological and organisational divide amongst the different components of South 
African civil society, serving to problematise an orthodox notion of the Anti-Apartheid 
movement as consensual and homogenous. Marais for example describes the 
'remorseless and sometimes violent intolerance shown towards dissent and 
heterodoxy within the popular movement' (2001: 63). 
The transition and immediate post-'94 period were characterised by a 
harmonisation of development objectives and by cooperation between civil society 
and the newly-democratic state. This was a result both of a consensual model of 
Post-Apartheid nation-building that attributed a service delivery role to CSOs, and of 
the formalisation of civil society through the structural and legislative consolidation 
that I have outlined in chapter 2. In the RDP, the state had committed itself formally 
to fostering institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society. 
NGO expert knowledge was to play an important part in the capacity building of civil 
society and the transition process, with increasing numbers of progressive CSOs 
involved in policy-development, training, networking and implementation. 
The post-'94 funding crisis that led to the folding of many organisations and 
to the professionalisation of what remained of the sector was a product of changing 
priorities of international funders. These now supported the democratically elected 
South African Government directly through bilateral agreements thus reducing the 
resources available for NGOs: 
The donors said we won't be giving you that amount of money; you've now 
got a good Government, and all things are right and all things are wonderful 
106 
and rosy and you can get your money there (F. Gibbs, Operation Hunger, 
Interview, 4 Jul 07). 
Much of the expertise of the civics was being absorbed into the new state 
bureaucracy, as former civics staff were employed by Govemment ministries, 
agencies and commissions. This process continues today, as witnessed by the high 
rate of personnel change in the sector - some of my informants had moved into 
positions in the public sector by the time I returned to Johannesburg for the second 
leg of my fieldwork. Richard observes: 
Government, you know, people in the president's office always complain 
where are the alternatives coming from civil society, where is the strong 
research. Well, part of the answer is that most of the good researchers have 
been recruited by Government, you know our budget programme has been a 
training arm for Government. I can name 20 people who have been through 
this office and who now work for Government. Fair enough it's not a bad 
thing. But it is where they end up, or in the private sector (R.Caliand, IDASA, 
Interview, 23 Apr 07). 
Other NGOs survived the transition and associated restructuring but found 
that they needed to either reposition themselves as service delivery organisations or 
to carry out contracting work for the Government. This integration into state and 
corporate structures - both on a level of personnel and in terms of shifting activities 
towards service delivery - can in some ways be understood as a desire to contribute 
to the shaping of progressive policies in the newly-democratising South Africa, 
ensuring that the expertise available in these civic organisations would assist 
Government. The shift in 1996, from a framework seemingly emphasiSing 
reconstruction to GEAR, moreover favoured 'institutionalised corporatist 
relationships involving all social forces in the project of "nation building" through 
politicallideological "consensus'" (McKinley Unpublished Book Chapter). The 
emphasis on being partners in a shared national project, usually cast in terms of 
social cohesion and the construction of the 'new South Africa', was an important 
discursive building block of the initial Post-Apartheid years and has arguably 
impacted on the funding model and value orientation of what were now called NGOs. 
Indeed, by the time GEAR emerged, the NGO sector found itself side-lined and 
unable to challenge Government in a meaningful way. Many international donors in 
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fact began to directly support civil society organisations again by the beginning of 
this decade, but with their funding priorities having shifted to partnerships. 
The birth of the new NGO 
As a result of the above-outlined processes, the NGO sector was weakened in terms 
of capacity, reduced in numbers, increasingly dependent in terms of activities and 
had re-structured itself in important ways in line with Government policies and 
priorities (also see the historical background discussed in chapter 2). The new type 
of South African NGO that emerged in the beginning of the decade had already 
internalised these issues and incorporated them into its organisational form (also see 
the timeline in appendix 4). The financial crisis effectively created a more 
streamlined and self-sufficient NGO, as John Pampallis' account illustrates: 
We were forced onto the market and had to become self-sufficient. And 
think we woke up a little late and came very close to closing. The deputy 
director at the time and me really walked the dusty streets of Pretoria from 
embassy to embassy and went to various big companies trying to beg money 
and tried to get tenders, I mean we were pretty bad at that in those days. 
Now we are pretty good, you see, now we churn out those tenders like we 
are a factory. A tender factory (J. Pampallis, CEPD, Interview, 23 Feb 07). 
Similar narratives were apparent in most interviews, often framing the 
changes in business management terms. Here, Imraan explains how the changing 
funding modalities affected his organisation: 
We had to manage the process, which means we had to cut down 
programmatically. We also had to very immediately decide on retrenching 
staff, because a significant part of the budget was going to human resources. 
We had expensive office space which we shut down [ ... J SO there was all 
these cost-cutting measures [ ... J And then we sort of revisited programmes, 
strategically, and developed a more streamlined, focused programme (I. 
Succus, CPP, Interview, 26 Jun 07). 
The language employed in many of the interviews highlights concerns with 
reconfiguring the organisation, maximising efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as is 
evident in terms such as 'streamlining', 'focusing' and 'managing the process'. The 
funding crisis was thus instrumental in the birth of the new-generation NGOs and in 
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the restructuring of those who survived the transition, producing a particular ideal-
typical NGO that is professionalised, efficient and flexible. 
The renewed changes in aid modalities towards sector-wide approaches 
(SWAP) and budget support have caused a second funding crisis in recent years, 
leading to a transfer of 'blue-chip NGO' activity to the SADC (Southern African 
Development Community) region, as I will further explore below. The pressures by 
many donors to give fewer and larger grants to NGO partnerships or consortia have 
led to a stratification process, whereby CBOs and smaller NGOs directly support 
people, whereas larger or more formalised organisations address political and policy 
responses to developmental issues, comprising activities such as advocacy, 
lobbying, research, organisational development and so forth. 
I said above that case organisations often rhetorically distanced themselves 
from an older model of NGO. This was particularly noticeable with newer and with 
more corporatised NGOs. They perhaps regarded the 'old struggle NGOs' as 
outdated or archaic, given that the themes of death and survival were dominant: 
some NGOs were said to be 'withering on the wine' (R. Calland, IDA SA , 23 Apr 07) 
or 'falling by the way side' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). Significantly, there is also a 
value judgement by newer types of NGOs towards others that are perceived as not 
being equally prepared for the new configuration. Dion Jerling of Connect Africa, an 
organisation that characterised its organisational model as a social enterprise, told 
me: 'And those poor NGOs, they spend most of their time trying to find where next 
year's money's coming from, or next month's' (D. Jerling, Connect Africa, 16 Mar 
07). This conveyed a sense of old NGOs that, like dinosaurs, are not being versatile 
and flexible enough to adapt to the ever-changing rules of a Post-Apartheid and 
Post-Washington Consensus world. 
Accordingly, interviewees evoked an understanding of progress which always 
necessarily discredits the old and which crucially has to involve a transformation of 
attitudes: 'A lot of the NGOs are still working with the pre-'94 mindset, people and 
strategies. And that is where they're not much advancing' (M. Oyedan, Agenda, 27 
Jun 07). Conversely, an organisation that does advance is one that is flexible and, as 
Felicity's account of the transition at the start of this section illustrated, not 'incredibly 
politically oriented' (F. Gibbs, Operation Hunger, 4 Jul 07). The survivalist language 
is also a reflection of the shift in donor guidelines to NGO-conceived and 
implemented projects that demonstrate sustainability. As I discuss in the following 
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section, sustainability is conceived of in narrow financial terms by both donors and 
NGOs in this research thereby establishing a link between producing commercially 
viable development products and organisational survival. 
Indeed, flexibility sums up the new NGO. As I will show in the following 
chapters, it can adapt to the agendas of Government, ingest the working practices of 
corporates and still be aligned with the normative ideals of civil society. Flexibility 
also describes the new NGO in terms of its organisational structure. Many activities 
such as fund raising or aspects of monitoring are outsourced now, and core and 
support staff had been drastically reduced in every organisation in which I 
interviewed. Flexibility is a key characteristic of post-Fordist capitalism, its 
organisational model centred on increased responsibility and self-supervision of 
workers and productive sites (Hardt and Negri 2000). The donor model NGO 
operates as a unitary, stand alone organisation that needs to spend a lot of 
resources on raising funds to do their core business. Trying to 'offer a one stop 
service' (K. Greenop, Mindset, 1 Feb 08) makes it difficult to sustain itself. 
Conversely, a new NGO like Mindset tries to form partnerships to increase impact so 
'that everything is added value' (ibid.). 
Given this restructuring of the NGO sector, sustainability has emerged as an 
essential part of organisations' thinking. Partnering is arguably the most effective 
sustainability strategy for South African NGOs, as it allows for co-financing between 
sectors and is a funding condition of many donors. The policy drive that encourages 
partnerships is therefore explored in greater detail later in this chapter. However, 
besides partnering, the successful NGOs in this research employed a variety of other 
strategies to remain financially sustainable. 
4.3. Survival and sustainability: some NGO strategies49 
Whilst most NGOs understood the term sustainability in terms of reducing their 
resource vulnerability, there are different dimensions of sustainability, the most 
important of which are: 
• development impact and enduring change 
49 Also see appendix 4 which presents case NGOs' sustainability strategies at a glance. 
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• resource mobilisation (human and financial) 
• the adaptive viability of organisations (Fowler 2000c) 
A focus on financial survivability therefore in itself entails a narrow conception of 
sustainability, which may impact negatively on other dimensions, such as 
development impact and lasting change. As Fowler argues, strategic choices in 
terms of resources have a ramification beyond their reliability, 'because the choices 
made can also affect what the organisation stands for, which equates to a second 
task of protecting its mission and identity' (ibid: 60). Being sustainable from this 
perspective goes some way towards becoming more autonomous and flexible, 
producing marketable or profitable outcomes. The central problem with this restricted 
definition of sustainability lies in the fact that by its very nature, NGOs cannot be 
financially sustainable, since they should be needs-oriented rather than profits-
oriented. In other words, funders require a model of sustainability that NGOs by 
definition cannot fulfil unless they radically change their mode of operation, both in 
terms of structure and activities. 
The debate on NGO sustainability first arose in the 1980s in the context of 
the classical neoliberal understanding of non-profit organisations that called for 
development NGOs to be completely self-financing. Today, this is no longer seen as 
necessarily desirable, not least due to the partnership trend which has led to co-
financing between sectors and the resurgence of civil society as a panacea for 
development. Fowler (2000c) defines the following factors that impact on NGOs' 
strategic choices for resource mobilisation and sustainability: 
• vulnerability (the ability to suffer costs imposed by external events; the 
(in)ability to 'cope'), 
• sensitivity (how fast and to what degree do resource changes impact; 
severity of disruption), 
• criticality (how easily a resource can be replaced by another), 
• consistency (the ability to alter resource profile without compromising mission 
and identity), 
• autonomy (the ability to say 'no' in terms of resources) and 
• compatibility (the similarity between new and existing resources in terms of 
structure and values; the extent of modifications required) 
111 
Bearing in mind these factors and turning to the case organisations' sustainability 
strategies, NGOs firstly often sought a diversification of funds and funders (also see 
section 4.4. below): 
I think our independence comes from the fact that we have several sources 
of funding, we are not completely dependent on anyone source of funding 
and I think independence comes from having several income streams, and 
not being entirely beholding to anyone donor (J. Duncan, FXf, 30 Mar 07). 
This strategy remains firmly within the framework of a donor-based organisational 
model. Its disadvantage lies in investing greater resources into M&E, proposal-
writing and administrative tasks, which many of the NGOs are not equipped to do: 
'what I would like would be that we have less funders because the administration of 
a lot of funders is very hard' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). Yet, it is precisely a 
diversification of funders that is meant to guarantee survivability, which implies an 
even greater commitment to auditing. Moreover, the organisational ability to learn 
and to monitor projects supposedly contributes to cost-efficiency and so to 
survivability, which indicates a link between sustainability and M&E. 
With some of the bigger NGOs, there is also a danger of diversification of 
activities which can sometimes lead NGOs to become too unfocused, moving away 
from their core strengths and threatening their identity. This may then be affecting 
their organisational consistency. Tendering for Government money is probably the 
most significant amongst these diversification strategies, although Government 
contracts have been a source of income for many South African NGOs since the 
transition. The dynamics and challenges of NGO-state relations are addressed in 
detail in the following chapter; here, it is sufficient to point out that this may affect the 
extent to which they can be autonomous. 
Secondly, due to the re-c1assification of South Africa as middle-income 
economy, donors often require South African NGOs to develop projects in the wider 
Southern African region: 
In the last 5 years, where we have been pulled or where we've headed in 
terms of our portfolio of work is to do a hell of a lot more work outside of 
South Africa, throughout the rest of the continent, and initially that was just 
following the market, so the market place came to us and said we want to 
buy your skills, is basically what happened. And we would say yes or no, and 
often we would say yes. Because it was attractive, because it was a good 
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way of creating a new sustainability model. So for IDASA it has been a very 
valuable way of creating a new business model (R. Calland, IDASA, 23 Apr 
07). 
Many of the blue-chip NGOs now carry out a range of activities connected with 
training and capacity building of local civil societies (also see chapter 7 for a 
discussion of the implications of an 'export model'). The preference of donors for 
such regional expansionism interestingly both constitutes a tribute to ideas of local 
ownership, in that it is seen as more appropriate to have South African NGOs carry 
out capacity building than an INGO, and betrays a sense of paternalism towards 
local NGOs. The language of 'following the market' once again speaks to my overall 
argument of the extent to which NGO discourse is framed in market terms and led by 
profitability concerns. 
This particular sustainability strategy may affect dimensions of sensitivity and 
consistency, as not all organisations may be mature enough to deal with the 
expansion into different countries, as Vanja Karth from the Harold Wolpe Memorial 
Trust readily admitted: 
So for us it is far too soon to say we can actually afford to start working with 
people in Malawi, in Mozambique. We are not ready, we still need to actually 
get it properly recognised and properly instituted here before we can take it 
further. And the thing is, people take time to get good at what they do - We 
have finished fighting the struggle, now we need to solidify whatever we do. 
And we can't dilute ourselves by pretending to be the best (V. Karth, 25 Apr 
07). 
The trend towards geographically extending one's work once again emphasises the 
huge impact that international resource flows have on shaping NGO activity: 
It's more around how foreign governments define South Africa. If they 
continue to define it as a [middle] income country, and therefore less 
resources coming in; so there's less resources coming in not just for civil 
society but even sometimes for government projects that's coming in. So that 
affects across the board and it has nothing to do with shift in government 
policy around RDP, GEAR or greater social development (A. Motala, CSVR, 
14 Mar 07). 
Thirdly, NGOs in this research increasingly seek to develop profitable 
activities by charging for consulting, training, grant-managing or publishing. It is not 
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that these are always new activities but rather that they are now conceived of as 
chargeable. Imraan explains: 
And obviously CPP has also gone into the phase now where we take on not 
consulting work, but sort of contractual work where maybe a state 
department wants a workshop on public participation. Previously we probably 
wouldn't have charged but now we do. It's all about building a sustainable 
income (I. Buccus, CPP, 26 Jun 07). 
There are often two-tier systems in place, which means some clients pay whereas 
the poorest or most marginalised do not. This shift arguably impacts on the way in 
which NGOs think about the development projects they develop and implement. 
Whether a 'development solution' is marketable as a product becomes an important 
criterion in the conception of projects. Michelle from Agenda for example told me 
about the difficulty of 'pitching' the publications it produces for a pay-for market, after 
the Ford Foundation had stopped funding publications. Other NGOs such as IDASA 
or CEPD have begun to manage grants in a drive to develop profitable activities. 
Grant-management is 'an efficient way of making money' (R. Calland, IDASA, 23 Apr 
07), but it is also a way of ensuring that Government departments work more 
efficiently: 'the Education Department prefer to have it outside of the department 
because there is less bureaucracy, they can make quicker decisions, for example on 
how to spend money' (J. Pampallis, CEPD, 23 Feb 07). This understanding - that 
NGOs are more efficient than the public sector - is central to the sector's self-
perception and legitimacy. 
This branching out constitutes another example of the all-singing, all-dancing 
NGO that is able to take on grant management in addition to its more traditional 
activities. In this field as elsewhere, NGOs often compete with private sector 
organisations: 
In the beginning we found that we were tendering and competing against 
other NGOs. Now you put in a tender and you find yourself not only against 
the other NGOs but also against Ernst & Young, Deloitte's, 
PriceWaterHouse, POE Private Bank, depending on the kind of work it is (J. 
Pampallis, CEPD, 23 Feb 07). 
Whilst successful NGOs portray themselves on the one hand as highly adaptable, 
being all kinds of things to all kinds of partners, there always lurks an essentially 
precarious situation of needing to find efficient ways of making money and to avoid 
the fate of other organisations that have folded. Organisational dimensions of 
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compatibility and consistency are potentially negatively affected here, given the 
resources and expertise required by such new (or newly-packaged) activities. 
Fourthly, a number of foundation funders view endowments as a solution to 
the sustainability problem and have allocated grants to prepare and establish 
endowment funds to build financial sustainability. Lastly, Mindset has set up a for-
profit arm that offers media services and communication services to the corporate 
sector using the organisation's expertise and technology platforms, generating 
money for the entire NGO. This hybrid profit-making non-profit structure is currently 
the exception amongst the researched NGOs, although it is rapidly becoming more 
commonplace in NGOs globally. Viewed from the perspective of sustainability alone, 
this seems a logical progression from charging certain users for activities or services. 
Clearly, there are potential compatibility issues of the for-profit segment with the 
values and culture of the non-profit element. 
Other organisations conceived of themselves as following a social 
entrepreneurship model (often defined in contrast to a donor-based NGO model) in 
that they follow public good objectives in ways commonly attributed to private sector 
entrepreneurs (for instance Teboho or Connect Africa).50 Due to the reduction in 
available funding and the push towards self-financing, the social entrepreneurship 
model is set to become increasingly common in South Africa, although it would 
arguably be difficult to transform a pure donor-based NGO into a social enterprise. 
4.4. The power of donors: NGOs in the global context 
The above discussion of sustainability models has already hinted at the continued 
importance of donors in the NGO sector, despite the changes in the modality of 
development funding that I argue for in the thesis. This section further discusses the 
modalities of global development funding in the South African case. The pool that 
funded the NGOs in this research is almost exclusively international. They include 
50 Contrary to private sector entrepreneurship, the surplus made is fed back into the organisation to 
ensure organisational viability and social benefit. A distinction should be made between making a 
surplus and feeding it into an NGO as a kind of cross-subsidy, and making a surplus which has an 
explicit social value. The strengths of the social enterprise model is that it is seen as efficient and has a 
high staff retention; its weaknesses are the challenges of managing a hybrid and its 'neither-nor' 
reputation (Fowler 2000c). 
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foreign government agencies (such as USAID, DflD and NORAD), private 
foundations (such as the Open Society, Charles Stuart Mott and Ford Foundations), 
party-aligned foundations (such as the Heinrich B511, Rosa Luxemburg and Konrad 
Adenauer Foundations) and Northern NGOs acting as grant-makers. With donor 
agencies, a large part of their spending for South Africa will go directly to provincial 
governments through bilateral aid or through partnership arrangements with 
Government which then disemburses, implements or delivers through NGOs and 
CBOs (also see the diagram in appendix 4). 
Foundation funding is usually administered through short-term grants, 
typically over 1 or 2 years. It is increasingly rare for this funding to cover core costs; 
donors fund discreet projects which lends precariousness to the funding of 
operational costs for many of the NGOs in this research: 'we are struggling for core 
funding. We've got project funding, we've got more funds than we need for 
programme work. But we're still in a salary deficit' (M.Oyedan, Agenda, 27 Jun 07). 
Moreover the short-termism of funding presents ongoing challenges for NGOs, as it 
makes forward planning difficult. From this perspective, partnerships across sectors 
may be a preferable option for an NGO as there is an assumption of longer-term 
commitment and sharing of responsibility. 
The size and scope of bilateral development assistance is necessarily 
connected to the political landscape in the donor country. Probably the best-known 
example - one which affected the case NGO Mindset I discuss in chapter 5 at the 
time of research - is the impact of the Bush Administration's Christian stance 
regarding abstinence and behavioural change on USAID's priorities for HIV/Aids 
programmes in Southern Africa. However, in perhaps subtler ways, all foreign 
government funding has political motivations or conditionalities. This was 
experienced as a great constraint by NGO staff who felt that planning security and 
sustainability of projects was severely threatened by changing governments in donor 
countries: 
With foreign government funding it very much depends on which political 
party is in power in the country. And therefore you have priorities changing, 
and there is a level of fickleness there where sometimes they even fund you 
on a project for three years and then suddenly decide that, well, for this year 
they will take time out or we think the priority is not correct or so on (A. 
Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 07). 
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A key point about any type of international development funding for NGO 
activities in capacity building, governance, civil society and participation is that it 
allocates a key role for donors in domestic policy issues. The new post-conditional 
architecture of aid includes governance concerns beyond donors' previous interests 
in economic and financial management. Donor-funded NGOs can become conduits 
for the agendas of foreign governments or private entities that in turn begin to 
influence national political matters. This is certainly not a new claim to make 
regarding the global development system, but it is one that becomes more important 
when considering the increasing intermeshing of national and transnational 
development realms and agendas in partnerships. For instance, foreign-funded 
NGOs in my research collaborated with the provincial departments to provide 
training for the Local Government Ward Committees, which are themselves formal 
corporatist structures for engagement between the state and society. 
The pressures of constantly changing donor priorities could be ameliorated, 
some felt, by having a range of funders and diversifying income sources. On the 
whole, EU funding was perceived as most burdensome in terms of bureaucracy and 
reporting requirements. The funding application alone was putting many off: 'I am 
going to have to work for a whole year on the proposal' (M. Oyedan, Agenda, 27 Jun 
07). The complex requirements of the EU and other large funders raises important 
issues concerning the expertise they necessitate and produce in NGOs and the 
effects of this expert knowledge on the govern mentality of civil society, to which I will 
attend in chapters 6 and 7. Some of the European government funders prefer to 
support Northern NGOs which then enter into partnerships with South African NGOs, 
thus adversely affecting the funding pool available to local organisations (see the 
diagram in Appendix 4). Still, this type of agency funding is less and less available 
due to the drive to refocus NGO activity on the SADC region. 
Whilst the contributions of private funders such as the Ford or Mott 
Foundation are necessarily smaller than those of Northern government agencies, 
their prioritising of civil society and public sphere support provided crucial resources 
to the intermediary NGOs of this research. These types of funders were perceived as 
most in touch with the situation 'on the ground', most flexible in terms of changes to 
project spending and least burdensome regarding grant agreements and reports: 
The private foundations often have staff who understand the situation in SA 
very clearly, they know where the gaps are, they know where they will need 
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to put the money in, they often undertake detailed analyses and evaluations 
of a range of projects and factors and issues and therefore the funding is 
often longer-term, much more sustainable (A. Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 07). 
This in-depth understanding of the situation in South Africa was sometimes attributed 
to the fact that country officers for the foundations tend to be South African citizens. 
A final category of funders comprises larger NNGOs such as Oxfam and 
Save the Children, which have supported case organisations activities in the areas of 
capacity building, media education and human rights. My research showed mixed 
reactions to this type of funding: some NGO staff characterised their Northern NGO 
funders as 'completely lovely, they're able to really give me some good advice and 
assistance' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07) whereas others complained about Oxfam's 
'hierarchical reporting structure' (M. Oyedan, Agenda, 27 Jun 07). On the whole, 
unequal power relations seemed less of an issue here than with other funders, 
presumably because there was greater organisational similarity between the two 
parties. In any case, NNGO grants are relatively small compared to the ones 
discussed above. 
Despite these general comments, there were almost always significant 
differences in perceptions of individual funders. For instance, whilst the majority of 
interviewees were critical of USAID's approach to target-setting, their reporting 
criteria and their reportedly patronising approach, Vanja had been given free reign 
with one of the agency's grants in a previous job: 'you know not only did they not 
interfere with what I did, I never heard from them, frankly' (V. Karth, Wo/pe Trust, 25 
Apr 07) This certainly demonstrates the great variety of ways in which any type of 
donor funding is negotiated. Some NGOs portrayed themselves as being at the whim 
of funders, whereas other seemingly confidently rode out the ever-changing funding 
priorities, political alignments and new bureaucratic pressures. The bargaining power 
of NGOs in their relationships with funders was impacted on by personal 
relationships, solidarity or ideological affinities, reputation and credibility, the ability to 
'speak the funders' language' (also see chapter 6) and the solidity of their 
sustainability strategy. 
It should also be noted that the vast majority of NGO staff had good relations 
with their donors, perceiving individuals in donor agencies as helpful and sensitive to 
NGOs' work and the systemic constraints of funding regimes. The long-standing 
criticism of technocratic, removed and culturally insensitive funders mostly does not 
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hold true today. Perhaps then, the critical issue is not their relationships with NGOs 
but their claims about what they do. For instance, foundation funding is often aimed 
at building capacity in civil society, when they are in fact mainly supporting highly 
formalised NGOs. 
Taking civil society strengthening programmes as an example of the extra-
economic funding priorities discussed above, donors tend to specify particular roles 
for NGOs, such as 'partnering with government to improve the quantity and quality of 
basic services' or 'engaging in policy formulations' (Mott Foundation website, 
http://www.mott.org/aboutJprograms/civilsociety/southafrica.aspx, last accessed 02 
Jun 2009). Foundation funding seeks to 'encourage opportunities for public debate 
on critical issues' and building capacity for civil society participation. These 
objectives of supporting 'a vibrant, diverse and inclusive civil society' (ibid) seem 
largely rhetorical where it is mainly highly formalised and usually urban and elite 
NGOs that qualify. With civil society itself being constructed, discursively and 
materially, according to narrow donor criteria, its extension through capacity building 
projects can arguably result in more of the same civil society, as opposed to 
contributing to greater participation (also see further discussion in chapter 7). 
This argument is certainly backed up by the difficulty that progressive NGOs 
have faced in getting funding for their work with social movements, which should 
certainly fall within the definition of a diverse civil society. The FXI experienced such 
issues: 
There were intimations that funding may be withdrawn. But it's probably 
resulted in us being underfunded, because the more mainstream donors 
have I think become a little bit nervous about our image as an organisation, 
and our strong identification with the social movements (J. Duncan, 30 Mar 
07). 
This section has shown that donors continue to exert very significant power and 
influence in the NGO community in South Africa. What has changed in recent years 
is that the focus on sustainability strategies and in particular on multisectoral 
partnerships has created strong relationships between different sectors and different 
spatial levels. Donor funding flows connect local, national and global spheres, 
rendering them increasingly hybrid spaces. Moreover, the partnership mode may 
give some NGOs relative autonomy in relation to some of their partners (such as 
their private sector sponsors). 
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4.5. The greater good: NGOs and nation-building 
Despite the global context within which NGOs operate, the focus of my research on 
national NGOs implies that organisations' objectives sometimes very clearly align 
with specifically national goals. The specific history of the sector, and particularly its 
role in the transition that I charted above, further contributes to this alignment. The 
ruling party's casting of NGOs as partners in a shared national project arguably 
impacted on how organisations have thought of themselves. To cite one example, 
one of Starfish's staff quotes as the organisation's objective to 'contribute to the 
future of South Africa' (D. Marshall-Smith, Starfish, 23 Mar 07). For many 
respondents in this research, their identity as citizens in the young South African 
democracy was a key reference point. Time and again, they expressed the idea that 
collaboration of NGOs with Government or the private sector is the only way to 
tackle developmental issues of the magnitude that South Africa is facing. 'The point 
is to try to get together and do whatever we can to make sure that it is in the interest 
of the greater good', as Shafika put it (S. Issacs, Mindset, 2 May 07). Tuki Senne 
echoed this sentiment when he told me that 'the problem is far too big for us to be 
grappling over mundane issues' (T. Senne, Mindset, 6 Feb 08). 
I discussed above how the immediate post-transition environment can be 
characterised by an institutionalisation of civil society activity with the aim of 
contributing to the national development, democratisation and reconciliation project. 
This can be observed with regards to increasing professionalisation, but also in 
terms of establishing a ideological consensus on the construction of the new South 
Africa. The Mbeki era since 1999 has arguably seen much more explicit attempts to 
reign in critics and achieve political cohesion by referring to nation-building 
objectives. Ahmed Motala sums up the change in Government discourse: 
Immediately post '94, the difficult was that many of those in Government 
were former colleagues and you did not want to be seen to be publicly 
criticising somebody you worked closely with and whose value and worth you 
know quite close up. So that was the kind of tension. Now it is more about 
this whole notion of nation building, that sometimes the definition is distorted 
to such an extent that it is actually seen as stifling any kind of criticism of the 
Government (A. Motala, CSVR, Interview, 14 Mar 07). 
NGO-state cooperation then becomes framed as a facet or necessary condition of 
nation-building. 
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The notion of a greater good as it was encountered in the above quotation by 
Shafika relates to objectives of partnerships, such as inclusiveness, building broad-
based support and sharing the goals of development. The self-evident commonality 
that was sometimes evoked makes it difficult to disagree with a consensual notion of 
development, as the following account by Carole Podetti shows: 
I firmly believe partnerships in South Africa are so important and working so 
well because there is no arrogance. [ ... ] we all fight to make it work. And [ ... ] 
we'll reach a common understanding to make sure that we implement what is 
good for the country. And I think also it is so important that when you speak 
about development or that people understand the [ground]. And I think the 
more you have the corporate, particularly in a country like South Africa, 
coming to the ground, understanding the ground and Government doing the 
same and listening (C. Podetti, Valued Citizens Initiative, 21 Jun 07). 
The rhetoric that was used to express commonality by a range of different actors is 
normative and addresses incontestable values. Likewise, the 'mundane issues' that 
Tuki mentioned related to the accurateness of educational content distributed by his 
NGO, and the Government's stance on HIV/Aids prevention. Resorting to the idea of 
a greater good that overrides all differences stifles a sustained critique of the 
Government's way of 'doing development' and of the ultimate goals of development 
and democracy. 
It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse the various metaphors 
that are employed to evoke a shared Post-Apartheid identity - most well-known is 
certainly that of the rainbow nation, although this has gradually been replaced by 
Mbeki's 'African Renaissance' (Mbeki 1998b), drawing on Africanism imagery and 
perhaps indicating the increasing deployment of a racial nativism (Mangcu 2008). 
Others themes that are regularly invoked in the nation-building context include the 
new South Africa and the struggle.51 The creation of a shared identity is a key 
element of the nation-building process, as the following definition suggests: 
51 Interestingly, such nation-building objectives are often coupled with an anti-globalisation or post-
colonial development rhetoric. Bond (2004b) has shown how the Mbeki Government deployed an 
eclectic mix of radical critique of global institutions and the neoliberal mantra of there being no 
alternative to globalisation. The combination of a technocratic, seemingly politically neutral language of 
modernization (for instance in terms of macroeconomic policy) with the appeal to an alternative 
modernity (for instance in terms of advanced governance and African values) not only forms a powerful 
and flexible nationalist discourse but also cements South Africa's position in the region (Greenstein 
2003). 
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Nation building is the integration of communally diverse and/ or territorially 
discreet units into the institutional framework of a single state and the 
concomitant transfer of a sense of common political identity and loyalty to the 
symbolic community defined by the founding ideology of such a state 
(Liebenberg, cited in Goebel 1999: 308). 
Indeed, this is how the official discourse on the National Democratic 
Revolution (NOR) has been deployed, seeking to discipline 'ultra-left factions within 
the Alliance' by accusing them of acting in coalition with 'right-wing professionals', as 
one ANC National Executive Committee member writes (Makhaye 2002). As 
Mangcu (2008) argues, nationalism, instead of being a tool in the struggle against 
repression, has become an instrument of rule. The ANC constantly invokes its own 
revolutionary tradition by referring to the national liberation struggle and re-
articulating it in terms of the NOR, as Bheki Khumalo does here: 'there should be no 
denying the fact that our tradition in firmly revolutionary, now committed to a national 
democratic revolution of reconstruction' (2007: para. 11). Questions of development 
and of the relationship between democracy and nationalism are linked to the civil 
society experience of the Anti-Apartheid struggle, portraying 'criticism as 
undermining nation building' (A. Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 07). Hart suggests that 
invocations of the liberation struggle as central reference point are 
not just a cynical manipulation from above; [they carry] powerful moral weight 
and [connect] with specific histories, memories, and meanings of racial 
oppression, racialised dispossession, and struggles against apartheid (2008: 
22). 
The way in which nation-building links up with specific modalities of 
development funding, such as the partnership agenda, leads to another important 
argument. Multisectoral partnerships seek to build a consensual approach to 
development, which in South Africa is tied up with ideas of nation-building and social 
cohesion. It is true that issues of poverty and inequality in South Africa are 
enormous. Still, the appeal to a poorly-defined notion of the 'greater good' or a 
'common understanding' is potentially dangerous. It favours homogenised and 
convergent development approaches and implies that non-adherence means being 
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'unpatriotic'. By involving them in the process of governance and invoking the notion 
of participation, former or potential future dissenters can be drawn into a consensus. 
Greenstein criticises the ANC's notion of partnership, arguing that 'popular 
participation is invariably seen [ ... J as a way of bolstering the role of the state under 
ANC leadership, rather than as potentially contradicting, challenging or forcing it to 
re-think its policies and practices' (2003: 15). 
Most NGOs in this research described themselves in relation to national 
history, national issues and a national identity. Such questions of national identity are 
by definition not part of INGOs' remit, although INGOs that are operative in post-
intervention and reconstruction contexts clearly also have nation-building objectives. 
National agendas and discourses impact on NGOs' values, identity and relationships 
with other sectors. Having shown that development partnerships can fulfil a 
consensus building function of development in a specifically post-repressive nation-
building project, I now want to turn to a discussion of partnerships and their role in 
global development policy. 
4.6. Governing development: partnerships in policy, practice and theory 
As has become apparent from the above, both the global and the national context 
within which NGOs operate in South Africa involve an orientation towards multi-
sectoral collaboration. In addition to having increasingly complex sustainability 
models, many successful South African NGOs are organisationally configured 
towards strong partnerships with other NGOs, Government and the private sector. 
Partnership is both an ambiguous and ambitious concept, whose ubiquity and often 
ill-defined usage in policy and by NGOs is a reflection of the dominance of a 
partnership discourse at all levels of the development domain. This discourse 
impacts on how NGOs think about and act on what they do. This section examines 
how partnerships are conceived of in development policy, in NGO leaders' talk and 
in the development literature. Before doing so, we should remind ourselves that, 
historically, the language of governing in partnership is not new in South Africa or in 
the Southern African region. British colonial rule in Africa relied on incorporating 
tribally organised local authorities into the governing project, whereas the Apartheid 
system drew on local African leaders within the Bantustan system (Barber 1999). As 
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Mamdani (1996) contends, Apartheid is in fact a peculiar version of the indirect rule 
model, rather than an exception. Indirect rule, by governing natives through local 
powers using customary law (as defined by Native Authorities), constituted African 
societies into 'citizens' or 'subjects'. 
Moreover, as Chapter 2 already outlined, partnerships first entered the policy 
lexicon with alternative development approaches in the 1970s that advocated 
development starting from Southern communities, as represented by grassroots 
organisations. Development was now to be people-centred, participatory and 
pluralistic, methodologically expressed in new research methods such as 
Participatory Action Research and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). The aim of 
participatory planning and methods was to make people central to development, 
which was justified in terms of greater sustainability, relevance and empowerment of 
development projects (Cooke and Kothari 2001). The language of partnership sought 
to encapSUlate an ideal of co-operation and capacity-building between equal 
partners (instead of the conditional aid paradigm that characterised the Cold War). 
The rise of the NGO - both as supposed guarantor for participatory development 
and as third sector alternative to 'failed' developmentalist states - is indicative of the 
intertwining of the discourse of participatory development and the neoliberalisation of 
development. 
Partnership as efficient deliverv mechanism in an interconnected world 
In their second coming, partnerships have at the beginning of the 21 st century (re-) 
emerged as the latest panacea for African development. USAID for instance 
enthusiastically claims that there has been a 'renaissance of partnerships for 
international development': 'the United States is changing the paradigm for 
development, rejecting the flawed "donor-recipient" mentality and replacing it with an 
ethic of true partnership' (PEPFAR 2007: 9). Policy texts from this decade refer to 
the need for African governments to 'work in close partnership with civil society, 
established businesses (both domestic and foreign) and the international community' 
(Commission for Africa 2005: 240). To 'develop a global partnership for 
development' is one of the Millennium Development Goals that the UN member 
states and many international institutions have agreed upon. 
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The partnership approach in development is based on the assumption that 
contemporary complex developmental challenges cannot be solved by one sector or 
set of actors alone. By bringing together the varied skills and resources of different 
sectors, development projects are meant to be delivered better and more inclusively. 
As a World Economic Forum publication states, 
that is why we believe in facilitating public-private partnerships, so that many 
necessary advances can be achieved - with stakeholders such as 
governments and NGOs working closely with companies to apply the 
resources and competencies of business for the benefit of all (World 
Economic Forum 2006: 29). 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) refer to an arrangement with at least two parties -
one from the public (governmental) sector and one from the private (non-
governmental) sector, although 'inclusive partnerships' should ideally involve a range 
of partners such as local government, business, communities and wider civil society. 
A common feature of PPP schemes supported by international development 
agencies is that 'they target the poor, either as beneficiaries of the services and the 
generated jobs, or also as actual partners in the implementation of the partnerships' 
(International Labour Office 2007: 1). 
The Post-Washington Consensus has identified state and institutions as 
central to the efficient functioning of markets. The emphasis on market failure, and 
the associated rediscovery of social relations that replaced the cruder liberalism of 
earlier decades, provides the theoretical underpinnings for the 'renaissance' of 
partnerships - the concept typifying the re-accommodation of the state and society 
as complementary mechanisms for development. My analysis of policy documents 
demonstrates the importance of the term in the current development regime (for 
instance Commission for Africa 2005, Department for International Development 
2006, NEPAD 2004). In these texts partnerships are understood as a consequence 
of growing interdependence under conditions of globalisation. Similarly, Haider and 
Subramanian observe: 
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PPPs highlight the key aspect of globalization and answer the need for a 
changing model of service delivery and governance in an increasingly inter-
connected society (2004: 26). 
This assessment allows us to already identify some of the key assumptions of the 
partnership rhetoric: globalisation has losers as well as winners, hence necessitating 
a new, more efficient model of service delivery; developmental needs are an 
unavoidable consequence of the world we live in, but can be solved if the correct 
solutions, the appropriate model of service delivery and the right kind of governance 
are applied. Therefore the issue is one of fine-tuning and of correct management. 
The social risk that globalisation carries due to its marginalisation of large parts of 
the world's population can be downplayed by portraying partnerships as a technical 
issue. Such a representation makes use of two related practices that are central to a 
liberal rationality: problematisation and rendering technical (Li 2007). These 
practices confirm expertise and bestow it on those who have the capacity to 
diagnose problems. 
In South Africa partnerships have been very popular too: donors are keenly 
supporting development projects that integrate voluntary, private and public sector 
efforts, as this interview extract exemplifies well: 
The regional head for the [Development Bank of Southern Africa] came in 
and said what she really loved about this was the cooperation between 
private enterprise, social enterprise, Government at all levels, and utilising 
technology and she said look we've got money for exactly these kinds of 
projects. She said not only must you come back again, but she said "to all of 
you Government officials, we've got money to finance this kind of initiative so 
please come to me" (D. Jerling, Connect Africa, Interview, 16 Mar 07). 
The DBSA in fact characterises its role as 'partner', with the goal of 'Ieverag[ingj 
private, public and community players in the development process' (DBSA website, 
www.dbsa.org, last accessed 04 June 2009). Alternatively, donor funding criteria 
often specify that projects be carried out in partnerships of NGOs with other NGOs 
(also see section 7.3.). Moreover, under their CSI mandates, the South African 
private sector increasingly seeks collaborations with NGOs (see section 5.5. for a 
discussion of these relationships). The bilateral aid that is allocated directly to the 
South African Government is often conditional on the latter forming partnerships with 
civil society or the private sector. Multisectoralism has been particularly characteristic 
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of donor responses to HIV/Aids (Birdsall and Kelly 2007), but certainly applies to 
other funding areas toO.52 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the South African Government 
has displayed a due fondness of PPPs: the World Bank and DBSA were involved in 
the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit that set out the privatisation of services 
as PPPs (Bond 1998). 
These shifts towards multisectoralism indicate a significant transformation of 
aid modalities over the last decade or so. Firstly, from 2000 onwards, SWAPs and 
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), funded by the IMF, the World Bank and 
other donor agencies, have sought to move from support of discrete service delivery 
projects to financial support of governments' budgets, especially if these were seen 
to be committed to pro-poor policies and the good governance agenda. They have 
stressed decentralised implementation and participatory approaches involving the 
government, domestic stakeholders and external development partners, including 
national and international NGOs, businesses and donor agencies. 
Poverty reduction strategies must be based on the five core principles of 
being country-driven (including broad-based participation of civil society), pro-poor, 
comprehensive (recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty), partnership-
oriented (involving coordinated participation of development partners) and based on 
a long-term perspective for poverty reduction.53 Although South Africa, classified as 
a middle-income economy, has not been given a PRSP, I argue that the very same 
rhetoric of cross-sectoral partnership, harmonisation and broad-based participation 
has become dominant in the South African and more broadly in the global 
development domains. 
Secondly, the recent focus on aid harmonisation, as embodied in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), has again emphasised the role the state 
52 In relation to AIDS, multisectoralism has been a leading approach, intent on involving all sectors of 
society and all tiers of government and calling for partnerships of diverse actors who are seen to 
contribute not only different skills but also different positionings in relation to affected communities. 
53 For critiques of the 'new architecture of aid' and PRSPs, see Cling et al. (2003), Lister and 
Nyamugasira (2003), Gould (2005a, 2005b), Cornwall and Brock (2005) and Craig and Porter (2006). 
Such critics maintain that whilst trying to avoid accusations of institutional blueprints - not least in order 
to distance itself from the now discredited 'one-size-fits-all' approach of the SAPs - the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy initiative was nonetheless homogenising in its embracing of liberal free trade 
regimes, but couched in a language of participation and ownership It is indeed the case that all recipient 
governments must tie their budgets to an IMFI World bank-defined framework and most budget 
spending must be targeted to poverty reduction, again as defined by the international institutions. Gould 
(2005a) argues that the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility - the successor to the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility - contains the same key macro-economic policy conditionalities, so that 
the institution's policy prescriptions have not been adjusted to suit the goals of poverty reduction. 
Moreover, despite the participatory rhetoric, participation by, and consultation with, popular movements 
or grassroots constituencies has been selective or non-existent. 
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has to play in new forms of development cooperation. The declaration specifies 12 
effectiveness targets as part of the broader partnership commitments of ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, management for results and mutual accountability. 
Together, they seek to reduce transaction costs arising from reporting and evaluation 
procedures by using common arrangements, improve the public administration of 
aid, and employ results-oriented frameworks (OECD 2005). Whilst this debate does 
not immediately seem to concern civil society funding, I believe that the targets and 
instruments of the Paris Declaration in fact set important discursive priorities that 
impact on the way development can be conceived of by NGOs. 
As will have become apparent in the previous section, the language of 
partnership is ubiquitous and employed by different actors to describe what are 
highly varied and often normative relationships. This was empirically reflected in 
interview data and observation research, where reference to partners denoted 
anything from NGOs to CBOs, governments and companies, and comprised a range 
of activities such as funding, technical assistance, sharing information or managing 
projects jointly.54 I have chosen to use the term multisectoral partnership, or 
sometimes simply partnership, as this reflected the usage of case NGOs 
themselves. 
Issues of usage 
The term partnership was routinely conflated with terms describing other types of 
relationships such as funding. The same interviewee often used different terms to 
describe their relationship with one partner. There is clearly a difference between 
programmatic collaboration and short-term financial agreements; there are 
qualitative differences between 'partnerships' with the government and 'partnerships' 
with CBOs - yet, this was hardly noticeable in the language used by staff. 
The conflation between funding and partnership was noteworthy particularly 
since it was organisations fitting my idea of the new corporatised NGO that were 
most likely to use the terms partnership and donor funding as interchangeable 
(Mindset and Teboho, for example). Tuki differentiated between different types of 
54 My concern lies with cross-sectoral partnerships as an organisational mode, although I did question 
NGO staff about their experiences with working with other NGOs, both South African and international. 
The distinction between different partnerships is further complicated by the fact that several large 
NNGOs act as donors in South Africa. 
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relationship with Government, funders and other CSOs but insisted on calling them 
all partnerships: 
We see our relationships with our donors as partnerships, because although 
they have been donor-recipient relationships, they have had a lot of 
interaction with our programmes as well. So it goes beyond just the money 
[ ... ] For me, what determines how the partnerships is constructed is what the 
desired outcome should be. And then you build it around that (T. Senne, 
Mindset, 6 Feb 08). 
This extract highlights that NGOs themselves employ and circulate the vocabulary of 
partnerships. The case NGO in question used the partnership discourse as a 
resource. The argument of NGOs strategically using the partnership discourse 
stands in contrast to a NGO narrative that sees development concepts and 
languages as being introduced in a top-down fashion. From the latter perspective, 
partnerships are merely the latest trend in the transnational development industry. 
Conversely, this poses the question of what a NGO stands to gain from portraying 
itself as having no agency. Moriss (cited in Lukes 2005: 66) writes: 'You can deny all 
responsibility by demonstrating lack of power'. If an NGO in fact does not want to be 
responsible or responsibilised, it may be strategic to portray itself at the whim of 
funders, or as a small cog in the development machine. 
Portraying what are essentially donor-beneficiary relationships as 
partnerships however also suggests that the two have the same goals. It implies 
that, being 'partners', all participants in the relationship have the same ability to 
articulate their objectives. One of the consequences of portraying relationships as 
equal in this way is that it obscures from the analysis the issue of how power is 
distributed in relationships between different development actors. The convergence 
of development language around a rhetoric of partnership seems to me to indicate 
that NGOs become compromised in their motivation and ability to employ an 
alternative vocabulary for development. 
Turning now to conceptions of partnerships, NGOs that positioned 
themselves as progressive and aligned with social movements depicted partnerships 
as compromising the identity of NGOs and as masking the continuing unequal power 
relations between different partners: 
[Such] organisations [engaging in PPPs] actually endorse the status quo. 
They actually endorse cost recovery measures, they actually endorse 
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neoliberal policies [ ... ] And of course they would, because that means more 
communityOprivate partnerships, it means a greater role for NGOs, and I 
think this is often why NGOs don't raise their voices (J. Duncan, FXI, 30 Mar 
07). 
Jane draws attention to NGOs' self-interest in partnerships which is often hidden 
from how these partnerships are portrayed: not only are they increasingly demanded 
by donors, but they also guarantee long-term sustainability. Such sustainability 
concerns have, progressive NGOs argue, led to NGOs becoming 'conveyor belts of 
government policy' (ibid.) and 'strategically incorporated in the neoliberal order' (L. 
Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). 
Still, the majority of organisations - even those whose model was based 
purely on partnerships - advanced some critical assessment of partnerships, even if 
they were central to their sustainability. For instance, informants would provide a 
critique of the concept of partnerships in the abstract, would concede that in practice 
it can be difficult to achieve equality and mutual understanding, and would then focus 
on logistics and organisational dynamics. Concrete problems emerging in 
partnerships could therefore be described as of a technical or managerial nature. Vis 
Naidoo told me: 
The issue has been in terms of the frequency of payment, getting the contract 
signed often takes very long - in those kinds of issues which are more, I 
believe bureaucratic, rather than fundamentally conflictual around the kind of 
pedagogical issues (V. Naidoo, Mindset, 9 May 07). 
The term partnership was here more concerned with the effective management of 
projects than with the reconfiguring of power relations, as is claimed for instance in 
USAID's emphasis on an 'ethics of partnership' cited in the previous section. 
Responsibilisation of civil society, and assignment of its appropriate roles and duties, 
occurs through the rendering technical of development through partnerships. 
Rendering technical implies rendering non-political, in this context framing political 
economic issues in terms of technical responses and bureaucratic management. 
Partnerships as mechanism for inclusion and legitimacy 
Much of the academic literature on development partnerships focuses on how they 
can be made more effective by analysing opportunities and limitations of 
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partnerships. Accordingly, the necessary ingredients for a successful partnership 
include: mutual trust, a shared sense of purpose, the willingness to negotiate and 
make long-term commitments to working together, reciprocal accountability, 
transparency and joint decision-making (Haider and Subramanian 2004, Community 
Agency for Social Enquiry 2004, Brinkerhoff 2002, Lister 2000). Brinkerhoff (2002) 
distinguishes between the (not necessarily contradictory) normative and instrumental 
values of partnerships, the former being based on ideals of participation and 
empowerment, the latter crucial to meet objectives such as effectiveness and 
efficiency. Development agencies often evoke normative values such as honesty, 
mutual respect, understanding and trust; partnerships for development are seen as a 
way of overcoming the power inequalities that have characterised North-South or 
donor-recipient relationships in development. In this respect, it seemingly draws on 
the tenets of alternative and participatory development in the 1970s. 
Despite these stated intentions, many the interviewed NGO staff cited 
unequal control over money as a major constraint of 'genuine' partnerships: 'the 
notion of true partnerships is a fiction, because the person that has the money 
inevitably has a bit more power in the relationship. Even with a big NGO like IDASA' 
(R. Calland, IDASA, 23 Apr 07). Other frequently-voiced obstacles and constraints 
were a climate of mistrust between different sectors, institutional capacity restraints, 
lack of experience and lack of an overall vision for interaction with NGOs on the part 
of Government. Incompatibility of approaches and aims were also criticised, as was 
the problem of state bureaucracy: 'you get pockets of excellence but you are fighting 
a huge bureaucratic system' (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). Some of the literature on 
partnerships in South Africa lists these limitations only to conclude that partnerships 
are highly beneficial if NGOs can remain independent and do not become mere 
delivery agents (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2004). It is precisely this quite 
substantial 'if that is not addressed. 
Alternative perspectives to these idealist accounts in the literature have 
variously dismissed partnerships as rhetoric, tactic or spin (Baaz 2005). They are 
understood as the 'Trojan horses of development' (Miraftab 2004) or as 'old wine in 
re-Iabelled civic bottles' (Fowler 1998: 137). The partnership rhetoric, according to 
such accounts, is deliberately employed to mask continuous unequal power relations 
between different types of partners at all levels of the aid chain. This includes 
relationships between donors - or 'funder partners' as they now sometimes call 
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themselves - and governments, between governments and civil society, and 
between NNGOs and their Southern counterparts (see Brehm et al. 2004, Mawdsley 
et al. 2002 on North-South NGO partnerships). Others (Crewe and Harrison 1998) 
point to the clash between the concept of partnership as process of cooperation and 
the agenda of good governance, arguing that partnerships are more concerned with 
the management of projects than with the changing of relations of power. For 
instance, despite the partnership rhetoric, participation by popular movements or 
grassroots constituencies has been selective or non-existent in African countries' 
actual development frameworks. 
This analysis places partnerships in a broader framework that seeks to 
understand what the rise of the partnership model indicates about power in the 
development domain. In the first place, this involves seeing development 
partnerships as mechanisms of inclusion. On one level they are, as Jane put it, 
'conveyor belts of government policy' (J. Duncan, FXI, 30 Mar 07), serving to 
compensate for cut-backs to service delivery through NGO-government partnerships 
(also see discussion in section 5.3.). But crucially, they are also a way for various 
partners to gain legitimacy. For the South African Government for instance, they 
offer the potential to include previously adversarial actors (such as the 'ultra-left') into 
the policy consensus on Post-Apartheid development, and to marginalise others as 
outside of that 'greater good' normativity. 
But partnerships hold the promise of increasing legitimacy for NGOs, too. 
This is apparent in the way new-generation NGOs use leverage - as a way to gain 
various forms of capital. For example, NGOs may strategically use partnerships with 
the provincial or national Government to increase their legitimacy with donors or 
corporations which they can in turn use to leverage new partnerships (also see the 
diagram in appendix 4). As one informant put it: 
It becomes a little more complex than simply going to the funder looking for 
money directly. Sometimes it's about creating relationships that leverage and 
leverage and leverage to the point where we can actually get access to funds 
(L. Jiya, Mindset, 15 May 07). 
The terminology of leverage itself is interesting in terms of the conception of power it 
entails: it can be defined as the power to influence people, but also as acting from a 
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distance and with only small investments. At Mindset, some sites were funded 
through provincial health departments, some of whom would take these resources 
directly from their own budgets, whereas Gauteng had an agreement with a private 
sector investor that was used to support Mindset's work in that province. North West 
province had yet another model using budget support from the Dutch government to 
fund the NGO's work. 
Besides my point about leverage and NGO agency, these arguments also 
emphasise that NGO activity connects different spatialities and contributes to the 
intermeshing of multiple sovereignties and responsibilities in the development 
domain. For those NGOs already configured to multisectoral partnerships, they 
constitute a way of gaining forms of capital and increasing their power. Partnerships 
are uneven, but they also constitute strategies by different development actors to 
'reform' the development system in line with their own objectives. For NGOs in 
particular, they can come to constitute ways of ensuring continued relevance and 
survival and provide leverage on development agendas and projects. As a form of 
power in global governance, partnerships produce self-disciplining organisations, 
citizens or states (Abrahamsen 2004), bestow authority and circulate particular 
practices and values. 
As discussed in chapter 2, reflexive neoliberalism retains conservative 
neoliberal policy settings but emphasises empowerment to enable participation of 
countries, organisations and people in global and local markets. In the development 
domain, this has translated into efforts to harmonise and align the administration of 
aid. One absolutely central point about this form of inclusion is that it can co-opt 
previously dissenting or alternative voices. As Gould puts it succinctly, partnerships 
represents attempts to 'draw a select class of "constructive" non-state actors - policy 
advocates and self-styled representatives of "the poor" - into the circle of consensus 
and intimacy which cements the partnership' (2005a: 7). This is not just the case 
regarding governments: NGOs can also be enlisted into Corporate Social Investment 
programmes as partners, as I discuss in section 5.4. However, attention must be 
paid not to confuse outcomes with intentions as some post-development writers do: 
that genuine partnerships do not materialise does not imply that none of the 
participants had partnership objectives. 
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4.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has charted the restructuring of the NGO sector in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa, arguing that the death of the traditional donor model has given birth to 
an ideal-typical streamlined NGO that can be characterised by flexibility, 
preparedness, multisectoral linkages, formalisation and professionalisation, 
versatility and autonomy. The various sustainability strategies that were discussed 
can lead to commercialisation and commodification, for instance due to a push to 
produce commercially viable development products or to expand activities abroad. 
The NGO sector becomes dominated by elite blue-chip organisations, with smaller 
ones not being able to survive the restructuring and disappearing. It is not just 
organisational practices and structures that need to change in order to cope with the 
changed environment; it is also mindsets, attitudes and values. 
I then discussed partnerships as the most important amongst the various 
sustainability strategies for NGOs. Partnering is often inscribed into organisational 
structure and vision, although at other times partnership may be invoked rhetorically 
and employed as a resource. Partnerships are often normatively constructed as 
common good approaches to global development problems. Interestingly, it is this 
construction that also enables the articulation of partnerships in terms of nation-
building. Partnerships are not only a donor prerogative but an opportunity for 
Government and others to bring adversarial groups into the nation-building project, 
therefore turning 'potential civil society critics into consensual governing partners' 
(Craig and Porter 2006: 79). I am not suggesting that global and South Africa 
development priorities always overlap, or that a global development blueprint is 
necessarily adopted in South Africa. In this case however, a national and a global 
reform project for civil society reinforce one another. The partnership agenda is 
indicative of a particular form of power in global governance as well as articulating 
specifically Post-Apartheid narratives and reference points. 
At the same time, the present research focus on national NGOs has served 
to demonstrate that they have very different objectives to international ones; to 
contribute to South Africa's future is a motivating factor for many of the NGO staff I 
interviewed. This objective presumably does not playas central a role for INGOs 
operative in South Africa; or if it does, it is not tied up with questions of biography 
and personal identity in the same way. This is also where the focus of the present 
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research differs significantly from the majority of the literature on partnerships in 
development. 
The drive to partnerships then provides a way of understanding the role and 
scope of NGOs that in important ways parts with an earlier donor-beneficiary model. 
Nonetheless, the South African NGO sector - even within the narrower focus of this 
research - is highly differentiated, with the partnership rhetoric being employed 
variedly, and with different effects and outcomes. Therefore, the partnership mode 
may be negative for some NGOs whilst it gives other NGOs relative power. The next 
chapter will explore the dynamics of partnerships more fully, examining NGOs' 
relationships with the public and private sectors and showing that, despite the 
prevalence of an overwhelmingly ubiquitous partnership vocabulary, partnerships in 
practice encompass many different and often contradictory policies and discourses. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 
NGOs and Their Partners 
The angel is in the principle, the 
devil is in the details, so that's 
where you do your Faustian 
dances, most of the time. 
(s. Issacs, Mindset, 2 May 07) 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the language of partnership has come to 
encompass the whole spectrum of development institutions, and institutions tend to 
refer to their work in terms of partnership. This includes not just the NGOs of this 
research but also grant makers, donors, IFls and government agencies. Partnerships 
were often framed in terms of the sectoral advantages that NGOs brought to them. I 
discuss these in the first part of this chapter, highlighting claims of efficiency and 
proximity to communities in particular. 
As I sought to emphasise above by providing a historical context of the sector 
since the democratic transition, state-NGO relations are diverse. They encompass 
adversarial as well as collaborative relationships. Changes in funding modalities 
towards budget support, the fact that multisectoral partnerships have become a 
priority for donors and the consolidation of funding flows under national authority 
have all made cooperation with the government in some form or another an 
important route to sustainability. Seeking to go beyond the binary of watchdog and 
service deliverer, the notion of the Post-Apartheid NGO as a 'critical ally' to 
government is explored below, arguing that the invocations of authenticity are central 
to this construction. 
Whilst NGOs' positioning in relation to the state can be crucial to their 
survival, it clearly impacts on their identity and mission too. Maybe this explains why 
NGOs' portrayals of their relationship to the state were often ambiguous: many 
initially described themselves in a polarised fashion as either oppositional or 
engaged (although not necessarily 'collaborative'), only to later give a more balanced 
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assessment of their position as somewhere between these two extremes, as I go on 
to discuss in section 5.3. This mirrors my observation that partnerships were 
critiqued in a remarkably similar fashion by different NGOs, even as some of them 
relied on them whilst others rejected them. However, the below analysis of state-
NGO relations does not imply that I understand the development sector to be 
structured in terms of these relations or that I see state and NGOs as opposites; 
rather, relations with the state are one (albeit important) aspect of a networked, 
enmeshed, intersectoral whole of development practices and interactions. 
Given companies' constitutional commitment to Corporate Social Investment 
in South Africa, partnerships with the private sector are significant and are set to 
become increasingly so. Observational data indicates that the CSI landscape may 
have become more sophisticated over the past few years than simply 'painting the 
local hospital bright red', contrary to what the accounts of most interviewees would 
suggest. Thus, many NGOs had either not fully grasped how to make use of these 
kinds of relationships, or continued to feel that corporate funding was too 
circumscribed. There were however exceptions to this. Section 5.4. presents a kind 
of interlude, in that it discusses Mindset's partnership model and the challenges it 
may pose for the NGO's quality of output, consistency and relevance. 
Mindset is a South African, internationally-funded NGO that creates and 
delivers educational materials through ICT platforms. The organisation has 
successfully adopted a range of the sustainability strategies outlined in the previous 
chapter: its organisational model revolves around partnerships with the public, 
private and non-profit sectors; it has diversified its funding base; it has established a 
for-profit arm and has built an endowment fund through investment. The NGO is 
clearly rather uniquely positioned in the sector so it would be a mistake to 
extrapolate from this case study to other NGOs in this research. I have chosen to 
discuss it in some detail because I believe that it sheds light on dimensions of non-
financial sustainability, in particular development impact, organisational identity and 
coherence. Below I point to areas which may impact negatively on Mindsefs non-
financial sustainability, thereby showing the limitations of the all-singing, all-dancing 
NGO that perhaps tries to be all things to all partners. However, even in an 
organisation drawing so heavily on the language of partnership, partnerships in 
practice encompass many different and often contradictory practices, with the NGO's 
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vocabulary representing a mix of bureaucratic speak, the language of participatory 
development or that of auditing. 
5.2. Partnerships: between idealism, self-interest and critique 
NGO staff cited a variety of motivations for entering into development partnerships. 
Given the restructuring of the sector outlined in the previous chapter, I expected 
economic necessity, sustainability concerns and donor pressure to be foremost 
amongst them, but this was not necessarily how partnerships were framed. NGO 
staff highlighted their potential to foster greater commitment and shared goals 
amongst partners: they 'bring players together just to talk to each other, just to find 
each other' (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). This chimes with the ideal of partnership as 
democratising development and giving a voice to those previously excluded from 
power. But it also reiterates that partnerships are portrayed as a necessity because 
the challenges facing South Africa are too big to tackle alone. This has the effect of 
constituting these challenges as technical matters, and amenable to partnerships as 
a solution. 
Partnerships were consequently identified as mutually beneficial for all 
parties involved, as for instance Rama expressed: 'we're all winning' (ibid.). The 
point of partnering is to combine the knowledge and resources specific to each 
sector and to compensate for each others' weaknesses, thereby reaching wider 
constituencies. Accordingly, partnerships were often discussed in terms of NGOs' 
'comparative advantages' which connect to assumptions about NGOs' appropriate 
roles in development. By emphasising the comparative advantages that NGOs bring 
to partnerships, informants down played the necessity of entering into partnerships as 
a means of organisational survival. 
The frequent usage of terminology such as comparative advantages and 
value-added is noteworthy in itself as, like the language of efficiency that comes 
across clearly in the data, it derives from the world of economics and business 
management. Examples of NGO staff employing business, marketing or 
management language to describe things that properly belong to the social domain 
are cited throughout this analysis. NGO discourse, even amongst progressive 
organisations, is often framed in market terms. To cite just a few examples here, 
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development projects were often referred to as 'products' or 'development solutions'. 
Vis contrasted 'crass capitalism' with the application of sound business principles to 
the running of an NGO: 
You don't have to subscribe to kind of what I would describe as 'crass 
capitalism' in a way that says you make profits at any cost. But that you can 
use business processes that talk about increased efficiencies, that talk about 
better use of people, of staff, that talk about better ways of liaising with your 
clients, your partners, that talk about proper financial accountability, proper 
procedures internally (V. Naidoo, Mindset, 9 May 07). 
Michelle Oyedan argued that NGOs need to 'market [their] social capital. And I know 
this sounds terrible, just using capital. But the social capital, the intellectual capital, 
the, I suppose, entrepreneurial capital that we have within the civil society 
environment has not been exploited fully' (M. Oyedan, Agenda, 27 Jun 07). Far from 
providing an exchange of ideas and perspectives between the sectors as it is usually 
claimed, partnerships then seem to involve the adoption of a business approach by 
NGOs. 
NGO advantages 
Frequently cited amongst NGOs' advantages was the ability to deliver at local level 
due to their capacity to mobilise communities and coordinate relations with CBOs 
and communities and reach the grassroots: 
So it's also useful for [partners] if they want to expand their work to partner 
with somebody who already has a presence, and who already understands 
those communities, and has the relationships that have been built up over 
time (J. Currie, Africa Foundation, 25 May 07). 
Community is understood as poor and rural in many of these NGO accounts. NGO 
abilities are directly contrasted with the failures of service delivery by an ANC-
government that lacks expertise and capacity: 
In terms of support for the Anti-Retroviral (ARV) roll-out, the government 
doesn't have the capacity to do that. It is civil society that can do that. Civil 
society has links in the communities, has the confidence of communities. And 
can you imagine what a fantastic partnership it would be if the Department of 
Social Development, Department of Health and civil society organisations got 
together and said okay; these are our different roles and we are gonna 
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provide, you know Government says we will provide money for civil society 
organisations to function in a particular area and provide a specific support to 
communities in terms of ARV roll-out and voluntary counselling and testing 
(A. Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 07). 
Another comparative advantages that NGOs thought they brought to the table was 
their innovativeness in development approaches: especially the newer-generation 
NGOs characterised themselves as possessing 'a model that is pioneering and 
innovative' (J. Bright, Teboho, 19 Jun 07), as 'build[ing] more innovative ways of 
doing [service delivery]' (V. Naidoo, Mindset, 9 May 07), 'leading by example' (R. 
Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07), and 'demonstrating a viable model to government' (D. 
Marshall-Smith, Starfish, 23 Mar 07). These examples reflect the concern of these 
NGOs in particular to portray themselves as advanced organisations, again set in 
contrast to the bureaucracy of the state. They also indicate what may be called their 
reformism: a reformist drive to change the developmental practices and 
methodologies of other partners, especially provincial government, was apparent. 
But portraying themselves as innovative also demonstrates NGOs' self-
perception as more efficient. They saw their comparative advantage as having a 
better response time to development needs and greater cost-efficiency in service 
provision: 'we work more efficiently than government departments do' (J. Pampallis, 
CEPD, 23 Feb 07). Another informant pointed out: 
Not in all instances do all the things that Government should do need to be 
done by Government, especially if you take into account that there are certain 
skills bases that they will not have' (T. Senne, Mindset, 6 Feb 08). 
These statements paint a picture of a bloated and highly centralised state 
bureaucracy, implying concerns about the inefficiency of state delivery mechanisms. 
Such a portrayal is evocative of a liberal mistrust of the state as inefficient and weak. 
By ostensibly governing less, so orthodox liberal thinking goes, development is to be 
made more streamlined. In partnerships NGOs thus compensate for the lack of 
capacity and skill in government, resulting in increased effectiveness and efficiency 
of development interventions. Dion, director of the NGO-cum-social enterprise 
Connect Africa, identified this as their unique selling point: 'what we are saying is 
what we can do is provide your people [Government officials] with the infrastructure 
and a means by which they can be more efficient' (D. Jerling, 16 Mar 07]. Clearly, 
NGOs understand themselves as more efficient; it is their adoption of business and 
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audit principles and a language of management, as opposed to some intrinsic NGO 
value, that they are keen to promote. 
One advantage of partnering, according to interviewees, was to ensure a 
long-term commitment to projects. By partnering with Government for instance, the 
sustainability of a project can be more easily guaranteed: if a classroom is built by an 
NGO, teachers need to be provided by Government, or if Government partners on 
an ICT-based project, they will be more likely to maintain the equipment. Lusanda 
Jiya at Mindset explains: 
The advantage [of partnerships] is if you get it right; you have a much longer 
term partnership and ownership rests with Government, which is important 
for us because we do not own the schools that we install Mindset at. And if 
we do not have Government support, the equipment can die and nobody 
cares; and nobody makes sure that it is used and all of those things. So it's 
important to have those relationships with Government (L. Jiya, Interview, 15 
May 07). 
The notion of ownership is a key term in the Post-Washington development lexicon. 
As a central pillar of the partnership mode, it is intent on making development aid 
more effective. The policy emphasis on local ownership is at once political and 
governmental, in that it gains legitimacy for development interventions and enables 
deeper penetration into what are domestic policy choices (Mosse 2005). As with 
accountability, the nature of ownership in multisectoral partnerships could perhaps 
be called shallow - giving rise to extensive audit practices and forms of expertise 
rather than being concerned with empowerment. Empowerment itself is hailed as an 
objective of partnerships, with skills transfer and capacity-building amongst NGOs' 
chief roles. This is once again connected to NGOs' expert role as a provider of 
neutral or technical advice. 
Moving on to NGOs being closer to communities, this claim is not backed up 
by my research: all the NGOs I came across were urban, formalised and not at all 
close to rural communities. In order to reach poor and rural communities, they must 
draw on CBOs which they work in partnerships with. In order to sustain the claim of 
their comparative advantage, the homogenous notion of the 'we' of civil society is 
often evoked, thereby professing that NGOs and the CBOs with whom they work are 
one and the same. In practice, NGOs are more likely to act as an intermediary 
between government or corporates and local communities, providing a link between 
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the national and the local, connecting a variety of geographical scales. The following 
quote is instructive in terms of NGO location: 
I see ourselves positioned directly in the middle. As a non-profit we sit firmly 
in the middle of two client bases, basically, in business terms. That's the best 
way to look at it. Our two clients are the donors and the communities, and we 
sit squarely in the middle, and it's up to us to try and speak language on the 
one side and speak language on the other side and get the two to merge on 
a common goal (J. Currie, Africa Foundation, 25 May 07). 
Having the ability to reach communities in this way extends the reach of the state, a 
donor or a corporation. NGOs become a governing partner that can provide 
government and corporate access to poor or rural communities. Overall, it is notable 
how NGOs are in fact reproducing donor understanding of their nature and roles 
themselves, despite their awareness of critiques against these perceived 
advantages. 
5. 3. State-NGO relations: walking the tightrope 
Beyond the binary of adversary and service deliverer 
State-NGO relations are diverse, encompassing adversarial as well as collaborative 
relationships (see for instance Ranchod 2007). Whilst some NGOs repositioned 
themselves into partnership roles with the Government in welfare and service 
provision, other progressive NGOs cast themselves as a watchdog of Government or 
in an activist role. The functions that case organisations saw as fulfilling were: 
• activism 
• assisting Government 
• assisting social movements 
• being critical/ being a watchdog 
• establishing best practices 
• capacity building 
• representing communities 
• improving efficiency of development 
• fighting for social justice 
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• forming networks 
• fostering political dialogue 
• innovating 
• lobbying and advocacy 
• research 
• empowerment 
• service delivery 
Accordingly, NGOs had very different assumptions about the appropriate roles they 
should play in the new democracy and how they ought to relate to the state and its 
agencies, with each of these roles corresponding to particular conceptions of civil 
society. 
The binary of adversariall aligned that some (and particularly the liberal) 
NGOs were eager to employ, betrays the complexity of NGO-state relations: all of 
the NGOs in my research, no matter how critical they are of Government, tender for 
Government contracts from time to time or are involved in Government-led consortia 
in their expert area. The key question for NGOs seemed to be in how far 'working for 
Government' was understood as 'working with Government'. Imraan for instance 
strongly opposed the idea that his NGO was somehow in partnership with the 
Government - 'we wouldn't enter partnerships with government around doing work, 
we wouldn't produce a report with the Government' (I. Succus, CPP, 26 Jun 07) -
but the organisation has developed national policy documents for the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government. 
Further disturbing the adversariall engaged binary is what might be referred 
to as biographical alignment. The Post-Apartheid NGO sector is characterised by its 
interlinking with state and corporate structures, by absorption of NGO expertise into 
the state bureaucracy and by linkages with the ANC (through membership, trade 
union movements, social networks or business relationships). Networks of former 
'struggle comrades' are for instance evident in the composition of many NGOs' 
governing boards. It is therefore perhaps more apt to speak of a fluid spectrum of 
relations which is also contingent on individuals, their short-term considerations and 
their class positioning. Moreover, personal networks work as disturbing factors to the 
regimes that are in place in partnerships, for example regarding monitoring and 
evaluation. Whilst it was commented that 'unless you know the people that you are 
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dealing with, you are not gonna get that funding' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07), it is also 
true that reporting was sometimes deferred or negotiated according to one's 
relationship with a grant manager or government official. This again underscores the 
point that technologies of rule are only ever projects: their implementation is not 
necessarily successful or may have unintended consequences. 
In South Africa, the progression from activism to NGO employment and into 
the public sector is quite a typical career path. Alternatively, career activism may 
entail a journey from community via CBO and NGO to an international NGO. A 
glance, on any given Friday, into the weekly newspaper Mail & Guardian shows that 
nearly the entire appointments section is taken up by charities, international NGOs 
and development agencies, inviting applications for posts in South Africa and all over 
the African continent. Activism clearly provides a domain of expertise in civil society 
that can be institutionalised. I pick up the point about 'career activism' again in 
chapter 7, when I consider the relationship of formal NGOs to social movements. 
The formalisation of civil society that I have outlined in the previous chapter 
has been accompanied by the massive outsourcing of service delivery and 
development to NGOs. These interlinkages have influenced government's 
perception of the role of NGOs in Post-Apartheid, as Rama notes here: 
I think it is an expectation of Government that NGOs need to be the service 
provider arm somehow. So they have an HIV/Aids programme and they got 
R10,000; here is it, you are gonna do these workshops. And that is not 
understanding the role of NGOs, that is using them as an extension of the 
state. And I think my argument is that that is not what we want to be seen as. 
We want to still retain very strongly our watchdog role, we want to stay 
outside of government (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). 
His statement points to the centrality of the watchdog role in the self-perception of 
the NGO sector. It also speaks to the tensions characterising state-NGO relations in 
a post-repressive society where the liberation movement has taken power. What is 
missing from his account however is the attempt by some sections of Government to 
include and neutralise civil society actors by involving them in key tasks such as 
service delivery. This is at the heart of my understanding of partnerships: they also 
represent attempts by the state to enlist civil society into its agendas. 
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Claims of independence: NGOs as watchdog 
NGOs that saw themselves as having an adversarial relationships to the state 
employed language such as 'conflict', 'challenge' and 'antagonism' (J. Duncan, FXI, 
20 Mar 07); they spoke of 'forces in society' and their 'resistance' to an ANC 'who 
themselves have been transformed into middle-class election machines' (L. Gentle, 
ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). This terminology can be linked to an understanding of civil society 
as providing spaces for dissent and struggle. Such a Gramscian understanding, as 
frequently evoked by activists, implies that civil society is an arena for contestation in 
which counter-hegemonic struggles can develop. NGOs have a watchdog role 
regarding the state, which situates them as strongly independent and intent on 
strengthening civil society. Rama for instance bemoans: 'we have lapsed in our role 
of being watchdogs [ ... ] Government has had a fairly free reign in most things. And 
they haven't had the kind of vociferous opposition we're expecting from civil society' 
(R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). 
Progressive organisations such as the Freedom of Expression Institute see 
themselves as aligned to social movements, trade union or labour movements. But 
unlike many of these movements, an 'adversarial' NGO like the FXI uses a variety of 
modes of interaction such as organisation and mobilising (both through media and 
through protest) and the court system. Whilst seeing their role as 'fighting the state', 
they engage in existing spaces (such as the legal system), operating at once within 
and against state structures. Other progressive NGOs occasionally do small, 
commissioned work for the Government but made it clear that they can never be 
involved in substantive collaborative work that might, as William put it, cause 'people 
to start seeing us as being some kind of Government stooge' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 
07). Tracy Bailey, the National Coordinator for the Wolpe Trust which organises 
public debates that bring together various stakeholders, reiterated this difference 
between collaborative work and engagement: 
Because I do not think it would be desirable to partner with Government in a 
financial sense because that gives them kind of like editorial control. But 
certainly to engage them is something that the Trust is constantly wanting to 
do (T. Bailey, 25 Apr 07). 
Conversely, some understood income generated in this way as having less 
conditionalities than donor money: 'the good thing about that kind of money is that 
it's contract work and then you can spend it the way you like, really' (W. Bird, MMP, 
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13 Jun 07). This presumes that discreet project work had no impact on 
organisations' alignment and activities: 
If we had the opportunity to influence the work of government for a fee, 
would be more inclined to do that. As I would be inclined to do some Agenda 
stuff with Anglo-American for a fee. But the fees are completely ours, and 
based on that we are able to do with it as we please. As opposed to it being a 
purely donor relationship where there is always a bigger, you know, the donor 
is the bigger guy in that relationship. There's all kinds of power stuff attached 
to it (M. Oyedan 27 Jun 07). 
Independence and criticality are central to the identity of monitoring or 
research NGOs like the ones William, Michelle and Tracy work for; those features 
are their raison d'etre. However, not a single one of the NGOs that I came across 
pictured itself as anything other than completely independent. Critiques of NGO 
legitimacy, accountability and representativeness have been advanced by 
communities, activists and scholars for a long time. NGOs themselves are acutely 
aware of these critiques, which is perhaps why independence is such an important 
claim that constantly needed to be reasserted in the interviews: 
Given all of the challenges and given the things that are coming up that you 
have to fight against - you need to keep an eye on what these people 
[Government] are doing. And where an NGO is useful is that it's an organised 
form of civil society that allows you to be sort of critical of whatever these 
things are; and you have some level of independence (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 
07). 
This assessment ties in with a perspective of civil society as a watchdog as 
we have encountered above; yet even NGOs that primarily define their role as 
assisting Government cite as a secondary objective to 'provide a critical civil society 
voice' (S. Issacs, Mindset, 02 Apr 07). Because there are tensions between a service 
delivery and a monitoring or watchdog role - such as forgoing one's responsibilities 
towards the constituencies one supposedly serves in order to meet contractual 
requirements with Government, as the Mindset example below will show - the 
definition of independence has to be widened if it is too be maintained as central 
identity claim. Where independence from the Government cannot convincingly be 
professed, some of the more corporate NGOs claimed financial autonomy by 
highlighting the variety of funding sources they have. It is via independence that an 
NGO's continued relevance can be justified and that legitimacy and authenticity can 
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be ascertained. However, interviewees' accounts and observation research also 
showed that the increasingly complex intersectoral funding arrangements that 
characterise partnerships furnished several of the NGOs in this research with greater 
autonomy, for instance in relation to how they focused their research activities. 
Moreover, strategic alliances with partners sometimes provided opportunities to do 
more explicitly political work in a different area, or to be able to achieve particular 
objectives. In other words, although the partnership mode was experiences as 
imposed and constrictive by some, it still allowed strategic alliances and certain 
gains. 
'Working with the system to change practices' 
Notably, it is often those NGOs that are closest aligned with government priorities 
and objectives - those that see themselves as working in partnership with 
Government - that have no direct financial relationships with it (for instance 
Siyazisika or Operation Hunger). One characteristic of the donor-funded 
multisectoral partnership model is that Government endorses an NGO project which 
can then access donor funds more easily. Connect Africa for instance received a 
OBSA grant to provide the 'capacity for local government [to] get their services out 
into deep rural areas rather than people having to come to town to get the services' 
(0. Jerling, 16 Mar 07). In these complex arrangements, non-financial partnerships 
with the Government provide leverage to increase funding from other income 
streams, for other kinds of work. 
For Mindset, 'working with the system is quite crucial. Because we wanna 
change practices etc. but we wanna do it within the system' (V. Naidoo, 9 May 07). 
This entails a complimentary role to Government that is ensured by aligning itself 
with the national curriculum and health priorities. Shafika explains: 
We tend more to be supportive and complimentary to Government, based on 
the recognition that the public sector in and of itself can no longer fulfil public 
good needs, which is why we are firmly in the public goods sector such as 
health and education. But again those terrains are also shifting, so education 
is no longer just a public good, nor is health no longer just a public good, 
giving the commercialisation of both sectors (S. Isaacs, Mindset, 02 Apr 07). 
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What is assumed here is that the state is unable to fulfil its obligations, and that 
health and education are no longer matters of the state. Both arguments repeat 
standard liberal assertions about the need for private sector intervention in these 
areas and the inability of the state to provide services for its citizens - despite 
Shafika insisting her NGO is not in the business of competing with government for 
resources. These issues tie into broader debates about the role of NGOs and of the 
state in relation to service delivery. If non-profit organisations deliver services for 
government, does this not encourage inefficiency and skills shortages on the part of 
government? The international development industry has in some case built what 
amounts to shadow health or education systems thus contributing to the under-
resourcing of the national budget in neighbouring Southern African countries. 
Although South Africa does present a different case in terms of state capacity, a 
large proportion of services have been outsourced to private entities. As the state 
withdraws from service provision, the spaces get filled by NGOs, This is part of a 
transformation of the state that ensures that money does not get spend on direct 
services to people. Seemingly paradoxically, the research indicates that NGOs that 
positioned themselves as adversarial to the state believe in the importance of its role 
more that those that align themselves with it. 
In practice, for some of the more delivery-oriented NGOs, alignment with the 
Government was often marred by what informants saw as the immature attitude and 
distrust of government vis-a-vis civil society. In the example of Africa Foundation, 
Government representatives took all the credit for work that the NGO had done. 
Most important however were challenges related to the state bureaucracy, which 
was seen as too technical and unrealistic in its expectations: There are lots of 
wonderful people in the Government that I have met personally who share our 
frustrations. But you succumb to the system, you know, your hands are tied' (R. 
Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). Others define their relationship to the state in terms of 
alignment to the Government's priorities, but have not been able to get Government 
funding, as is the case with Siyasizika: 'I know I am getting nowhere. And it's 
inexcusable. The government goes on about poverty and so on. [ ... ] Possibly I am 
the wrong colour and we work in the wrong area' (J. Zimmermann, 4 Jun 07). 
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The critical ally 
Somewhere between the positions exemplarily discussed above lie the majority of 
organisations I came in contact with. Carrying out activities such as advocacy and 
lobbying, monitoring, capacity building, organisational development and research, 
organisations enter partnerships with the Government on specific issues but also 
characterise their role as critically engaging the state through the official political 
system and fulfilling a watchdog role. Influencing Government was considered by 
many as one of their primary aims. Such intermediary organisations - covering the 
middle ground between pure service delivery NGOs and the less-formalised parts of 
South African civil society - are also most likely to be sponsored by international 
funders. 
Ahmed outlines his NGO's more traditional donor-based funding model, 
again evoking independence to claim legitimacy and authenticity: 
We are very mindful of the fact that we are an independent non-governmental 
organisation, and we are non-partisan [ ... J And that to us is essential. 
Therefore the larger proportion of our funding comes from donors. Either from 
foundations or from foreign government funding and in that way we maintain 
our independence from the South African government at least (A. Motala, 
CSVR, 14 Mar 07). 
The emphasis on 'at least' being independent of the Government draws attention to 
their dependence on international development funding, which resonates with a 
whole host of issues connected to aid conditionalities and the power of donors that 
were discussed in chapter 4. CSVR regularly receives income from Government and 
partnerships are formed on an ad-hoc basis, but there is a sense of discomfort at 
those facts in Ahmed's account. The defensiveness about such collaborative work is 
articulated by insisting that 'we didn't tender for it, they came to us' and that this 
'indicates that the Minister of Safety and Security sees the need for this engagement 
with civil society (ibid.). 
In this seemingly uncomfortable space NGO's 'schizophrenic capacity to 
work in different ways with different people during the same time' (R. Calland, 
IDASA, 23 Mar 07) is most apparent. John explained the situation the CEPD finds 
itself in: 
Because we continue to do independent research with money raised from 
donors, and this often put us in a situation where we were critical of 
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Government. Often you find yourself critical of government, so on the one 
hand Government is a client and sometimes they get sensitive about 
criticism. So one has to walk a tightrope, and I think we have been doing this 
for a long time and we still standing on the rope, maybe we are still sitting on 
the fence (J. Pampallis, 23 Feb 07). 
This account articulates a common dilemma, but is actually quite rare in its realistic 
assessment of the challenges that relationships with the public sector pose for an 
NGO. Far more prevalent was a rhetoric that portrayed other organisations as 
affected by such processes, but citing their own maturity for why this does not affect 
them: . 
Civil society organisations need to have a level of maturity that allows them to 
engage in government tender or receive government money and work for 
government without necessarily being co-opted by government. And I think 
some of them find it very difficult to maintain that sort of independent and 
critical relationship whilst at the same time taking money from the 
government (A. Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 07) 
It is usually other organisations that need 'worrying about' (K. Greenop, Mindset, 1 
Feb 08), whereas a mature NGO possesses the stability or organisational agility to 
negotiate this tension. The way some of these - usually very successful - NGOs dealt 
with this was through constructions such as 'critical partner' (S. Isaacs, Mindset, 2 
Apr 07) or 'critical ally' (R. Calland, IDASA, 23 Apr 07). 
According to the latter, one can retain the position of a critical ally through 
relevance, positioning and relationships: 
It works on different levels; it's partly about tone, so it's about being 
empathetic as well as critical, understanding the problems and not just 
blaming people. So it's tone and style. Secondly it's about relationships, 
preserving good relationships so you can work with Government [ ... J. It is 
quite hard to have two NGOs under one roof but that's what we try to do. We 
try to retain our ability to be a training! capacity building NGO and on the 
other hand a sort of advocacy! policy research organisation on the other. The 
last point is how you direct your research. You can try and steer your 
research agenda towards an agenda that is aligned to some extent with what 
the Government want. Not because you are doing what the Government told 
you to do but because it is useful to Government. Now I call that 
sophisticated lobbying, because if you are doing the research for 
Government then it puts you in a strong position to influence how 
Government thinks on important subjects. So it's not being docile or 
compliant, but it's also about having the strategic relationship (R. Calland, 
IDASA, 23 Apr 07). 
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When I prompted the interviewee about how critical alignment worked in practice, 
Richard again referred to 'tone and style'; Ahmed told me that, at CSRV, they have 
'a lot of internal debates around how we manage the relationship with Government' 
(A. Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 07). 
From authenticity to legitimacy 
Interview data does not provide conclusive insights about the extent of such 
aforementioned internal debates. During observation research at Mindset however, I 
did not find evidence that the NGO was engaged in an organisation-wide reflection 
about maintaining its criticality and independence despite working with government. 
In interviews, other NGO professionals tended to reject the idea that there might be a 
dilemma between work for the Government and organisational autonomy in the first 
place. Imraan evoked a postmodern scenario in which theirs is a 'fluid, complex, 
plural, ever-changing, ever reengineered relationship with the state' (I. Buccus, CPP, 
26 Jun 07). From this perspective, concerns about the effects of these relationships 
on an NGO's activities and identity can be marginalised as 'ideological' or 
'unsophisticated': 
I have a number of friends in social movements who tell me ( ... ) you cannot 
engage in those spaces because they're engineered for social control. But I 
think that links to a broad debate of the world. I think debates have become a 
lot more sophisticated than capitalism versus socialism. They've become 
more nuanced, they've become more about how do we ethically manage this 
monster of globalisation (ibid.). 
The language of management that Imraan uses here in relation to what are social or 
ethical issues certainly resonates with the argument I have sought to make about 
partnerships seeking to make development more efficient as opposed to, say, more 
democratic. 
Moreover, as with the 'sophisticated lobbying' that one of the NGOs sees 
itself involved in, sophistication (or unsophistication) is evoked. The use of 
terminology such as 'sophisticated' or 'nuanced' achieves a distancing from 
organisations who do not seek engagement or collaboration. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, NGOs frequently portrayed an earlier activist NGO model as 
archaic and dying out. Given this rhetoric distancing of '(post)modern' organisations 
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from the 'dinosaur NGOs', there was a defensiveness that characterised informants' 
responses to questions such as: how do partnerships with the government impact on 
your organisational identity? Above, I already cited two extracts that conveyed a 
sense of unease; a similar sense is discernable in the following extract: 
I mean you can't not take any money from the government. It's like taking 
money from a cigarette company. I do not have a problem taking money from 
a cigarette company, I am not gonna go and buy cigarettes. They want me to 
put their profits to good use, I will do that (F. Gibbs, Operation Hunger, 4 Jul 
07). 
I often felt that informants worked hard to convince me of how authentically non-
governmental their organisations were. Many seemed uncomfortable with the 
relationships their organisation had struck with Government or with the corporate 
sector. Charges of co-option always loom large and NGOs are extremely aware of 
this. Consequently, they often referred to their own past as activists, conceivably to 
'justify' organisational practices: 'Some of my closest buddies are from hard core 
social movement backgrounds. And they continue to be' (I. Succus, CPP, 26 Jun 
07). Shafika, on a number of occasions during our interview, referred to her trade 
unionist background, seemingly in order to vouch for the NGO's integrity: 
We have to be clear of what it is that we stand for and when we do make 
compromises we are clear that those are the compromises that we're 
making. And I think that that is, it certainly helps someone like me who comes 
from the purest background, in particular (S. Isaacs, Mindset, 2 Apr 07). 
Parallel to how organisational independence needed to be continuously 
asserted, biographical authenticity is evoked by individuals in NGOs which is 
measured in terms of a purity of struggle. This is more often than not achieved by 
reference to struggle credentials. If one comes from the 'purest background', the 
NGO one works for must be true to a (never quite defined) NGO ethos. It is worth 
mentioning that staff of the NGOs that had been established most recently, such as 
Teboho or Connect Africa, did not draw on a notion of authenticity in the same way, 
and did not seem uneasy or uncomfortable about their organisation's partnerships 
(also see the timeline in appendix 4). There are certainly political gains to an 
evocation of authenticity in this way, especially given the Post-Apartheid context. 
Firstly, no former struggle activist wants to be seen as having 'sold out' or having 
been co-opted. This is a noteworthy point, given that the progression from activist to 
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NGO worker and possibly to government official remains incredibly common in South 
Africa and elsewhere. 
Secondly, there still exists in contemporary South Africa a normative left 
discourse which is strategically mobilised from time to time by a range of actors 
(including Government) even where their politics may tell a different story. Patrick 
Bond (2004b) has coined the phrase 'Talk Left Walk Right' to describe this 
characteristic of the Mbeki presidencies, but I think it can feasibly be applied to parts 
of the NGO sector, too. The fact that many of my informants were well versed in 
social theory, Marxist economics and (counter-)development discourses means that 
a critique of their NGOs' activities and structural position is always already included 
in their narratives. 
5.4. Case Study Example: the 'neutral' NGO and 'minor gaps' 
We have always aligned ourselves with whatever the policy framework of the 
government is in terms of HIV/Aids. Then the Minister of Health goes to the 
Toronto conference and insists that instead of seeing just the ARVs at the 
stall she wants to see the beetroot55 and we are at the same conference. So 
where do we stand, do we go on the side of Government and say, yes, 
nutrition is important, or do we go on the side of the T AC and the rest of the 
organisations and condemn what was happening? And that, I think, is a 
question which Mindset will have to grapple with for a long time. On the one 
hand, through our projects we are meant to be advocating for the change that 
is required, change in people's behaviour, change in people's attitude 
towards their sexuality and their relationships with their partners but for them 
also to know where to go to get the help they need. Now where do they go if 
their nearest clinic, through the actions of the minister, has been discredited, 
or there is no capacity? (T. Senne, 6 Feb 08) 
Given that NGOs' work seeks to ameliorate the effects of government's partial failure 
in service delivery, should NGOs not hold Government accountable for this failure, 
as opposed to delivering services in its place? During my observation at Mindset for 
instance, where partnerships are at the absolute core of the NGO's organisational 
55 'The beetroot' refers to the ideas of controversial Mbeki-backed former Minister of Health Tshabalala-
Msimang. Internationally, she came to epitomise South Africa's inadequate response to the HIV/Aids 
epidemic by prescribing eating a healthy diet, such as beetroot and garlic, over anti-retroviral (ARV) 
drugs as a protection against the virus. 
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model, I felt that it was easily discernible how the relationships, demands, 
accountabilities and strategies that the various partnerships required all interacted, 
sometimes counteracted each other and essentially compromised the integrity of the 
organisation. At the same time it was these overlapping responsibilities that gave 
individuals in the organisation considerable agency in circumventing technologies 
and processes employed by their partners. It also allowed 'piggy-backing' - where 
staff used information that had to be produced for their own purposes such as 
increased financial autonomy. 
Regarding their relationship with Government, the Health Channel Manager 
Claire Stevens explained that theirs is 'a more subtle alignment': 
When we align ourselves we align ourselves with guidelines on a theoretical 
level so we never say in our videos there are not enough ARVs, we just say 
this is how ARVs work, so it is a very medical/theoretical side. We don't get 
into the politics of it [ ... ] we just stick to the facts, the medical facts, the social 
facts (C. Stevens, 6 Feb 08). 
Mindsefs self-declared mission is to provide information that is as 'high-
quality, up-to-date and accurate' (K. Greenop, 1 Feb 08) as possible. The allusion to 
factual medical information indicates a self-portrayal by the NGO as value-free, 
technical and specialised. Medical information is assumed to be neutral, as is the 
way in which such information is packaged and delivered (in this case mainly 
through ICTs). To bring forward a positivist and biomedical discourse by reference to 
medical facts then makes this information difficult to critique. Claire gives the 
impression of the NGO as an apolitical and objective provider of scientific facts, 
therefore somehow being exempt from questions of how to position oneself in 
relation to the state. However, in my time spent with the organisation, it became 
clear that in some cases the information disseminated was not accurate or up-to-
date. This is because health and education content is intentionally left incomplete, as 
the NGO wanted to comply with the South African Government's framework. Claire 
explains: 
The other area that we get restrictions from is the fact that we partner with 
the Department of Health. So there we sometimes find a bit of incongruence 
when you follow recognised guidelines by the WHO which the whole world is 
following, but our Department of Health haven't yet adopted those guidelines. 
It becomes a restriction in terms of content. I can give you a specific 
example. With the [Prevention of mother-to-child transmission], the WHO 
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recommends Nevarapine, single dose, blablabla, it's not in our guidelines. So 
when we were creating content on PMCTC we couldn't talk about 
Nevarapine, so there is a gap in our content. 56 
Natascha: 'So you just don't talk about it?' 
Claire: 'We just haven't made that content' (C. Stevens, 6 Feb 08). 
This not only makes Mindset's content inconsistent with the internationally 
recognised recommendations as advocated by the WHO, it also means that there is 
no information in Mindset's materials on the preventability of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV in a country where well above a quarter of pregnant women are 
HIV-positive57. This is certainly not a technicality or a matter of 'minor gaps', as 
Claire put it: a recent study found that the premature deaths of 365,000 people 
earlier this decade could have been prevented if the Government had provided 
ARVs to Aids patients and administered prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
(PMTCT) drugs (Dugger 2008). Another example of gaps in Mindset's content is that 
they cannot show footage of anyone wearing the well-known red T AC T-shirts that 
read 'HIV-positive'.58 Such disparities prompt the question of what else gets left out 
in the NGO's educational material. Other partnerships may call for other issues to be 
down played or excluded altogether. On the basis of this example, Mindset's self-
positioning as neutral and purely technical has to be rejected - this is certainly not a 
'subtle alignment'. But by offering what are billed as technical fixes or simple medical 
facts, they can maintain close relationships with a number of different partners. The 
example of Mindset captures well how a supposedly de-politicised and neutral NGO 
offering technical solutions is ideally suited to a partnership model. 
I also observed that each of the people I worked with had their own creative 
ways of negotiating the dilemmas Mindset's partnership model generated. Claire for 
instance was very aware of the different and often competing demands of partners. 
She was able to negotiate these because she was very clear about what each of 
these partners stood for and what their motivations were - although she could not 
56 Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug that reduces the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
Antiretroviral drugs were only made available to all South Africans after the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) successfully sued the South African Government in 2002. The organisation now campaigns and 
mobilises for universal access to ARV treatment. 
57 29.1 % of pregnant women in South Africa tested positive for HIV in 2006 (SA Department of Health 
statistic, from the TAC website http://www.tac.org.za. last accessed 20 February 2009). 
58 This is because of the historical conflict between the TAC and Government over ARVs (see footnote 
above). 
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resolve the dilemmas that such competing demands posed for the integrity of 
Mindset content. Partnership demands and conditionalities by a corporation, the 
national Government and a critical civil society organisation vary greatly, each 
affecting the scope and content of the messages Mindset produces and broadcasts. 
Partnership requirements and constraints had a subtle but perpetual impact on how 
content was developed, and which focus areas were chosen. Yet, in the absence of 
an organisational policy on how the NGO ultimately aligns itself and where its 
accountabilities lie, the quality, consistency and relevance of its activities are 
threatened. 
Mindset in many ways exemplifies my ideal-typical model of multisectoral 
relationships and illustrates how, in seeking partnerships with anyone working in the 
same field, the organisation tries to be all things to all people and may well spread 
itself too thinly in terms of its objectives. Partnering began to pose a problem 
whenever disparities between the partners became apparent, as was the case 
around service delivery or PMTCT. Moreover, with these issues being voiced by 
parts of civil society which are themselves subject to Government marginalisation 
and repression, the positioning of this NGO to the state determines its positioning to 
the more activist sections of civil society. Clearly, Mindsefs particular configuration 
and sustainability model cannot be generalised across the NGO sector, but I feel that 
it serves to bring into focus challenges and effects of partnerships that are relevant 
to other NGOs in this research. The constantly shifting alliances in partnerships have 
real implications for organisational values and accountabilities. 
This overall tendency towards mainstreaming however does not imply that 
there is a single determinate outcome of the partnership mode in other 
organisations, or indeed that there are no other effects of this discourse within 
Mindset. The relative autonomy of NGOs is both increased and restricted in cross-
sectoral partnerships: they involve commitments to more parties and intensified 
reporting demands, but also allow the development of strategic temporary 
relationships, such as with the private sector. The observation research thus serves 
to underline the difference between how participants position themselves in relation 
to partnerships or auditing and what work is actually undertaken - or neglected - in 
an organisation. 
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5.5. Partnerships with the private sector: one foot in the boardroom 
As a truly South African company, we believe in nation-building and the 
development of a strong economy. It is our responsibility to help improve the 
lives of the people from this country - a duty we embrace, as our Corporate 
Social Investment brings a double return. Investing time, skills and money in 
improving the quality of life for all South Africans is the right thing to do. 
Secondly, it means relief of poverty through an investment in the very 
community we form part of, an investment in South Africa's next generation of 
economically active people - our future client base. 59 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate sector funding accounts for about a quarter of all civil society assistance in 
South Africa. Currently, an estimated R4.1 billion is spent on CSI programmes 
(Seokoma 2009). In 2004, corporate sector funds were mainly directed to education 
and training (46%) and health and social development (24%) (Kuljian 2005a). Given 
the decrease in foreign donor money and the rising reporting requirements to access 
such donor monies, partnerships with the corporate sector are vital to the 
sustainability of many NGOs - and will likely become more so in the future. The way 
such relationships were understood was contingent on whether organisations were 
quite corporatised and configured to partnerships, or mostly donor-based. Some 
organisations welcomed corporate partnerships as more flexible and less 
bureaucratic than their relationships with donors or the state. Their benefit was also 
seen as enforcing corporate obligations towards communities. The majority, despite 
their pragmatism in seeking corporate funding, viewed them with scepticism. They 
saw them as based on corporate needs as opposed to 'real' community needs, 
driven by a need for high visibility of output rather than actual developmental impact. 
Besides, corporate budgets are often so small that many of the bigger NGOs found 
the requirements and conditionalities to outweigh the benefit to their organisation. 
NGO-corporate partnerships are typically part of a corporation's social 
responsibility mandate. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), according to 
Blowfield and Frynas, is 
59 From the Corporate Social Investment section of the San lam website, last accessed 27 October 
2008. Sanlam is a South African financial services and insurance corporation and the 5th largest 
company in Africa (Forbes 2008). 
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an umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of which recognize 
the following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on 
society and the natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance 
and the liability of individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the 
behaviour of others with whom they do business (e.g. within supply chains); 
and that (c) business needs to manage its relationship with wider society, 
whether for reasons of commercial viability, or to add value to society (2005: 
503). 
The latter point underlines that CSI is 'good for business' - development goals and 
profitability are linked because CSI improves the welfare of citizens, increases social 
capital and deflects criticisms of unsustainable practices. 
There has been a huge growth of ethical concern and the language of ethics 
on the part of businesses worldwide in the last decade (see for example Barry 2004). 
Nonetheless, due to Apartheid's ongoing social and economic legacy and the 
adoption of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), the private sector was forced to 
adopt socially responsible policies and practices that are more advanced than those 
in many of the richer economies; the country is ranked 6th worldwide in the area of 
CSI (Pennington 2007). The 2002 King II report urged companies to embrace the 
'triple bottom line' - 'the economic, environmental and social aspects of a company's 
activities' in addition to the financial bottom line alone - as a preferred way of doing 
business (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 2002: 9). This is particularly the 
case in relation to HIV/Aids where corporations such as Anglo American began 
education and prevention programmes to employees, and now fund voluntary testing 
and counselling as well as ARV therapy (Kuljian 2005a). 
CSI, as the 'merger of profits and morals' (Charkiewicz 2005: 78), effectively 
marketises social responsibility. There is a connection between a (post-)neoliberal 
project and CSR, in that the latter 'responsibilises' companies to '[enact] and 
[perform] such a neo-liberal programme on themselves and others' (Thompson 
2007: para. 19). The notion of the economically active people in the quote at the start 
of this section speaks to the concern of creating entrepreneurial citizen-subjects. 
Empowerment and agency are at the core of this liberal rationality, in that the 
practices and aspirations of the citizenry are meant to be constructed through 
governmental technologies. There is a parallel between the work of NGOs that seeks 
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to build more economically prudent subjects, the responsibilisation of NGOs through 
M&E, the responsibilisation of companies through CSI and the responsibilisation of 
states through the good governance paradigm. Partnerships between these different 
actors are thus arrangements through which accountability is produced and 
managerial norms and neoliberal values are circulated. 
For companies, there are clear advantages to channelling their social 
investment through well-established NGOs, as I discuss below. Accordingly, CSI 
assumes specific ideal roles for NGOs that are predicated on NGOs' function as 
service providers. As South African businesses begin to engage, however 
superficially, in development issues, there is a growing interest in NGOs as partners 
and the use of a language of partnership. On one occasion, an investment banker 
with Citigroup in South Africa, upon hearing what had brought me to Johannesburg, 
swiftly handed me his business card, exclaiming that of course Citigroup must 
establish relationships with NGOs and can I please contact him. Yet, this corporate 
interest in NGOs is not only an expression of the rise of ethical corporatism but also 
overlaps with the nation-building project of the new South Africa and the 
harmonisation of development objectives. 
NGO-company relations 
As with partnerships with Government, NGOs often distanced themselves from their 
collaborations with private sector actors when they were actually central to their 
sustainability strategy. Most interviewees addressed the gulf between corporates 
and the non-profit sector in terms of basic principles and values, pointing out that 
they were separated by 'completely different language' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07): 
So the board has said we should be getting more corporate funding and we 
should be looking at the CSI handbook and identify people. I think for me it's 
a values issue. It's a values issue, so much so that we're dissenting because 
I am not prepared as the organisation's director to go off to British Tobacco 
and say can you give me a full year's salary for my editor and five desks? (M. 
Oyedan, Agenda, 27 Jun 07). 
Whilst NGO-company alliances may have been viewed as impractical or unethical, 
they were nevertheless not seen as a danger to the NGOs' autonomy; unlike in their 
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relationships with donors or government, NGOs did not think themselves the weaker 
partner. 
NGOs usually referred to CSR programmes as Corporate Social Investment, 
reflecting the common usage in the country; Fig argues that this is because 
corporate citizenship or CSI are concepts 'that ask no questions about legacy, 
memory, history, justice or moral and ethical responsibilities' (Fig 2005: 601). In the 
following, Dom Marshall-Smith describes the aims of Corporate Social Investment in 
a blue-chip NGO such as his own: 
It's a condition of funding, if we are working with CBOs whose families have 
members that work in [South African Breweries] or depots, suppliers, or glass 
manufacturers, top makers, if those communities represent SAB in any way, 
they want to be in those communities fixing their HIV issues, caring for the 
orphans of that community. To drive reputation, yes, but to drive employee 
loyalty, to drive staff retention, a healthy work force (D. Marshall-Smith, 
Starfish, 23 Mar 07). 
This extract raises three key issues. Firstly, CSI is a way for corporates to fulfil their 
CSR obligations, as agreed to in King II (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 
2002). Secondly it provides a possible avenue for increasing the reputation of a 
company. Many people I interviewed focused on this aspect of CSI, treating it as a 
mere cynical marketing drive. William Bird: 
What a lot of South African companies call Corporate Social Investment isn't 
Corporate Social Investment, that's bull-shit. It's offensive to call it that 
because what it is in most of those companies' cases is feel good marketing, 
which is we're giving this much money away to an Aids orphanage. Aren't we 
just fantastic! It's got nothing to do with it, in fact. And all of it is driven by 
what kind of extra good branding they can get in and media-buy in. So if you 
can't deliver on that level then they are not interested. Unless if it's an overtly 
feel good kind of thing, then they would say sorry (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). 
This assessment gives clues as to the type of organisation and the kind of activities 
that can be suitable for corporate partnerships. Such partnerships overwhelmingly 
contain projects that have a high visibility and short-term gains, thereby automatically 
disadvantaging NGOs whose work is longer-term or not immediately tangible. 
Corporates want to 'go in' and 'fix' things, as was expressed in one of the above 
extracts. I was told by a number of informants that large South African companies 
want to be able to put up signs with their name and logo in front of a clinic they have 
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helped building, whereas it is much harder to point to a single tangible result when it 
comes to human rights or monitoring work. 
Corporate funding often seeks prestige projects that can be marketed. 
Because of their involvement in policy-oriented activities, many NGOs in my 
research found it quite hard to secure stand-alone partnerships with corporates 
outside of multisectoral partnerships. Imraan from the CPP voiced some of these 
d ifficu Ities: 
Corporates think that CSR is somehow about doing some relief work. It's 
about contributing to a soup kitchen. That seems to be their simplistic 
understanding of it. And when an organisation like CPP in the democracy and 
government sector has to say to a corporate: "but we want to create spaces 
for communities to engage in policy processes", they do not see value in that. 
That's an abstract policy (I. Buccus, 26 Jun 07). 
Many of the interviewees found the private sector's philanthropy to be one-
dimensional and clumsy, not least for not being able to see the link between NGO 
work, a stable democracy and long-term business sustainability. 
The third and related point is that CSI is often concerned with a specific 
population's health and welfare, for instance by improving nutrition or health 
provision in a community from which they draw their workers. There is little incentive 
for a corporate to try to build a citizenry that engages in policy spaces whereas, for 
instance in the case of HIV, biopolitical issues of individual sexual and reproductive 
behaviour interconnect with the concerns of capital ensuring a healthy work force is 
critical to the health of the corporation. It follows that corporations favour projects in 
the area of health, HIV, welfare and community care. As Christa Kuljian writes, 
'[Absa Foundation's] HIV/Aids programmes represent some of the most creative and 
forward-thinking elements of CSI, but they hardly amount to social justice 
grantmaking' (2005b: para. 6). 
CSI, even outside the context of PPPs themselves, is one way of 'linking a 
company to one of the priorities of Government' (C. Podetti, Valued Citizens 
Initiative, 21 Jun 07). Socio-economic development is one of the seven pillars of 
BEE, enabling companies to collect points on their BEE scorecard for CSI. Often, 
multisectoral linkages that involve NGOs facilitate further capital gains for 
corporates: if an NGO already has a presence in communities which geographically 
fall into the Government's priority areas for development, the corporation can get 
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more points on their scorecard than working in an urban community. These links 
between CSI and BEE are one reason for why there is, amongst corporates, a 
preference for NGOs with good relationships with Government; personal 
relationships and the myriad connections between the political and the business 
world in South Africa are another. Therefore, endorsement by Government often 
secures access to corporate funding. 
This argument also sheds light on why NGOs seeking corporate funding have 
a vested interest in maintaining an image of being close to communities and their 
needs. NGOs ought to play the role of an intermediary or interpreter that translates 
what happens 'on the ground' into a manageable solution for a corporation. This 
positioning as social capital middle man moreover involves the practice of 
translation. Dom for instance argued that this ability to translate is what Starfish's 
value had historically consisted of: 
We can travel, we can take the language, we can make that cross-over into 
the board room easily and now we are putting our foot into the shanty town 
shack and the other foot in the boardroom and kind of creating a bridge in 
that way which I think is quite a subtle thing but it is what has added a lot of 
value to the Starfish brand. That you can talk the boardroom speak and then 
are learning more and more about meaningful development speak, too (D. 
Marshall-Smith, Starfish, 23 Mar 07). 
NGOs then enable the linking up of communities with government or corporations. 
As Dom puts it, their function is to create a bridge, ostensibly where there was none 
before. 
The type of NGO best suited to corporate partnerships is then an 
organisation that has existing linkages to government and to communities, is non-
political and government-aligned, as Ahmed explains here: 
I think some of the corporate sector maybe concerned about seeing an NGO 
like CSVR as critical of the Government and therefore does not want to be 
seen to be supporting a critic of the government (A. Motala, 14 Mar 07). 
The fact that the Government has promoted public-private partnerships - and that 
companies' participation in development partnerships gains favour with Government 
and gives exposure - makes it unlikely that companies will either openly criticise 
government policy or fund organisations that are critical of government. 
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In addition to not being critical of Government, an NGO entering corporate 
partnerships cannot be critical of corporate malpractice in South Africa. Reliance on 
corporate partnerships raises concerns about NGOs becoming a vehicle for a 
corporation's specific objectives, therefore coming to represent private company 
interests. These NGO-company alignments then leave it to social movements to 
challenge the effects of the privatisation of basic services such as water or 
electricity.so The failure of NGOs to take a stand against privatisation is particularly 
grave given the reinforcement of socio-economic inequalities after 1996, when the 
ANC adopted a neoliberal macroeconomic programme. The conflicts between 
communities and the state that have emerged in the 2000s' over the adoption of a 
cost-recovery model for the provision of basic social services represent a failed 
opportunity for NGOs to support the constituencies many of them claim to represent. 
The fact that many NGOs do not officially align themselves with the grievances of the 
majority of the population has further contributed to setting a de-politicised and 
neutral organisation as a standard for the whole sector. 
Corporate sector organisations want to work with NGOs that are established, 
that they have perhaps worked with before and that are financially accountable. A 
track record is needed not simply in terms of previous work but also in terms of the 
ability to monitor previous work in a way suitable to the corporate requirements. As 
Dion from Connect Africa puts it: 
They are not interested. Not in start-ups. They all want tick boxes, they all 
want somebody who is established, someone they have worked with before. 
And the other thing about CSI, it takes you ages to get involved, you have to 
get into their budgets at the right time 'cos then they are allocated, and it is 
an annual cycle, but if you miss it you're out of it (D. Jerling, 16 Mar 07). 
It should be noted that monitoring and 'ticking boxes' here does not refer to the 
stringent M&E requirements from donors that I will describe in chapter 6. Rather, 
businesses usually seek high visibility projects, reporting thus being a question, for 
example, of producing photographs 'with Mandela outside the school they just paid 
for somewhere in the Eastern Cape' (R. Calland, IDA SA, 23 Apr 07) for their annual 
report. It is a question of what type of organisation can deliver, in Will's words, 'feel 
good marketing' and 'media buy in' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). Whilst reporting to a 
60 Exceptions are the more radical NGOs such as the FXI who have in fact been engaged in litigation 
against South African corporations. 
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corporate funder is usually more flexible and negotiable than to agencies, corporate 
partners tend to aim for glossy annual reports that sum up an NGO's developmental 
contribution in a few sentences and in terms of predefined entities such as numbers 
of hospitals or schools built. 
Starfish provides an example of an NGO whose organisational model is 
based on corporate partnerships: 
One of the value-adds that we give a corporate is that, prior to that reporting 
period, if we hear a story on the ground, we'll take a photo, we'll record it, put 
it on a CD or put it in an email and swing it into the corporate and do with it 
what you like, newsletter, up to you, but we kind of know what your platforms 
are, we'll give you some content, because those guys they always look for 
content, it's the value that Starfish brings to the funder-grantmaker 
relationship (D. Marshall-Smith, 23 Mar 07). 
For an NGO like Starfish that is able to 'deliver' on these corporates requirements, 
project orientation and targets have been impacted on. In the following example, a 
corporate partnership was set up on the basis of a visit to a specific project site. The 
partner then insisted on funding only this project, disregarding the targets and 
priorities that Starfish itself had determined: 
We have a huge push by Virgin to do project visits and particularly the one 
project close to Gauteng that is accessible to them from a logistical point of 
view, that they like and know [ ... ] And we are going 'hang on, these guys are 
just coming into our training programme, we don't want to rock their boats 
over this time at all, so no, you can't do a visit'. And they are going, fuck you 
basically, we are doing visits because we have paid for this thing. [ ... ] That's 
where the partnerships are starting to become complicated [ ... ]. Our partners 
are chucking funding into very specific restricted areas that are overfunding, 
certain areas that are supporting 300 children, and we are saying we need to 
support 700 children in that area so don't restrict the funding to that particular 
project, bring other projects on board (ibid.). 
The practicalities of project visits point to an important unevenness of corporate 
funding: its urban focus. In 2003, two-thirds of CSI spending was directed towards 
urban and semi-urban areas despite the high levels of rural poverty (Kuljian 2005b). 
Moreover, communities that are not connected to corporate South Africa as 
employees or customers - arguably the most marginalised - are usually not targeted 
byCSI. 
As Dom's account strongly suggests, whilst NGOs themselves may not see 
corporate partnerships as a threat to their autonomy, they in fact impact strongly on 
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NGOs' activities and their identity. With there being less donor money available and 
partnerships becoming the norm, it is likely they will have to depend on partnerships, 
and change their activities in line with the requirements of corporations who demand 
high visibility and marketability. But the example of Starfish also raises issues 
concerning the measurability of developmental impact, how it is framed by different 
development actors and how these actors struggle over definitions of development. 
Impact measurement is a site where the inherent contradictions of the partnership 
model become visible. The following chapter will expand on this point. 
5.6. Conclusions 
This and the previous chapter were concerned with what type of NGO the 
partnership modality produces in South Africa. This concern is linked to the question 
of what roles are 'allowed' and appropriate for NGOs in Post-Apartheid democracy. 
Partnerships seek to produce appropriate, modern NGOs that can be included into 
government or corporate agendas as partners through responsible self-governance. 
But they also operate to make corporations and public authorities responsible. 
As I have argued, alignment with governmental priorities may well make 
NGOs structurally unable to challenge particular aspects of Government policy such 
as its approach to service delivery, given that they assist with implementation. 
Likewise, partnering with corporates means they are structurally not in a position to 
conduct a critique of privatisation. To form these relationships means that a more 
corporate approach to development is adapted, as was evident in the language of 
management and efficiency that was largely employed by NGOs and in the 
organisational structures and funding modalities they adapted. Ideologies of 
development thus tend to be reproduced even as NGOs are often in disagreement 
with development institutions. NGOs often police themselves to try and be good 
partners, therefore beginning to organisationally resemble other sectors. I contend 
that these similarities do not just indicate the lack of an alternative vocabulary of 
development, but also of an alternative vision. Because NGOs tend to have to work 
within a particular discursive formation that entails a level of coherence, there is a 
tendency of producing similar outcomes. In other words, the flexibility that 
characterises the new NGO also implies that it is less likely to have an independent 
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vision of development or of the shape of democracy. Importantly, this tendency to 
homogenisation is then transferred to the rest of civil society, as I will argue in 
subsequent chapters. 
The more the NGO sector becomes similar to other sectors - both in terms of 
how it organises and how it speaks about what it does - the more important the 
manner in which it rhetorically situates itself becomes. NGOs purposefully use claims 
about their identity to gain power and activate agency. These may be conflicting or 
essentialised ideas such as being close to the poor and being able to speak the 
language of corporations. One of the key claims by NGOs that have emerged from 
my analysis in this chapter is that of authenticity. Authenticity was constantly evoked, 
both by reference to organisational independence and through personal pedigree 
and struggle credentials. In this way NGOs can emphasise their legitimate role in 
development. This becomes necessary due to the paradox that NGOs should 
arguably be supporting the struggles of those marginalised by government and 
corporate practices in areas such as service provision and yet, in order to remain 
sustainable, are aligning themselves with these very actors hence endorsing policies 
that are anti-poor. 
It is this very legitimacy that it is bestowed upon donors, corporations or the 
government by their partnering with NGOs. Conversely, NGOs in turn often seek 
legitimacy from their more grassroots counterparts in civil society, such as CBOs or 
social movements. Of course the NGO sector itself is not homogenous and has a 
number of roles it can fulfil in South Africa. So it is indeed appropriate for an NGO 
not to focus on 'toyi-toyi-ing with all your friends to your local community centre' (C. 
Stevens, Mindset, 6 Feb 08). Yet I believe there is, at least in South Africa at this 
present point in time, no middle-ground position that allows NGOs to partner with 
everyone without this affecting their minimum commitment of supposedly uplifting 
and empower the poor. 
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Chapter 6 
NGOs and Impact Measurement 
6.1. Introduction 
Message to Africa: if you don't count, you don't 
count. 
(Lehohla 2007) 
You must then be able to account for each 
person; you must have a report back against 
each person and so it's a kind of language of 
efficiency. But it's efficiency not in terms of 
human development; it's efficiency in terms of 
financial management. 
(Lenny Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07) 
It is the weekly meeting of the health channel. There are 14 of us in the big 
conference room at Mindset and we are discussing sample sizes, base line data and 
mixed methodologies. Claire has prepared tables of indicators which are projected 
on the wall as the channel manager is giving a run-down of the new M&E guidelines 
required by one of the NGO's major funders. Funding mechanisms have just 
changed, and alongside so has impact assessment. Most people's eyes are glazing 
over as soon as Tuki starts talking of heteroscedasticity. I'm struggling to keep up, 
although I have had research training in the first year of my Ph.D. and have since 
worked in applied research. Members of the research team sit in on these meetings 
and occasionally speak up to clarify variables. Kirston, Danielle and Monika of the 
Research Team have backgrounds in psychology or economics, with high-level 
analytical and numerical skills. But, judging by their facial expressions, most of the 
other staff members find this both incomprehensible and annoying. Still, as Kirston 
tells me later, 'sometimes people with money prefer numbers and graphs'. Later in 
the kitchen, John, the head of the schooling channel, complains that funders just do 
not understand that education is a process. He used to be a teacher. 
NGOs in South Africa and elsewhere are challenged more than ever before 
to demonstrate relevance and results. This is due to a development environment of 
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increasingly scprce resources. Impact measurement is becoming an ever-bigger 
priority for donors, some of which now stipulate that a certain percentage of the 
budget is spent on M&E. In the case of USAID grants to South African NGOs for 
example, M&E is to make up 9% of total project expenditure. Other donors 
supporting South African NGOs may not specify a percentage to be spent on M&E 
but have in place particular systems for reporting which demand considerable NGO 
resources, such as the provision of extensive narrative reports, budgets and financial 
audits. At the opposite end of the funding cycle, grant applications are likewise 
regarded by many staff as increasingly lengthy, elaborate and resource-intensive. 
It is not only funding scarcity that has precipitated these changes however. 
Transformations in public management have put pressure on NGOs to prove good 
governance, accountability and cost-effectiveness. New Public Management, the 
philosophy guiding public sector reform, has impacted on every kind of organisation, 
dismantling the public-private divide and forcing them to 'organize their activities as if 
they were little businesses' (Rose 1999: 152). By the 1990s, what Power (1997) has 
called the 'audit explosion' had also spread to the world of development. The need 
for the production of impact statistics has spawned a growing number of data 
collection instruments and indicators, and in some cases experimentation with 
different methods. In order to secure future funding NGOs must show that they are 
able to apply a range of techniques that are evidence of good governance and 
efficiency. 
This chapter analyses the impact of intensified reporting requirements on the 
NGOs in this research. Systems of monitoring and evaluation play central roles in 
shaping NGOs' everyday activities and the discursive strategies they employ to think 
through these activities. This has profound implications for the projects they carry 
out, their organisational make-up and their structural positioning. A central argument 
put forward in this chapter is that apparently mundane techniques like M&E are 
technologies of governing in the development domain, and as such constitute and 
produce specific forms of knowledge and expertise. Audit is a relationship of power 
between scrutiniser and observed (Shore and Wright 2000). Rather than NGOs 
being merely at the receiving end of such practices of governing though, I 
understand them to be intermediaries between the national! global level of donors 
and the level of communities they claim to serve. By acting as expert and broker, 
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they actively circulate meanings and practices of development and shape what 
organisational forms civil society can take in Post-Apartheid democracy. 
Following on from the analysis in the previous chapters, monitoring is shown 
to be a key demand of partnerships for which capacity has to be created, requiring 
specific sets of skills. An audit culture is thus further reinforced through the 
partnership mode, with cross-sectoral interaction providing a context for its 
circulation. Partnerships for development also have structuring effects because, by 
attributing particular roles or types of expertise to each sector (for the non-profit 
sector to be informal and flexible or the private sector to be highly efficient, for 
example), they prescribe how the different sectors ought to interact in the field of 
development. This then also allows the identification of a lack of expertise or 
capacity - for instance to count, manage or audit - which has to be corrected. An 
appropriate hierarchy of authority and expertise is established in this way. Once 
institutionalised, such NGO expertise becomes a channel for governmentality. 
I have chosen the term 'impact measurement' for the title of this chapter to 
address the various and divergent auditing, monitoring and evaluation practices that 
are mobilised through NGOs' reporting and fund raising requirements. I also use the 
terms 'audit society' or 'audit culture', again to capture the ubiquity of practices of 
evaluation, assessment, checking and account giving (see Power 1997, Strathern 
2000). This terminology also emphasises the importance of the issues raised for a 
wider context beyond the study of NGOs, highlighting the role of calculative practices 
in constituting particular economic spaces and linking them to global economic 
spaces (see for instance Larner and Le Heron 2004). 
6.2. The significance of monitoring and evaluation for NGOs 
Demonstrating impact, being accountable 
The principal evaluation criteria of M&E programmes, as set by the OECD and 
adopted by the majority of development agencies active in South Africa, are 
effectiveness, impact, relevance, sustainability and efficiency (Molund and Schill 
2004, European Commission 2005, PEPFAR 2006, USAID 2008). Although 
monitoring and evaluation are usually presented in tandem, they describe quite 
separate processes. Monitoring refers to the routine and continuous tracking of 
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information about a project, often with a focus on outputs. The information collected 
is used for the purpose of management control and decision-making. Evaluation 
consists of a periodic assessment of the outcomes, efficiency and impact of a project 
in terms of its stated objectives and is undertaken with a view to drawing lessons that 
may be more widely applicable. 
Donors are keen to emphasise M&E as beneficial to organisational change, 
arguably not least in an attempt to counteract perceptions of it as a donor 
requirement or conditionality. Besides encouraging organisational learning, donor 
claims on behalf of M&E include that it provides NGOs with tools to measure 
programme effectiveness and efficiency, that it fosters public and political 
cooperation, supports information needs for target audiences and promotes skills 
development and adaptive management (Bakewell et al. 2003). In short, better 
information - as derived from solid M&E techniques - is to lead to results-based 
management and ultimately greater impact. NGOs themselves acknowledge the 
need to develop better systems that assess and evaluate social development 
activities, having led calls for M&E of social development in the 1980s as a challenge 
to the large-scale development approaches of the major agencies (Mebrahtu et al. 
2007). It is accountability, however, that has been the most important reason for 
extending impact measurement. 
The push for greater accountability and better governance of development 
NGOs is connected to the rise and global spread of New Public Management (NPM). 
This public sector reform agenda assumes that public services will be more effective 
if organised according to the principles of market economics and that the 
management of such marketised public services will be more efficient the more it 
resembles private sector management practices (Awortwi 2006).61 NPM emphasises 
the importance of targets, incentives and punishments as a way to force public 
sector workers to behave in the interests of consumers. 
Audit describes an 'independent, objective assurance activity designed to 
add value and improve an organisation's operations' by 'bringing a systematic, 
disciplined approach to assess and improve the effectiveness of risk management, 
control and governance processes' (OEeD 2002). During the early 1990s, 'audit' 
began to be applied to a huge variety of contexts beyond purely financial matters: 'a 
61 See Shore and Wright (2000) for a history of managerialism in Britain, Awortwi (2006) for an African 
persective on NPM and the volume edited by Minogue et al. (1998) on NPM and governance. 
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growing population of "auditees" began to experience a wave of formalized and 
detailed checking up on what they do' (Power 1997: 3). A new financial rationality 
was applied to organisations and their practices, with accounting providing a 
technology for 'acting at a distance upon the actions of others' (Rose 1999: 152). 
The re-organisation of public institutions and formerly extra-economic domains 
according to such a financial rationality is enabled by constructing calculable spaces 
that are then made governable through experts and expertise (Miller 1994). New 
calculable spaces require new forms of expertise, but importantly experts are both 
objects and channels for calculations - the rendering governable of experts is 
changing expertise itself (Rose 1999). 
Power (1997) draws attention to audit as actively shaping the activities it 
controls and representing a particular conception of accountability. In the 
development domain for example, it is often understood in narrow financial terms 
and represented as a technical issue. At the same time it is assumed that the 
implementation of specific audit procedures will produce legitimacy. Accordingly, 
accountability is one of the key concerns of neoliberal development, linking the 
discourse and practices of good governance on a global level with those of 
corporatist governance of NGOs. Critical accounts maintain that 'coercive 
accountability' (Shore and Wright 2000) in fact does not contribute to greater 
transparency or democracy. Audit demands that its efficacy is trusted, thus co-opting 
management systems into the monitoring process and may therefore replace the 
monitoring of quality with the monitoring of systems to monitor quality (Power 1997). 
Audit society, according to Power, is one which has come to understand the solution 
to many of its problems in terms of audit; audit is a normalised style of analysis, and 
a way of categorising and breaking down objects, tasks and needs. 
The bulk of literature on reporting in NGOs is technical in focus, including tool 
kits and user manuals aimed at day-to-day management or providing targeted 
information for 'development partners'. It lacks a theoretical perspective on the 
broader implications of M&E and its effects on organisations and development 
projects. Amongst the more critical commentators, one study of M&E practices of 
British NGOs in Ethiopia states that 'the pronounced preoccupation with NGO 
effectiveness on the part of international donors and aid agencies has had a very 
real impact on INGOs' (Mebrahtu 2004: 87). The author identifies a lack of shared 
meanings of M&E: the further away from the field individuals were located, the more 
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likely they were to emphasise the potential of M&E to feed into organisational 
learning. Conversely, field staff was found to emphasise accountability to donors. 
Mebrathu et al (2007) report back from INTRAC's series of international 
workshops on evaluation. According to the participants, it is usually accountability to 
the donor, rather than evaluation with a view to stakeholders, that dominates M&E 
practices of African NGOs. The authors also note a recent trend to revert to 
quantitative M&E systems and an increasing blurring of effectiveness and efficiency, 
which they argue is particularly troubling in the context of the revival of state-centred 
approaches to development. 
Bryant's (2007) research likewise identifies a gap between assertions that 
M&E is necessary, and evidence of good quality M&E in practice. She finds that 
those NGOs with the least donor funding were the ones doing the most about 
evaluation - possibly because in the case of donor funding, the evaluation is treated 
as part of contract compliance and donor needs must be met, as opposed to meeting 
the learning needs of the own organisation. There is also a danger of donors 
confusing the outcomes of project evaluation with actual NGO performance (Ebrahim 
2003). The afore-mentioned studies focus on INGOs - as of 2008, there exists no 
academic literature specifically focusing on M&E in South African NGOs, although 
'grey literature' by development practioners can be found online, for instance on 
SANGONeTI NGO Pulse (http://www.ngopulse.org/, also see Mebrahtu et al [2007] 
on M&E in African CSOs). The INGO focus is significant; INGOs seem to be more 
likely to experiment with different methodologies. Whilst M&E practices become 
more sophisticated all the time, it would appear that only particularly 'capacitated' 
organisations are in a position to employ more innovative indicators.62 
Some of the critical literature understands M&E practices as modes of 
managerialism that are transforming SNGOs towards conforming to working 
practices associated with the corporate sector (for instance Roberts et al. 2005, 
Ebrahim 2003). Managerialism has four major elements, according to Roberts et al. 
(2005). These are accountability, institutional form (the way in which contemporary 
managerialist discourses tend to stress a specific approach to defining an 
62 This is not to argue that smaller or community-based organisations cannot develop innovate 
methodologies. On the contrary, as my interview data shows, it is often in the context of reporting back 
to community stakeholders that alternative ways of documenting and measuring impact have emerged, 
such as storytelling and outcome mapping (also see Mebrahtu 2007 on documenting and oral culture in 
African development organisations). My point is that these are unlikely to be accepted by donors, 
certainly on their own, and that there is more bargaining power for formalised NGOs to negotiate and 
indeed educate funders. 
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organisation), capacity building (e.g. leadership) and spatial strategies and 
discourses. Managerialism should certainly not be assumed to be homogenous or to 
necessarily always flow from donor to NGO but, as Roberts et al. argue, 'mainstream 
northern managerialism has become a fairly entrenched and institutionally developed 
set of knowledges and practices in the NGO sector' (1849). The fact that auditing 
and monitoring culture usually goes upwards to donors and bigger organisations, 
rather than donors also being monitored by smaller organisations or communities, 
has also been criticised (Mawdsley et al. 2002, Mebrahtu et al. 2007). 
Drawing on these critiques, I understand the above-discussed techniques of 
auditing, accounting, monitoring and evaluation as driven by the economic and 
political imperatives of neoliberalism, enabling the linking up of NGOs to other 
national and global actors. Partnerships as a preferred development mode 
necessitate multiple levels of accountability that become relays for audit, 
management and evaluation practices. However, information systems also constitute 
one of the mechanisms by which individual donor influence is exerted, thus 
reproducing geopolitical and cultural inequalities. Moreover, the staff of formalised 
South African NGOs themselves constitute a specific demographic with their own 
projects and interests that further circulate these practices. 
M&E, the necessary evil? 
M&E and reporting take up a large, and ever-increasing, proportion of NGOs' time 
and resources: 
It's about extensive reporting requirements. Those things have increased 
about 15 times since I have been running the organisation. I now have to 
submit very often independent auditor's reports. Which is fine, I do not have 
any principled issue with it, but it's the time and admin that it takes up (W. 
Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). 
This is not to claim that development projects were not assessed in the past (see 
Cracknell [2000] for a history of aid evaluation, for example). Development practice 
has consistently dealt with concerns of how the impact of projects can be more 
accurately evaluated. Participatory Action Research and Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) constitute such projects to improve research practices and develop 
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new methods of impact measurement that seek to locate knowledge production with 
the recipients of development. Li writes: 
[PRA] was designed to foster new desires from which new conduct would 
follow. It simultaneously made up communities, responsibilized them, and 
emphasized their autonomy (2007: 225). 
This argument draws attention to the fact that research methods like PRA 
necessarily constitute specific ways of framing poverty - for instance in local rather 
than in political economic terms - that correspond to specific forms of governance. 
What has changed is firstly that reporting, monitoring and evaluation have 
become primary focus areas for donors. Requirements and indicators vary 
considerably from donor to donor, but there are general observations that can be 
drawn from the considerable variety of NGOs in my study. Secondly, there now 
exists an industry of M&E training in South Africa, offering workshops, short courses 
and even degrees in monitoring and evaluation which further underlines the ubiquity 
of M&E in the development sector. The same applies to proposal and tender writing. 
The appointments section in the back of the weekly Mail & Guardian regularly listed 
reporting workshops and monitoring seminars alongside the advertisements for 
positions in the development sector (incidentally, these posts took up almost the 
entire appointments section, ranging from work at development banks and 
international institutions to international and local NGOs). Developing successful 
proposals is understood in this thesis as a skill and domain of expertise, as CEPD's 
director John clearly articulated when he told me they were now 'churn[ing] out those 
tenders like we are a factory. A tender factory' (J. Pampallis, CEPD, Interview, 23 
Feb 07). The metaphor of the factory is particularly striking, evoking not just 
commercialisation in the broadest sense, but also efficiency, automation, 
measurable output and regulation. 
Another contact who was working for a funder and had considerable 
international experience felt that there were many more workshops around proposal 
writing than anywhere else (M. Roll, FES, Interview, 27 Feb 07). Their sole purpose, 
he said, was to learn the vocabulary of participation, citizenship and democracy -
and this showed in the uniformity of language employed in grant applications to his 
organisation, which were full of 'senseless keywords' (ibid.). He saw this industry as 
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particularly relevant to development practioners in South Africa because there is a 
'neo-Marxist vocabulary' (ibid.) that is always drawn on, and that they needed to 
learn this other language for communications with their funders. 
Turning to perceptions of M&E next, the vast majority of the interviewed NGO 
staff experienced it as 'burdensome', 'fixed' and 'rigid'. Pragmatic concerns for 
sustainability and pressures from donors were cited as the main reasons for 
implementing M&E systems. Reporting requirements were perceived as a 
'bureaucratic exercise' on the part of donors that put a strain on the organisation and 
diverted important resources away from development projects rather than being 
motivated by a genuine interest to bring about change. Sitting in on the meeting at 
Mindset I described earlier I was struck by the disdain with which staff below senior 
management greeted discussions about targets, indicators and measurement. 
Donors and their requirements were ridiculed: 'if we can't give the numbers we don't 
get the money'; the language of M&E was often used ironically or in speech marks: 
'what do you call it, mixed methodology'. At best, people were uninterested, staring 
distractedly out of the window as the content manager outlined the new reporting 
criteria. 
The metaphors used by interviewees often drew from the language of 
modernisation, industrialisation, mechanisation, automation and so on, as was 
apparent in the image of the 'tender factory' above. The following extract is fairly 
typical of the sentiments expressed and language employed by some of the more 
political organisations: 
They're making us more uniformalised. It's a lot more literally that this is the 
form in which a proposal must fit and if it doesn't, it gets automatically 
rejected. Five, ten years ago, our funding partners that sourced the money 
through the EU had a lot more scope to themselves take the initiative and in 
a sense act as the intervening authority that would say the project in South 
Africa is an appropriate project. Now they're much more nearly transmission 
valves for a bureaucrat in some EU department who wants this thing set out 
in a particular way (L. Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). 
This perception of M&E as a 'tick-box exercise' and as a mechanism for uniformity 
conveyed a disempowering sense of a vast impersonal development apparatus. 
NGOs are caught in this 'machine', unable to challenge or negotiate its rules: 
And often what I found is that when you speak to the funders, it is not them; 
there's some kind of a system that because they're international they're being 
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given by somewhere upstairs with people who are out of touch with reality 
completely (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). 
NGOs were, in this construction, portraying themselves as weak and dependent with 
no power in a 'hierarchical reporting structure' (M. Oyedan, Agenda, 27 Jun 07). As 
noted in a previous chapter, this raises the question of what an NGO might gain by 
characterising itself as having no agency. Their portrayal can be contrasted with data 
gained from observation research and also from interviews: NGOs are constrained 
by funders in certain ways, but they are also actively involved in the circulation of 
development concepts and regimes, whilst perpetuating specific organisational 
forms, especially in relation to their community-based partners. Their own 
terminology drew on a number of discourses that include but are not limited to 
neoliberalism, African empowerment, participatory development and 'EU-ese'. As 
such, while constrained by increased and homogenising auditing technologies 
outcomes appear to be far less uniform and secure. 
Whilst one of the effects of increased reporting may be a degree of 
uniformalisation then - I will return to this argument below - there are significant 
differences between individual funders' requirements and approaches to reporting 
(also see chapter 4). Bi- and multilateral donors such as the EU or USAID were 
described as having the most 'unreasonable expectations' (A. Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 
07), demanding extended paperwork and exact adherence to formalistic demands. 
Some NGO directors have taken conscious decisions not to engage with this set of 
funders at all, arguing that the bureaucratic effort is not worth the relatively modest 
grants that they may receive. Other funders, for instance the Ford or Mott 
Foundations, were characterised as more flexible, approachable and amenable. 
Some grant-making Northern NGOs were also portrayed as very supportive by 
interviewees. Some interviewees highlighted that their funders are 'funders of 
solidarity' that 'tried to consciously make our lives simpler' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 
07); others that funder NGOs in particular were able to give 'informed suggestions' 
and advice in the proposal writing process. 
Concerns were also voiced about the paternalism of (foreign) donor-led M&E, 
which seems to imply that 'Africa is unable to evaluate' (K. Greenop, Mindset, 1 Feb 
08). The fact that development indicators are set by donor agencies which are 
situated outside of the country does indeed raise questions about what comes to 
constitute development knowledge and how it is measured. More generally, these 
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arguments are a reminder of the fact that M&E is necessarily shaped by relations of 
power. The global North-South hierarchy is just one example of such inequalities in 
the domain of measuring. Decisions about what and how to monitor reflect the power 
relations that underpin other development activities as well. Relatedly, some took 
issue with the unilateralism of measuring, accounting and reporting and with the lack 
of feedback: 
You submit these things to funders or whatever and reports, and the audits. 
And once you've submitted it you never hear from them again [so] it's more 
and more like a commercial exchange, rather than a thing about let's see 
how we can keep this going and make it better, which again enforces the kind 
of inequality of that relationship (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). 
Whilst reporting was by all interviewees identified as increasing staff 
workload, it was nonetheless welcomed as positive by some. Rather pragmatically, 
Sam saw M&E not as burdensome but rather as part of his job and absolute 
necessity. He argued that without reporting, there would be no Mindset, thus 
illustrating the extent to which monitoring and evaluation has become part of this 
NGO's core activities. The increased donor emphasis on M&E was further positively 
associated with financial accountability, sound budgeting, project management skills 
and organisational learning, taking the NGO through a 'budgeting exercise' (J. 
Bright, Teboho, 19 Jun 07) that 'encourages rigour' (M. Oyedan, Agenda, 27 Jun 
07). Jane Zimmermann made a point that was repeated by others: 
Given the history of mismanagement of funding and corruption and all of that 
stuff in this country, I think the more they call for accountability the better. I 
absolutely do not have a problem with that (J. Zimmermann, Siyazisika, 4 Jul 
07). 
This set of interviewees accepted the donor claim of M&E systems improving 
efficiency and effectiveness of their organisation. Efficiency might be improved in an 
indirect way, too: compliance with strict reporting requirements presents a virtuous 
spiral for an organisation as it can demonstrate financial accountability to other future 
donors, as this statement conveys: 
We have our checks and balances firmly in place. Having a German funder, 
the audit and the accounting is very strict. So especially the EU funders and 
other embassy say we could go with DDP because they know the money is 
safe (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). 
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Conversely, an organisation without a track record with a well-known donor will find it 
more difficult to access any donor funds at all. The more bureaucratic a donor, the 
better it is for an organisation's sustainability. 
The link between monitoring and sustainability is an important one and 
accounts for why some NGOs understand monitoring practices to be productive 
despite the added strain on organisational capacity. In addition to establishing a 
track record, continuous assessment of one's own impact can ensure that an NGO 
remains competitive: 
And so the kind of ability to learn from what we're doing, monitor exactly what 
we are doing and incorporate that into, not only reporting externally but into 
our own operations [ ... ] that's a key part because we need to constantly 
better ourselves. Because we may be unique today, tomorrow we're not 
unique (V. Naidoo, Mindset, 9 May 07) 
The sentiment about improving oneself that is expressed by Mindsefs CEO firstly 
points towards organisational learning as a key aspect of donor-led M&E. Secondly, 
the phrase 'to better oneself' echoes neoliberal thinking on individual and 
organisational obligations of self-government and responsibilisation. M&E is 
portrayed as beneficial for the NGO, in that it affords NGOs the opportunity to use for 
its own purposes data initially collected in the interest of reporting back to a donor. 
NGOs have adopted this understanding; the opinion expressed by the director of 
Agenda is typical of the majority of NGOs in this study: 
[Reporting] is not a constraint, I think it has a critical learning process built 
into it. It's not a conscious thing, but we use it as a learning opportunity. So 
the rigour with which we had to do the HBS accounts in some ways has 
contributed to the rigour of our financial systems (M. Oyedan, 27 Jun 07). 
Framing learning in this way raises a number of issues. In this case, what an 
organisation learns through continuous monitoring is financial accountability. 
Auditing techniques or project management strategies were often highlighted as 
outcomes of organisational learning processes though interaction with funders. 
Whilst these are undeniably important organisational skills, they only address the 
managerial aspect of an NGO's work. How organisational learning is constructed 
here is solely in technical, administrative and financial terms. Accountability itself is 
understood as a technical or managerial issue, a tool with which certain outputs can 
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be achieved. It has been noted that the automatic preference of an audit form of 
accountability often goes at the expense of evaluation as learning (Gasper 1999). 
Arguably, audit systems may impede genuine learning, since their main function is to 
highlight the short-term success of a project. Ebrahim (2003) accordingly 
understands organisational learning as structuring practice in the NGO community. 
NGOs that are already better equipped to deal with stringent donor 
requirements are certainly also in a better position to exploit the potential for learning 
on their own terms. Within Mindset, there was constantly an effort to 'piggy-back' off 
research for funders. For instance, over and above existing research, the 
organisation measured socio-economic indicators that were not required by their 
donors in order to seek further funding at a later stage. Piggy-backing was an 
attempt to bridge the gap between their donors' needs and whatever they may be 
able to gain from collecting that information. Whilst this practice undoubtedly has the 
potential of securing more funding, I do not read this as necessary evidence of 
'resistance tactics', as for instance Ebrahim (2003) has claimed, arguing that funders 
have enhanced learning by introducing NGOs to new ideas and technologies. 
On the contrary, I contend that organisational learning itself is part of a 
government rationality linked to NGOs' capacities to govern and reform themselves. 
Sitting in on meetings where M&E strategies were planned, it sometimes seemed as 
though measuring was done for measuring sake - the capacity to collect data was 
available so the data was collected even though it wasn't always clear to what end 
and how this would contribute to the evaluation of a project. This does not imply that 
NGO staff did not negotiate the impact of donor requirements and M&E regimes in 
different ways - many individuals did not report according to set guidelines or would 
creatively negotiate the constraints of partnership demands for auditing. 
Personal relationships and networks operate as additional disturbing factors 
for the regimes governing fund-raising and reporting. At the most basic level, 'unless 
you know the people that you are dealing with, you are not gonna get that funding' 
(W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). But grant managers of long-term funders were seen to 
have a better grasp of an organisation's areas of expertise, and regular exchange of 
information beyond formalised monitoring requirements occurred: 'they came to 
three or four workshops, and understood what we were trying to do. And after that it 
was very easy' (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). There is then an element of mutual trust 
although requirements still have to be met. Yet, established personal ties can lead to 
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increased pressures on projects because, as William put it, 'they think that because 
they then know you, it gives them a right to impress on you a specific goal and 
context' (W. Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). The central importance of personal relationships 
and networks is probably not unique in mediating NGO-funder relationships but in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa they appear particularly significant due to a shared 
history of the struggle. The 'will to improve' also plays a part in the NGO-donor 
relationship as some NGOs want to reform their donors, for example by bringing 
their own processes of organisational learning or modes of accountability upwards. 
Another striking point about NGO staff's perception of M&E is that no one I 
spoke to portrayed M&E as part of their work in a holistic sense. Whether judged as 
positive or negative, M&E was constructed as external to projects and respondents 
made little connection between measuring impact and having impact. Given these 
observations, the references to organisational learning may then be understood in 
terms of a necessary reflexivity. The willingness of individuals and organisation to 
such self-reflection can be seen as integral to governance through accountability. 
6.3. Structural impact: 'the format influences the source which informs 
the practice' 
Impact on the level of data: four issues surrounding measurability 
As was noted above, stricter monitoring requirements were sometimes experienced 
as productive. Reporting for purposes of financial accountability was mostly 
welcomed and the desirability of the outcomes sought by funders' requests seems 
common sense - who could disagree with the importance of demonstrating impact 
and being accountable to stakeholders. Viewing the issue from within the logic of 
M&E however neglects an analysis of power: in constructing impact measurement as 
commonsensical, what can be overlooked is how such assessment is measured and 
who determines these measurements. Ebrahim's (2003) distinction between 
'product' data and 'process' data is useful with regards to different types of impact 
data produced by NGO. Product data is generated about physical and financial 
details, focusing on easily measurable indicators and quantitative analysis; process 
data about qualitative dimensions of their work is context-specific and interpretative 
in nature (2003: 78). 
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Four interconnected issues can be identified in relation to measurability. 
Firstly, case NGOs excluded certain data because it did not fit into what was 
perceived as overly rigid reporting or research frameworks. For instance, log frame 
analysis (LFA) is mainly geared towards collecting quantitative data. The log frame 
matrix was introduced by USAID, and became the standard approach for planning 
and monitoring development work as part of the shift towards results-based 
management (see for example Bakewell and Garbutt 2005, Mebrahtu et al. 2007). 
This 'managing for results' is now a key principle of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. Appendix 5 shows both a typical log frame as identified in the report 
for SIDA (Bakewell and Garbutt 2005) and an example of a case organisation's log 
frame for the purpose of a grant application with the European Programme for 
Reconstructing and Development.63 
Donors assure grantees that the complexity of development projects is not 
limited in scope by employing LFA since a log frame is not intended to include every 
detail of the project, being intended as a 'convenient, logical summary of the key 
factors of the project.' (BOND 2003). Both the sentiments expressed by interviewees 
and the data gathered in observations contradict this assertion. The summing up of 
such 'key factors' was seen to lend a bias or specific focus to a project, even when 
there was no intention to reduce the project to these key factors. Log frames were 
seen as 'uniform' (passim) and 'literally prescrib[ing] every step along the way' (L. 
Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). Much of what NGOs conceive of as being at the core of 
their work, such as participatory work with communities or education workshops, 
cannot be expressed in this format. Participatory monitoring addresses some of 
these limitations, but none of the case NGOs assessed in a participatory manner 
alone (also see footnote below). 
The short-termism of development grants further exacerbates the problem of 
the exclusion of data, since developmental change - if it can be measured at all -
does not happen within a one-year budgetary cycle. Funders, particularly those from 
the corporate sector, want to see the rapid implementation and success of projects 
they support, whilst developmental change is clearly a complex and often slow 
63 Mebrahtu et al. (2005) distinguish between the logical framework, the four by four matrix (see 
Appendix 5) that summarises the main elements of a programme, and the logical framework approach 
concerned with the wider planning procedures of problem analysis, the development of objectives and 
indicators. The latter should ideally incorporate stakeholder analysis or other participatory 
methodologies. In practice, the two notions were used interchangeably by respondents, although 
depending on the individual's positioning towards M&E, one or the other aspect would be emphasised 
more. 
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process: 'it's long-term work, it's not work that you can monitor and evaluate to put 
into reports. It's working with process' (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). Consequently, 
donor-initiated project evaluation and performance monitoring tend to over-
emphasise quantitatively measurable outcomes. For instance, development projects 
often deliver predefined products such as a certain number of computers or schools. 
Having to fit proposals into fixed grids appeared not only to prescribe how results are 
reported but also to predetermine results, with little space to evaluate secondary or 
unexpected outcomes. The question then poses itself whether and how 
developmental needs may differ from predefined quantitative outcomes. 
Secondly, and very much connected to the above, another effect of the 
reductionism of reporting is that it excludes 'values'. Since many respondents 
defined NGOs as value-driven organisations, these were seen as integral to the work 
of an NGO and as unique to the voluntary sector. Dom works for Starfish, which is 
mainly supported by corporate funding. He illustrates the tensions between NGOs 
and funders in terms of type of data: 
It just comes back to the whole issue of actually [articulating] what is of value, 
like dignity, confidence, empathy, compassion, these kinds of intangibles, 
these immeasurables, over and above the hard facts. I think [that's] seen as 
tick-box stuff. Let's get it out there, let's get it measured, let's report back. 
Done. Now what's the real business of my business (D. Marshall-Smith, 23 
Mar 07). 
This statement chimes with the findings of Ebrahim's study that M&E systems 
'impact NGOs [ ... ] by promoting positivist and easily quantifiable valuations of 
success and failure' (2003: 78). The focus on quantitative data by funders can be 
contrasted with the preference for qualitative data expressed by many interviewees. 
However, if there is already an organisational focus on product information, as is 
structurally the case with new-generation NGOs, there are greater consistencies 
between funder and NGO and less of a need for the NGO to redefine its 
understanding of success based on funding requirements. 
Thirdly, reporting requirements lend themselves to the production of discrete 
NGO 'products' as opposed to more complex development processes. This clearly 
applies to producing something that can be sold in the market place, such as media 
'solutions', publications and so on. As was outlined in the previous chapter, 
commercialisation can be a sustainability strategy that involves the establishment of 
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a for-profit arm. But commercialisation is also encouraged by donors in other areas, 
such as NGOs charging for capacity building work shops or training. Such product 
output is better suited to partnerships and service delivery contracts with the public 
sector in South Africa. For example, Mindset explicitly frames its development 
project as the 'Mindset solution', which very much speaks to Li's (2007) related 
practices of problematisation and rendering technical: the identification of a problem 
is linked to the availability of a solution, confirming expertise and setting up 
boundaries between expertise- and capacity- haves and have-nots. More broadly, it 
also exemplifies the commodification of the social sphere, transposing 
entrepreneurial forms onto extra-economic domains (Miller and Rose 1990, Lemke 
2001 ). 
NGOs' continuous production of data for M&E purposes may also be sold for 
commercial use, for instance in market research: 
We are in the field, we can actually the research market potential of a product 
or service or whatever quickly, very efficiently, and we are doing that right 
now for ourselves just as a demonstration of just how efficient it could be (D. 
Jerling, Connect Africa, 16 Mar 07). 
Connect Africa aims to provide a mobile communication and public service network 
for rural areas in South Africa, and eventually across Africa. The organisation is part 
of a cross-sectoral partnership, in that it delivers bundled services on behalf of 
multiple suppliers in the private and public sectors. Alongside providing services for 
Government, community surveys (Connect Africa Community Survey, February 
2007) were also carried out, ascertaining 'where does your income come from, which 
grants would you need, which Government services are you looking for?' (D. Jerling, 
Connect Africa, 16 Mar 07). The organisation also gained funding for its 'community 
mapping exercise', whose purpose is: 
• To identify existing services in the community 
• Track changes to these services change over time 
• Identify available resources which will assist in building a community 
• Use it as a tool to gather information for the Connect Africa village case 
study 
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• Use it as a tool to check on needs and services Connect Africa can provide 
(Connect Africa, Guidelines to the Community Mapping Exercise, February 
2007) 
Lastly, the exclusion of particular data impacts not only on how the success 
of development projects is measured. M&E techniques such as log frames also exert 
influence on the level of project implementation and future strategies. The sheer 
availability of 'product data', whether it is actually considered important or not by 
NGO staff, influences decision making processes about how resources for a project 
are spent. Data gained from interviews is not necessarily sufficient in illustrating how 
these processes play out in the context of individual projects. The following data 
gained from observation, whilst being case specific and not applicable to smaller 
organisations, does however provide a springboard for some broader discussion 
points about M&E expertise. 
PEPFAR's M&E requirements and Mindset 
PEPFAR, one of Mindset's health channel partners, had always supported the Bush 
administration's priorities on HIV/Aids prevention - favouring the A (abstinence) and 
B (be faithful) of the prevention ABC over the C (condomisation). The new M&E 
guidelines for PEPFAR partners in South Africa were published at the time I was 
based in the Mindset offices during my second fieldwork period. These stipulated 
new monitoring requirements and indicators as well as 'ensur[ing] that our partner's 
monitoring systems are of the highest quality to strengthen program management, 
planning, implementation, outputs and outcomes' (USAID 2008: 5). 
Under the new rules, only content production in the areas of A and B is 
supported. This implies that extra funds were allocated for Mindset to produce new 
video content containing only messages about abstinence and being faithful. The 
three areas are for the first time separated out and guidelines specify the indicators 
associated with each. For AB, these are the number of individuals reached through 
community outreach that promotes HIV prevention through abstinence, through 
being faithful or through being trained to promote HIV prevention programmes 
though AlB, each aggregated by gender. Community outreach is a potentially 
ambivalent term, conjuring up images of community workers teaching individuals 
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about the H IV virus face-to-face. In Mindset's case, educational messages are 
broadcast to health care workers as well as the general public via a range of 
technological platforms. By using ICTs and satellite links, Mindset-produced video 
content is shown in waiting rooms, on public access TV channels or as interactive 
multi-media. Mindsefs outreach targets are high, and have been increased with the 
publication of these new rules; their broadcasts with AB content are meant to reach 
1.7 million viewers per month. 
There have recently been changes in the PEPFAR framework, with the 
funder requesting facilitators in some settings to discuss the broadcasted messages. 
In this way, the obvious gap between the number of individuals simply being present 
as a message is broadcast and the number of individuals having been exposed to it 
is meant to be overcome. Yet, the fact that impact is still measured in terms of the 
number of sites to which Mindset can be deployed, and the number of individuals 
passing though these sites seems to suggest that this is a largely rhetorical 
change.64 In addition, there are complex issues regarding the reception of media 
messages which are not necessarily addressed by selectively providing a facilitator. 
The existing monitoring framework does not allow for the measurement of such 
complexities. Likewise, an evaluative component is missing from the framework, in 
itself indicative of the bias towards the monitoring side of M&E that is displayed in 
many donor guidelines (e.g. PEPFAR 2006, USAID 2008, OECD 2002). 
This example underlines the general point that M&E as it is currently carried 
out rarely assesses whether development projects are actually 'making a difference'. 
In the case study organisation, monitoring for PEPFAR merely assessed how many 
people had been in contact with their programme. Regarding the issue of project 
impact, the 2008 requirements - whilst not stipulating that no content pertaining to 
'OP' will be broadcast anymore - entail that no such content will be newly produced. 
It was noticeable already that the focus of the organisation had shifted towards the 
new priorities: as this was where money was being spent, the content had to be 
produced and the people reached had to be counted. Should there be problems 
such as regularly happens, for example with the satellite downlink, organisational 
64 For instance, in the report delivered to John Hopkins Health and Education in South Africa (JHHESA) 
in October 2007, all that is reported by Mindset Health in relation to the indicator 'Number of individuals 
reached through community outreach that promotes HIV/Aids prevention through abstinence and/or 
being faithful' is: 'Number of sites: 306; Activities: Mindset Health Public Broadcast - Patients and public 
actively viewing content in public health care facilities; Gender: Male:347,003; Female: 782,256; Total: 
1,129,258' (Mindset, JHU Report October 2007). 
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focus is directed at fixing areas identified as monitoring priority by the funders. 
Discussions about the various channels and projects were more often than not 
framed in terms of targets and sites, especially amongst the channel managers who 
have to file monthly reports back to the funder. Expertise is concentrated in technical 
domains as well as in the research department itself. 
Impact on staffing 
Funders' information requirements impact on NGOs not only by favouring particular 
ways of measuring the success of a project, but also in terms of shifting 
organisational culture and structure and the types of activities or services provided. 
Specific capacities, resources and sets of skills are needed for an NGO to be able to 
fulfil the kinds of data requirements discussed above, and to qualify for further donor 
funding. Such capacities do not fall within the core expertise of many NGOs. For 
example, the Open Society Foundation, according to interviewees one of the 'easier' 
funders in this research, requires from its potential grantees the following: 
• Comprehensive Project Proposal 
• List of Board Members 
• Latest Audited financial statements 
• Constitution 
• Recent internal! external evaluation 
• List of key measurable outputs (Open Society Foundation for South 
Africa, Funding Request Form 2007). 
Whilst the first four to five documents have been required by funders for a decade'or 
more, measurable outputs are recent standard requirements. In the smaller NGOs in 
this study, it was often the director that took care of fundraising and reporting. There 
are demographic issues that pertain to NGO leadership in South Africa, which I 
touch upon below but do not have space to fully explore in this chapter. Auditing 
would be outsourced as these skills were not readily available inside the NGO. 
For larger organisations, changing reporting requirements usually meant that 
new staff was hired to cope with the added workload. Personnel with very specific, 
quantitative-analytical skills were therefore increasingly sought after by NGOs. The 
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internal balance between project staff and support staff - administrators, 
accountants and so on - shifted as a result. Financial management and 
administration expertise became just as important to an NGO as expertise in the 
NGO's core area. Indeed, one could argue that there has been a reversal in what 
constitutes core and support staff: support staff have become core staff since 
financial and administrative capacities are crucial to the survival of the organisation. 
Needing to employ people with quantitative-analytical skills, NGOs now also 
compete for staff with corporations and effectively have to pay higher salaries. Aside 
from an added strain on financial resources, there is thus a potential impact on 
organisational culture as certain skills come to be seen as of a higher value. 
But expertise is not only required in terms of finances but also in terms of 
language as the following underlines: 
This is the terminology. And this comes from the OEeD, so we must use this 
terminology. 'Note: an activity is economical when the cost of the scarce 
resources used approximate the minimum needed to achieve planned 
objectives'. [ ... ] If you do not fit in it word for word, it is immediately rejected. I 
mean at ILRIG I have to write the proposals and literally have to learn this as 
a language, and it sits in my gut - you know with revulsion - because you 
almost have to write what we know to be one thing in forms that you know 
would pass a committee (L. Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). 
As with any other language, failure to speak this language means being excluded 
from the conversation, or in this case being excluded from funding flows. Entering 
into funding arrangements consequently requires a high level of 'buzzword' fluency: I 
noted earlier the influx of training courses and workshops in the area of reporting that 
have made M&E an industry. NGO staff reported that they were often required by 
grant-makers to attend courses on how to complete tender or grant documents. 
Training for purposes of tendering was clad in terms of 'capacity building' or 'skills 
transfer', whereas it is highly specific managerial skills that are 'transferred' here. 
Skills-oriented learning and human resource development is often conflated with 
developing capacities of staff according to project or organisational needs. Such 
forms of shallow capacity building are central to what Ong (2006) refers to as 
optimizing technologies at the heart of neoliberalism. 
Besides having to be well-versed in current development terminology, perfect 
command of English in a professional and bureaucratic context is required, for 
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instance in order to correctly process 100-page EU grant documents. As Will from 
the MMP put it: 
For me it's fine you know, I've got a postgraduate degree, I've got a lot of 
experience [ ... ] But if you are a relatively young NGO, three years or 
something, and you are in an area where your focus is addressing social 
work or something, you're expected to read EU-ese documents, which are 
not written in plain English. If English is a second or third language for you, 
you're gonna have major problems (W. Bird, 13 Jun 07). 
Anyone familiar with EU funding agreements might add that they pose a challenge 
even to English mother-tongue speakers. But Will's statement also gives an 
indication of the appropriate person to work for organisations favoured by the 
existing requirements: NGOs ought to be well-established and staffed by English-
mother tongue speakers, which in South Africa usually means middle-class and 
urban. Conversely, less professionalised and/ or rural CSOs are disadvantaged by 
these funding regimes. Class position impacts on the ability to'speak the language of 
efficiency and may exclude entirely from funding flows. Successful NGOs that 
remain sustainable are often run and staffed by middle class individuals. 
Moreover, class position marginalises certain issues from the field of activity 
of an NGO. For instance, first-generation human rights issues connected to political 
liberty seemed to exercise many NGOs more than socio-economic rights. This is 
evident in the observation that it was seemingly only with the Government's assault 
on the mainstream media - in 2005, the ANC obtained a gagging order against the 
Mail & Guardian over 'Oilgate' and also threatened Business Day and the Sunday 
Times with legal action over articles following up on the story65 - that many formal 
NGOs began to become aware of the realities of repression and of freedom of 
expression issues faced by social movements in South Africa. 
Smaller size has other disadvantages: relatively small NGOs, not being able 
to spend as much resources and budget on M&E, are more profoundly affected by 
monitoring regimes: 
It becomes so complicated that it has excluded large numbers of CBOs from 
actually being able to understand and fulfil the requirements. Completing log 
65 The Mail & Guardian had been banned by the High Court from publishing a report in May 2005 
detailing how PetroSA, the state oil company, had secretly paid public funds to the ruling party via 
Imvume Management. The corruption scandal became known as 'Oilgate'. 
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frames, and all sorts of things. And even we have sometimes got difficulties 
meeting those very stringent requirements (A. Motala, CSVR, 14 Mar 07). 
This is clearly an important issue given that the vast majority of NGOs in this 
research rely on local partners such as CBOs. Starfish's community-based partners 
for instance are contractually obliged to provide financial reports, narrative reports 
and annual financial statements (Starfish, Contractual Agreement with Vuselela 
Orphan Program, April 2007). PEPFAR's (2006: 12) manual for implementation 
partners in Southern Africa outlines the features of a successful M&E unit, indicating 
the types of NGO expertise required: 
• epidemiological expertise 
• social science expertise 
• data processing and statistical expertise 
• data dissemination expertise 
Moreover, the funder details the infrastructural and informational resources that 
are required for this kind of M&E: data dissemination systems, centralised 
databases, second generation-surveillance and so on. Clearly, most national NGOs 
lack the material and human resources to attract this type of capacity, especially 
given the South African context of 'brain drain'. Indeed, PEPFAR trains its 'own' 
researchers under the PEPFAR fellowship programme. Typically a research 
psychologist at Masters level, a fellow is involved in designing and conducting 
monitoring and evaluation strategies and activities, gathering knowledge of M&E 
tools or evaluating psycho-social assessment tools for NGOs (PEPFAR Fellowship 
Programme 2007/8, Brochure and Application Form). 
Mindset is exceptional in terms of research capacity, having created a 
dedicated post for a senior manager dealing with reporting, monitoring and 
evaluation, due to the organisation's size and large-scale orientation. Given that 
Mindset is characterised by its strong partnership model, there is an additional 
connection to be drawn out. Partnerships in fact require heightened monitoring 
capacity due to a range of accountability demands by different partners. Increased 
skills in terms of standardised monitoring and evaluation are in turn considered 
indicators of improved capacity by partners. 
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6.4. 'Issues of what essentially you become': organisational forms and 
developmental subjects 
What organisational forms and development interventions are favoured by the 
structural changes and the focus on certain types of data production that were 
analysed above? Firstly, this chapter has demonstrated that calculative practices 
such as M&E require specific skills and capacities which produce a particular model 
of NGO broadly in line with neoliberal forms of organisation. This point adds another 
dimension to the modality of the ideal-typical new Post-Apartheid NGO that was 
employed earlier, in that this streamlined, flexible and self-sustaining organisation is 
also able to research, count and audit correctly. 
Secondly, there is the question of what subjects NGOs as a primary 
development actor in South Africa produce. This argument, concerned with 'subject-
making', has received some attention in the development literature (see for instance 
Postero 2007, Hart 2007, Brigg 2006, Rankin 2001), although it usually focuses on 
governments as 'subject-makers'. Development programmes seen from this 
perspective have the aim of shaping desires by setting the conditions for 
beneficiaries to behave in a certain way. It is human capacities that are to be 
understood and acted upon by what Rose (1999) has called 'human technologies'. 
The 'enterprise model' is thus not only extended to NGOs (or other types of 
organisations) but also to the individual, by creating the subjective conditions for 
entrepreneurship (Hart 2006). 
These technologies of subjectivity rely on systems of knowledge and 
expertise that can be taught by NGOs. Teboho is a small Soweto-based NGO that 
offers educational resources and life skills programmes and services to vulnerable 
teenagers. The focus of the organisation is to 'create a mindset of learning': 
So I looked at helping to create entrepreneurs, helping to create government 
officials, helping to create diplomats, going into different countries [ ... J We 
actually have them create their strategic road-maps as to where they wanna 
go in this world. And then these are the tools that would help them to get 
there. So if one person wants to be an entrepreneur, we are saying do not 
limit yourself to the borders of South Africa (J. Bright, Teboho, 19 Jun 07). 
The aim of this NGO's work is not to deliver pre-defined products, but rather to 
encourage the development of an 'enterprising self. The objective is to instil 
particular characteristics in its target group, who are to become entrepreneurial, risk-
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taking, ambitious, responsible and transnational citizens. These characteristics 
cannot be imposed but have to be promoted by encouraging people to choose to act 
on themselves in order to better themselves. By encouraging the creation of 
entrepreneurs in terms of individual subjects, an extension and reproduction of an 
enterprise model becomes likewise realistic: 
And I am telling them: but I don't get a salary out of this, we're helping the 
children, we're helping future employees, we're helping future customers of 
your company. [ ... ] And I am looking at taking them to the next level; 
investment clubs, so create an investment company where the young people 
are now being able to have a say in the economy, in economic and social 
development in the country through investing (ibid.). 
This line of reasoning clearly illustrates how, by reforming the practices and 
aspirations of a target group - in this case, young disadvantaged Sowetans - a 
particular model of society is constructed; a society composed of empowered 
entrepreneurs that solve their country's socio-economic problems through 
investment and voluntary associations. At the core of such rationalities is a logic of 
empowerment and self-government which develops capacities for accessing the 
marketplace and encourages people to find entrepreneurial solutions to their needs. 
At the same time, the creation and cultivation of an entrepreneurial self is 
emblematic of a 'culture of the self and self-improvement' that cannot be separated 
from the political rise of neoliberalism (Dean 1994). Going back to the example of 
Mindset, their funding-dependent emphasis of abstinence is a case in point for the 
argument that NGO projects also represent moral technologies. As Tuki articulated 
in an interview from which I cited earlier, his NGO is 'meant to be advocating for the 
change that is required, change in people's behaviour, change in people's attitude 
towards their sexuality and their relationships with their partners' (T. Senne, Mindset, 
6 Feb 08). Likewise, the NGO's focus on technological literacy is more than a by-
product of the curriculum that is taught: it seems to be central to a vision of the 
empowered South African citizen of the 21 st century. 
Technologies of optimisation may seem more apparent in the above NGOs' 
discourses and interventions where the entrepreneurial subject is directly addressed. 
However, empowerment must also be understood in non-economic ways, concerned 
with the cultivation not just of an economic-rational actor but a responsible and moral 
citizen. Taking the example of the Wolpe Trust, whose objective is to foster political 
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dialogue and public debate, educating the target population means to make them 
more involved citizens by participating in the public sphere: 
If you engage people like that, the youth or people from more disadvantaged 
areas who do not have the wealth and the status to be a powerful political 
elite or whatever it is, that by engaging them they become more patriotic, 
become more concerned about what is going on in their broader society, and 
become more proactive as citizens about their own needs (T. Bailey, 25 Apr 
07). 
In the subsequent chapter, I will pick up the related question of whether or not NGOs 
can be the appropriate agents to engage those excluded from political processes 
and to encourage criticism of the narrowing of spaces for democracy. The issue with 
the above-discussed programmes is not that they do something other than what they 
claim to do, or that there is some hidden political agenda. Rather, in the words of Li, 
it is the 'governmental stance that envisaged empowerment as a product that could 
be manufactured by technique' (Li 2007: 269). Both the project designs of Teboho 
and of the Wo/pe Trust are - in very different ways - governmental, because they 
seek to set the conditions to reform desires and shape conduct. They draw on 
concepts such as performance that are very clearly neoliberal, but combine them 
with notions of participation and empowerment reminiscent of earlier alternative 
development approaches promoted by NGOs. Rather than taking these two strands 
as conflicting, I understand them to be integral parts of a reflexive neoliberal project 
as I have defined it in chapter 1. 
As I have sought to show in this chapter, the implementation of extensive 
monitoring systems produces NGOs that are more streamlined and commercial. The 
demands for efficiency and transparency of financial management necessitate 
organisational restructuring and the acquisition of financial skills. M&E practices 
require certain organisational conditions which favour and indeed produce highly 
organised and professionalised types of NGOs, whilst marginalising others. 
Crucially, this formalisation affects NGOs' relationships with other civil society 
organisations. Once a formalised NGO has entered into funding and monitoring 
regimes, it becomes increasingly difficult to work with less formalised NGOs, CBOs 
or social movements. This is because such organisations are not structurally 
equipped to prove results-based management or adhere to complicated reporting 
systems. As Lenny Gentle put it quite simply, 'we only work with the ones who do 
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have a photocopying machine, who can account for all the money and so on' (L. 
Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). Where relationships with CBOs exist, NGOs often end up 
playing the role of translator: participatory processes may be used to design 
programmes but NGO staff repackage the stakeholder process in a log frame format 
for their donors. This process of translation produces a hierarchy, in that it 
establishes the NGO as expert, with the power to represent a CBO's activities and 
development objectives. 
In important ways then, the professionalisation and streamlining of the civil 
society sector that was documented in donor-NGO relations is reproduced in the 
networks on which NGOs rely for service delivery and indeed for legitimacy. The 
need for audit expertise influences NGOs' positioning towards their civil society 
counterparts, exacerbating hierarchies and potentially negatively affecting solidarity 
within civil society. Reporting and monitoring regimes work much more as 
disciplining mechanisms where there is no capacity, as is the case with movements 
of the poor and unemployed. New-generation NGOs are set up to deal with these 
challenges more effectively. 
6.5. Conclusions 
I have argued in previous chapters that the death of the traditional donor model has 
given rise to an ideal-typical, streamlined NGO that can be characterised by 
multisectoral linkages, professionalisation and versatility. This chapter has revealed 
as another characteristic of the new NGO its audit expertise. NGO staff need to 
know how to follow monitoring and evaluation procedures and they need to 
demonstrate expertise of how to count, manage and audit. Increasingly, NGOs are 
expected to be efficient financial managers in addition to, or perhaps as opposed to, 
being efficient at what it is that they do as their 'core business'. 
Audit regimes are clearly not limited to the development domain. Their 
ubiquity is paradigmatic for a particular phase of (global) governance which unites 
economic efficiency with demands for moral responsibility and an 'ethical' capitalism. 
Crucially, audit reshapes the organisations it audits into auditable commodities. It 
should thus also be understood in terms of its political functions as a technology of 
neoliberal governance. This chapter has explored some of the types of expertise that 
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auditing requires and produces over and above the core activities of NGOs. These 
include, as a minimum, language skills (including fluency in 'developmentese'), 
financial expertise, data processing and dissemination skills and quantitative-
analytical capacities. The larger an organisation (and its grants and grant-makers), 
the more specific statistical and social science expertise it is required to prove. 
The stereotypical understanding of M&E expressed in the NGO community is 
of the donor demanding quantitative data and the NGO wanting to express complex 
issues. Indeed, results-based methodologies such as log frames do not lend 
themselves to expressing complex project realities, tending to obscure project aims 
perceived as political, contentions or simply ambivalent; structural relations are 
excluded from evaluation and from future project design. It is telling that this kind of 
rational management thinking has found its way into the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. However, the empirical data paints a picture that is more nuanced. 
Firstly, M&E formats vary greatly from funder to funder - the Wo/pe Trust for 
instance mostly reports back with narrative reports, whereas Siyazisika has been 
required to complete lengthy quantitative assessment templates. Secondly, the more 
capacity an NGO has the more it is able to use its auditing as a resource. Yet, it 
remains true that M&E is always a reflection of other aspects of development 
relations: in the absence of 'genuine partnerships' for example, it is hard to imagine 
genuinely partiCipatory ways of evaluation. 
The language within which projects are planned and monitored is one of 
managerial ism and efficiency, which lends itself to an increasing commercialisation 
of development projects undertaken by NGOs, a process which is tied in with the 
logic of partnerships that was discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Moreover, specific M&E 
techniques are reflective of changes in aid thinking and in modalities of aid delivery. 
The calls for alignment and harmonisation of aid that have been brought forward in 
the Paris Declaration in fact give a renewed urgency to the issues discussed here. 
Whilst harmonisation is intended to reduce the transaction costs arising from dealing 
with a variety of donors, formats and procedures, it may also lead to a consolidation 
of mechanistic and technocratic approaches to M&E across the board. As I have 
discussed, the reporting requirements of NGOs in this research, although 
overwhelmingly experienced as burdensome, donor-led and homogenising, varied 
considerably from organisation to organisation. In the new dispensation, narrative 
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reports and participatory planning methodologies may well be usurped by log frame 
techniques as these are employed by most of the big funders. 
As I observed earlier, it is hard to disagree both with demands for greater 
accountability of NGOs and with the adaptation of systems that can demonstrate 
transparency and reduce transaction costs of development projects. Nonetheless, it 
is far from clear what this accountability means given the impact of auditing practices 
on NGOs as they were presented here, and whether more (or more sophisticated) 
auditing or reporting systems result in better aid. Demands for accountability and 
transparency are ultimately connected to claims of empowerment and the 
democratisation of aid. Quite contrary to such claims, auditing was shown to produce 
hierarchies within civil society and to exclude certain organisations altogether. 
Fluency in the language and practices of evaluation and reporting displays 
accountability and thereby apparently transfers legitimacy. NGOs' role as a 
transmitter of techniques such as log frames to their community-based counterparts, 
and their resultant status as experts is central to this hierarchy of legitimacy. 
This picks up a strand from the previous chapter where I wrote that NGOs 
come to act as bridge-builders or translators. The concept of the intermediary NGO 
comes to the fore again here: its activities encompass organisational capacity 
building, training and staff development, research and advocacy, collection and 
dissemination of information and networking. Their location is between various types 
of authority (often the state, but it may also be other actors in the international 
development system) and communities. Intermediary NGOs would be favoured by 
the current reporting regimes: research NGOs for instance already have the 
research and reporting expertise that help with M&E requirements. Auditing is 
shaped by and imbued with power relations, a power which is then transferred 
through partnership networks. Monitoring and evaluation is internalised and 
becomes a prime indicator of improved capacity that coexists alongside the rhetoric 
of partnership. From this perspective, M&E is a technology of power through which 
NGOs engage in problematisation and rendering technical. Given that auditing 
changes the very organisational structures of those required to audit, there is a 
danger of even progressive organisations becoming integrated in terms of their 
modus operandi into the neoliberal order they set out to change. 
The last part of this chapter briefly addressed subject-making and NGOs' 
moral technologies, arguing that NGO programmes often target mindsets, attitudes 
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and capacities of the individuals and communities in which they operate. This 
parallels the processes of neoliberal optimization of NGOs that have been charted 
throughout this thesis. Below I develop this point further, exploring how NGOs 
translate such technologies into their own reformist processes within civil society. 
Taking as their subject not simply the individual citizen or entrepreneur-to-be, but 
also other organisations, NGOs come to transfer the appropriate meaning of civil 
society in Post-Apartheid South Africa. These reformist projects are not uncontested 
however, as the next chapter argues. 
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7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 7 
NGOs and the 
Struggle for Civil Society 
When we marched - slithered - through 
slimy mud past riot-shielded cops 
in Alex, while children peered wild-eyed 
from dark windows, for some of us 
these were re-runs of earlier apartheid-
burdened days: but then it was 
defiant resolution that drove our hearts, 
braced our feet: now sadness at 
betrayal 
sat stone-heavy on our hearts, our 
shouted 
slogans, weighted with irony, hung 
heavy 
over us in grimy air, we winced 
at familiar oft-repeated lies. 66 
(Dennis Brutus) 
There were 10,000 protest actions in South Africa in 2007, more than anywhere else 
in the world (Bond 2007c). Social movement activity has primarily arisen out of a 
need to confront the extreme poverty and material inequality that characterise Post-
Apartheid South Africa. Many communities also feel marginalised in relation to 
service delivery. But there is another fundamental dimension to the prevalence of 
community protests: their function as expressions of profound betrayal (Hart 2008). 
The political freedoms of Post-Apartheid have not been accompanied by socio-
economic equality for the majority population; protests are a reaction against the 
ANC's 'broken promises' (Gibson 2006) as well as struggles over the meaning of 
66 Dennis Brutus writes about his poem 'Memory': The march from Johannesburg's Alexandra 
Township to the Sandton financial district - where the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development 
was held - on 31 August 2002, with an estimated 30 000 participants, was an important moment in the 
regrouping of liberation forces after 1994. I was glad to be part of it, but had to be aware of the irony of 
marching against the forces we had helped put in power' (Email, 05 January 2009, posted on 
debate@debate.kabissa.org). 
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nation and liberation. The social movement terrain is extremely diverse, but many 
movements directly or indirectly challenge the neoliberal economic project that has 
led to the privatisation of basic services and the increasingly narrowly defined nation-
building project designed to empower a small political and economic elite. The 
government's lashing out at protesters both in terms of violent repression and 
rhetorical marginalisation has been coupled with invocations of the nation and the 
national democratic revolution that is supposedly being betrayed by those protesting. 
This appears to be at once a drive to contain popular mobilisation and an attempt to 
define the formal institutional spaces where political contestation is allowed. 
I have argued in previous chapters that the partnership discourse frames the 
positioning of NGOs to popular movements and community struggles. My concern in 
this chapter is to examine how these politics of partnership impact on relations 
between different civil society actors. I particularly explore the positioning of NGOs in 
relation to social movements and trace the processes that allow NGOs to define and 
transfer what civil society should be. These processes can be summed up under the 
headings of NGO-isation and reformism. Whilst specifically focusing on NGOs' 
relationships with social movements, I am concerned more broadly with their 
relations to the 'civil society', which they continuously evoke and for which they may 
come to substitute, as I will put forward below. It should be noted that the continuum 
from NGO to movement is not always clear-cut; while the TAC is often cited as one 
of South Africa's strongest social movements, it also has characteristics of a more 
traditional NGO. In terms of case organisations, Gun Free South Africa began as a 
social movement but describes itself as an NGO now. I have therefore limited this 
analysis to data derived from organisations that both regarded themselves as NGOs 
and that fulfilled the definition of NGO I have adopted. In addition, the great 
heterogeneity of movements in South Africa involves a variety of positions in relation 
to NGOs, the state and political engagement. I note these differences but have no 
space to discuss them in detail, given that I am concerned with NGOs' discursive 
positioning in relation to movements. 
As a context to the analysis brought forward here, it is particularly important 
to call to mind again Chatterjee's (2001) observation, discussed in Chapter 1, of the 
potential of an emerging opposition between civil society and political society. His 
argument is useful for the current purposes as it distinguishes between population 
and citizens, between the popular and the elite domains. The state under 
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postcolonialism has had as target of its activities the entire population in its territory, 
'maki[ng] available for governmental functions (economic policy, bureaucratic 
administration, law and political mobilization) a set of rationally manipulable 
instruments for reaching large sections of the inhabitants of a country as the targets 
of 'policy' (2001: 173), whereas the domain of civil society institutions, if they are to 
conform to the normative model presented by western modernity, must exclude from 
its scope the vast mass of the population and be restricted to a fairly small section of 
'citizens'. Chatterjee, speaking about postcolonial India, goes on to argue: 
'the new domain of civil society [ ... ] will long remain an exclusive domain of 
the elite, [ ... ] the actual 'public' will not match up to the standards required by 
civil society and [ ... ] the function of civil society institutions in relation to the 
public at large will be one of pedagogy rather than of free association (2001: 
174). 
Although I have adopted a different conception of civil society (see Chapter 1), I 
have drawn on Chatterjee in terms of the elite NGOs in my research having a 
pedagogical mission to educate popular movements which are not (yet) part of a 
proper public. 
While I will argue I argue in this chapter that there are constantly discursive 
attempts - not necessarily conscious ones - by NGOs to take over the space of civil 
society, effectively substituting civil society for NGOs such as themselves, there are 
always challenges to these containment strategies by social movements. The 
analysis brought forward in this chapter then serves to highlight both the attempts by 
NGOs to govern civil society as well as the limitations of a govern mentality 
approach. Namely, the partial failure of processes of reformism or substitutionism 
that are discussed here shows that NGOs' projects of rule are not necessarily 
accomplished in practice. Moreover, forms of state coercion are shown to co-exist 
with non-coercive, governmental, forms of power. 
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7.2. Contextualising internal civil society relations 
Civil society in Africa 
South African political scientist Adam Habib, in line with the classical definition, 
describes civil society as 'the organised expression of various interests and values 
operating in the triangular space between the family, state and the market' (2003: 
228).67 I reasoned earlier that NGOs periodically refer to a generic 'we' of civil 
society in order to ascertain authenticity, independence or solidarity. But the notion 
of civil society is also perpetually evoked in the language of donors and international 
institutions. Civil society was 'discovered' by the development mainstream in the 
1980s, reinforcing an orthodoxy that discredited the state as at best inefficient. Civil 
society support programmes were massively extended globally and by the mid-
1990s the term had also become a fixture in debates on South Africa's democratic 
future. This was mainly due to the influx of international development funding and 
development knowledge into the country in the period between 1990 and 1994, 
during which global policy discourses such as 'good governance' and 'civil society' 
were circulated and adopted by national NGOs (Pieterse 1997). 
Some may think that the heyday of civil society discourse is 'passe' (Edwards 
2004b), but this is certainly not backed up by an analysis of donor priorities and 
institutional policy texts in South Africa, nor was it reflected in the interviews I carried 
out. Here, the link between a strong civil society and a healthy democracy was often 
emphasised: 'unless you have civil society in this country in a healthy state and 
being quite strong, the democracy we have could flounder' (A. Motala, CSVR, 14 
Mar 07). Or Richard: 'if you don't have a vibrant active civil society you are not going 
to have the pressure on government, the political incentives and disincentives to 
make government do what it should do. And probably vice versa' (R. Calland, 
IDA SA , 23 Apr 07). Its plurality was also highlighted: 'South Africa is an incredibly 
sophisticated complex full of contradictions, very dynamic, and that's largely a tribute 
to its very very powerful civil society sector' (S. Isaacs, Min dse t, 2 Apr 07). 
Enthusiastic assessments of a not always clearly-defined civil society, as 
they are frequently found in policy texts and donor guidelines for South Africa, can 
67 There is considerable discussion in the various civil society schools of thoughts about what is in- and 
excluded in civil society, and particularly whether the economy and family should be part of civil society. 
It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss in detail the broader literature or provide a genealogy 
of the term. Key debates in the field can be divided into a 'alternative and a 'liberal' lineage, the former 
covering Marx and Gramsci and Habermas, the latter Tocqueville and Putnam. See Edwards (2004) 
and Elliott (2003) for overviews. 
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perhaps be criticised for tending to overlook the anti-democratic potential of civil 
society organisations. There is also a danger of assuming that civil society can be 
transposed to any given political, economic or cultural context. Anthropologists for 
instance have questioned the salience of universalised notions of Western civil 
society development in the context of African states. Chabal and Daloz (1999) note 
that the term has no purchase in a region where the disintegration of state power, 
related to processes of liberalisation and the debt crisis, means that there is no 
hegemonic state which civil society could work in opposition to. The continent, they 
claim, pursues its own specific form of modernisation without a functionally operating 
civil society (also see Bayart 1993). Following this argument, external agencies are 
shaping civil societies in concordance with processes of neoliberal reform. The 
authors therefore rightly identify the link between civil society and a Northern 
development apparatus. 
Others highlight civil society as a governance concern, enabling a re-
organisation of state and society and indicating a deeper penetration of global actors 
into countries' national development. From this perspective, transnational actors 
evoke the interests of a 'civil society' (or 'the poor') to legitimise their penetration of 
national political arenas such as health or education (Gould 2005a). This argument is 
particularly salient outside of South Africa where states are often weak and it may be 
argued that international development actors such as INGOs have taken over 
functions of government (see Mosse [2005] and Gould [2005b]). Others yet have 
contended that the narrative of civil society can only ever be a replay of western 
capitalist modernity - imagined as an autonomous space of individual freedom and 
the protection of the self-determining individual - neglecting the 'sorts of public 
sphere presumed by specifically African relations of production and exchange, codes 
of conduct or styles of social intercourse' (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 23). 
These critiques are clearly significant: the first set breaks with a universalised 
notion of what is a historically and culturally specific Western idea, the second points 
to the rationalities underlying neoliberal development regimes and the last 
emphasises the need to re-conceptualise postcolonial civil society in Africa. Yet, 
South Africa's civil society is unique in that the length, intensity and impact of both 
colonial and settler interventions undermined indigenous structures and social 
networks more than in neighbouring countries (Greenstein 2003). Moreover, NGOs 
are bound up with the Post-Apartheid state in a number of ways, as I showed earlier. 
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The construction of civil society in liberal theory (and many of its radical critiques) as 
a binary opposite to the state (or a site of struggle) oversimplifies the complex 
relationships and frequent collaborations between state and civil society actors. 
Rather, the trans-scalar character of the development domain and the dense 
intersectoral relationships that NGOs are involved in and produce suggest that a 
governmentality-inspired theoretical framework as it was outlined in chapter 2 better 
captures the dynamics of their interaction. 
Habib's (2003) model is useful because he suggests that Post-Apartheid civil 
society is made of three blocs, each of which is characterised by its own set of 
relations to the state: formalised NGOs, survivalist community-based organisations 
and social movements. I have discussed the first bloc in chapter 5: relations to the 
state are heterogeneous but mainly engaged or collegiate. Community-based 
organisations essentially assist people with surviving the effects of the state's 
policies but do not interact with the state. Such organisations make up the bulk of 
CSOs in the country. The third bloc is discussed in more detail below. Habib rightly 
draws attention to the fact that these distinctions are not cast in stone; many 'social 
movements' have increasingly taken on characteristics of formalised NGOs, a 
process I discuss subsequently. However, whilst he emphasises the plurality of 
South African civil society as the 'best guarantee for the consolidation of democracy' 
(2003: 240) his analysis does not address the relationship among these three blocs 
- which is my concern in this chapter. 
Community struggles and social movements in South Africa 
Habermas (1987) has argued that it is social movements that are the principal actors 
for resistance and emancipation, responsible for generating and extending the public 
sphere in democratic systems. Whilst the 'colonization of the lifeworld' commodifies 
social life, replacing open dialogue by bureaucratic procedures and economic 
transactions, this commercialisation also gives rise to new social movements which 
construct relatively autonomous spaces for public debate about the legitimacy of the 
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political and economic system.58 Similarly, Heller and Ntlokonkulu indicate that a 
social movement cannot be assessed simply in terms of how it impacts on the state: 
Social movements often have their most lasting effects in civil society. They 
can create new identities and new solidarities, they can raise new issues, 
they can bring new actors into public life (cited in Kuljian 2004: para. 4). 
In order to understand contemporary relationships amongst the different parts 
of South African civil society, the transformations of the sector around the time of the 
transition as I described them in chapter 4, are important to recall again. The 
beginning implementation of neo-liberal policies after 1994 had a fundamental effect 
on the operational relationships between those civil society organisations that had 
survived the initial funding crisis by re-orienting themselves towards the new 
Government or international donors, and those that did not. As Dale McKinley, one 
of the founders of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), puts it: 
Because most of the NGOs that existed were orientated towards either the 
new government and began to access funding and supporting state 
programmes and all those other developmental [things]. Or they hooked up 
with new international big donors and began to carry out sort of more classic 
kinds of developmental NGO work. (Interview, 11 Jul 07). 
This development resulted in a vast gap in civil society in terms of movements, social 
movements, and CBOs throughout most of the 1990s, which can be characterised 
by a demobilisation of popular organizations and a depletion of organisational 
capacity at the grassroots. The hegemonic project of the ANC in particular has 
drawn previous activists into the state bureaucracy and has significantly shaped the 
relationships existing today between formal intermediary NGOs - even those of a 
progressive nature - and social movements. 
Fast forward a decade and South Africa has more protest actions than 
anywhere else in the world. Given that South Africa is governed by an overwhelming 
68 There is not enough space here to bring forward a critique of Habermas' original account; see for 
instance Fraser (2003) and Edwards, G. (2004a). Whereas Habermas, and new social movement 
theorists after him, argued that the new social movements were not 'problems of distribution but 
concern the grammar of life', distributional issues are clearly extremely significant in the formation of 
movements in South Africa - although identity is also a driver (cf. Ballard et al. 2004.). Also see Harvey 
(2005) who contends that more attention needs to be paid to the struggles occasioned by 'accumulation 
through dispossession' that focus the costs of devaluations of surplus capital upon the weakest and 
most vulnerable territories. 
203 
one party majority with weak opposition parties, social movements arguably do not 
only represent marginalised communities but also operate as a watchdog to the ANC 
(White 2007). The government makes considerable efforts to downplay these actions 
and to marginalise protesters as having been agitated by the 'ultra-left'. These 
sections of civil society have most clearly been the target of the Mbeki 
administration's 'you are either with us or against us' rhetoric, through which protest 
(or simply criticism) of the government is habitually constructed as treason of the 
'new South African' nation-building project. It is usually the bulk of protesters that are 
ignored in Government statements, whereas community leaders, civic organisers 
and critical commentators in the media or academia are variously referred to as 
'coconut intellectuals' betraying the National Democratic Revolution or as the white 
racist elites' 'native helpers'. 
During my time in Johannesburg, barely a day went by that I did not read 
about community protests concerning the lack of service delivery, capacity or public 
consultation. Protest actions comprise a whole array of issues and constituencies, 
and vary considerably in scale, organisational form and capacity, and reach.69 
Ballard et al. (2004), writing on South African movements in particular and paying 
attention to the heterogeneity of the terrain, define them as politically or socially 
directed collectives that tend to involve multiple organisations and networks and 
seek to change aspects of the socio-political and economic system in which they are 
located. Ashwin Desai draws attention to the background of the neoliberal project 
against which movements have emerged: 
The state's inability or unwillingness to be a provider of public services and 
the guarantor of the conditions of collective consumption has been a spark 
for a plethora of community movements ( ... ) The general nature of the neo-
liberal emergency concentrates and aims these demands towards the state 
( ... ) Activity has been motivated by social actors spawned by the new 
conditions of accumulation that lie outside of the ambit of the trade union 
69 Reflecting this diversity, see for instance Ballard et aJ. (2006a, 2006b), Buhlungu (2004), Desai 
(2002), Dwyer (2006), Gibson (2006), McKinley (2006), McKinley & Veriava (2005), White (2007), 
Pithouse (2008). On social movement theories, variously focusing on resource mobilisation, political 
opportunity or framing processes, see Ballard et aJ. (2004). Sometimes South African movements are 
also referred to as new social movements (NSMs), although this perhaps overemphasises similarities 
with what are historically and culturally specific movements. See for instance Habermas (1987), 
Crossley (2002) and Edwards (2004a). 
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movement and its style of organising. What distinguishes these community 
movements from political parties, pressure groups and NGOs is mass 
mobilisation as the prime source of social sanction (cited in McKinley 2006: 
418). 
A number of factors have thus contributed to the growth in protest actions. 
These include the extremely high levels of poverty and inequality that are in part 
outcomes of neoliberal restructuring after the transition, resulting in mass 
unemployment and the commercialisation of basic services. With many residents in 
poor communities and townships having little or no income, an 'economics of non-
payment' (Desai 2002) developed. Ballard et al. (2004) identify three types of social 
struggle emerging alongside the second democratic election and Mbeki's 
presidency: firstly, those directed against a particular Government policy (such as 
COSATU's opposition to GEAR); secondly, those focusing on Government's failure 
in service delivery (such as the TAC on ARVs); and thirdly, those challenging the 
enforcement of specific government policies like the cost-recovery model for service 
delivery (such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee). 
Moreover, following the mobilisations around the World Conference against 
Racism (WCAR) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
2001 and 2002 respectively that led to the formation of the Social Movement Indaba 
(SMI), the Government started to ban gatherings and repress movements - sparking 
new struggles and increasing support for existing movements. These events 
represented the first very public rejection of the ANC and their economic policies as 
well as signifying collective national action of previously highly localised community 
struggles (Hlatshwayo 2007). They are significant for this context also because they 
marked a defining point in terms of repositioning the relationships between some of 
the movements and NGOs: a small set of progressive NGOs and donors, both in 
South Africa and internationally, now began to support these movements. At the 
same time it showed the extent to which a majority of NGOs were either removed 
from the socio-economic realities, or were unwilling to align with the grievances of 
the majority population. Desai describes the scenario at the WCAR: 
A dramatic clarification of the cleft between representatives of 'civil society' 
and 'civil society' itself occurred when the Johannesburg contingent arrived at 
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the Kingsmead Oval to ask for the assistance of their supposed allies in the 
NGO movement. Having just alighted from an all-night train trip, they had 
nowhere to stay [ ... J It says a lot that their allies not only reclined in horror [at 
the Jo'burgers wanting to erect tents on a small patch of land], but called the 
police to have the Johannesburg arrivals dispersed (these people were not 
accredited and certainly hadn't paid the entrance fee) (2002: 133). 
Some NGO leaders in this research dismissed social movements as 
expressing local and single issues, perhaps in line with the orthodox understanding 
of such movements in the literature. However, the upsurge in popular protest 
extends well beyond specific local grievances. These broader and deeper tensions 
burst into open view in 2004 when a 'second generation of new social movements' 
(J. Duncan, FXI, 30 Mar 07) came into existence. Crisis committees and concerned 
residents' groups formed everywhere, protesting poor service delivery and the 
ongoing corruption in councils. Again, the reaction of the Government to these 
protests has been both brutal and framed in terms of betrayal, as Jane's account 
clearly illustrates: 
One of the main movements we have been supporting has been the Greater 
Harrismith Concerned Residents committee that took up the plight of people 
struggling against effectively commodification of service delivery in 
Harrismith. And that resulted in a march where a 17-year old youth was shot 
and killed, and there were 16 people who were arrested in that march and 
charged with public violence and sedition, which I think was the first time that 
people were charged with a form of low treason since '94. Simply for 
engaging in a protest action (J. Duncan, FXI, 30 Mar 07). 
Gillian Hart claims that this second wave of municipal protests in fact denotes 
the emergence of a 'movement beyond movements', arguing that important 
processes increasingly take place outside the scope of social movements due to a 
'failure of the first round of post-apartheid NSMs to tap into huge reservoirs of 
popular anger and discontent' (Hart 2008: 8). It is certainly the case that some 
movements have dismissed the Social Movement Indaba as a vehicle for NGO 
interest, which has in turn struggled to keep a united front. I explore the tensions 
deriving from resource flows and other forms of capital between different civil society 
actors more fully below. 
206 
7.3. NGO relations with civil society: from capacity building to 
distancing 
Building capacity and bridging the gap 
Most of the NGOs I interviewed saw capacity building in civil society as one of their 
primary roles. Rama described his NGO's capacity building function thus: 
What we have tried to do very consciously is bring other NGOs on board. It's 
a conscious decision to build partnerships, even at great expense to 
ourselves. Because some partners just do not have the capacity. So you 
really have to spend a lot of time and effort in building and it's starting to 
show now, in terms of the respect, in terms of people being able to take over 
in certain areas and districts in the work that we do. But that is the single 
biggest investment we have made in building our partners and trying to get 
the work done most cost-effectively (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). 
This extract highlights how capacity building, even as it is understood by NGOs 
themselves, is tied up with claims to efficiency that were emblematic of donor 
conceptions of partnerships. What also emerges here is the positioning of NGOs as 
middle man. There are similarities to the classic donor-benefiCiary model in this 
partnership of NGOs with CBOs, with NGOs as the senior partner holding the purse 
strings. The following extract speaks to the division of labour in NGO-CBO 
relationships: 
We often find that those [local] organisations are very important role players 
in regard to any success of a programme we want to provide. They already 
have the confidence of the community, they have established relationships 
with the very same group of people that we want to work with. So we work 
with them in terms of offering support. What we also do very often is we 
recognise that some of the CBOs do not have the resources or capacity to do 
everything we expect them to do, so we bring in the resources including 
financial resources, but we also help to build capacity (A. Motala, CSVR, 14 
Mar 07). 
Similar ideas are expressed by Rama, whose organisation also relies heavily on 
community-based structures: 
We work a lot with CSO network COMBOCO in this province. And they have 
over 300 CBOs based on the ground, doing actual work. And we're delivering 
a voter education programme for this province - it makes more sense for me 
to work through their structures than to set up an alternative DDP structure. 
And so I bring them on board, we tell them listen; this is exactly how much I 
have, this is what we can afford to do, I am not keeping anything under the 
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table. The transparency which we have done has bred a lot of trust. And 
therefore, people come to us when they are in trouble, when they need help, 
when they need capacity building. And one of our focal areas is the whole 
area of organisational development (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). 
The values that are alluded to in these extracts - such as transparency and trust -
re-iterate a normative understanding of partnerships. Mirroring what I outlined in 
chapter 5, the arguments for partnerships within civil society are similar: mutual 
benefit through pooled expertise and shared information and knowledge, as well as 
the potential for leverage for other partnerships. Another important aspect of non-
profit partnerships is to share administrative tasks such as fundraising and reporting. 
The functions attributed to NGOs by the donors come to be attributed to CBOs who 
are just as 'essential to the success of projects' and 'know the reality on the ground'. 
The above comment about CBOs 'doing actual work' is perhaps not so much 
a slip of the tongue as it is an accurate assessment of the role of intermediary 
NGOs, whose work precisely consists of organisationally developing the capacity of 
other organisations who then do the actual work. Organisational development as one 
of the primary areas of activity for intermediary organisations also involves the 
acquisition of expertise and an element of restructuring. Organisations are to attain 
administrative and financial skills and are trained in media work, research and 
monitoring capacity. By restructuring or streamlining CBOs in line with the 
requirements for expertise of their NGO partners, a particular version of civil society 
organisation is reproduced. 
The funding crisis has led many of the blue-chip NGOs to work outside of 
South Africa. CSVR is one of them: 
We also work with communities outside South Africa: in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Angola, and other countries. We cannot work in these countries with 
any amount of success unless we work with local partners, they are the 
people on the ground they know the area better than we do, they have 
established a relationship of confidence with the communities, with the 
authorities in these countries and they are able to bring in expertise and 
knowledge that is extremely valuable to the success of the project (A. Motala, 
CSVR, 14 Mar 07). 
Challenges and dangers associated with this extension of activities include NGOs 
not being mature enough to deal with the expansion into different countries. A 
corollary of this is a possible dilution or scattering of the core activities of an 
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organisation. Whilst local partners are essential to the success of an NGO project, 
South African NGOs also carry out specific capacity building programmes in the 
SACO region. IOASA is one of the organisations that 'follow[ed] the market' (R. 
Calland, IDASA, 23 Apr 07) into the rest of the continent: 
We don't work with the NGO world to formally build capacity, although 
interestingly we have done that outside South Africa. We have got a, 
basically a product, which we have used in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and 
the ORC, where we go in for a year and train NGOs and build capacity for 
usually 15 NGOs, and one week its advocacy, next it's admin, the next week 
it's dealing with the press, the next week it's whatever. And over 40 weeks, 
spread through a year, we help build capacity in NGOs (ibid.). 
Here, the concept of what NGOs should be and what they should do is 
transported across the South African border and into the wider region. As becomes 
apparent from Richard's account, they ought to be doing advocacy, be professional 
and organised and be media-savvy. This certainly mirrors relations between 
Northern and Southern NGOs.70 Specific practices, techniques and types of 
expertise are circulated through precisely such capacity building programmes and 
NGO networks; capacity building and organisational learning constitute strategies to 
(re )produce organisations with specific characteristics such as the ones mentioned 
above. They are concerned with a reform of civil society, with NGOs acting as 
experts who transfer the proper practice of development and institutionalise this 
expertise in civil society. NGO expansionism has thus far been neglected as an area 
that raises important issues about the pedagogical role of these organisations and 
about the role in transferring technologies and vocabularies of development. 
It is perhaps ironic that capacity building, in the form of technical assistance, 
management training and consultancy, constitutes one approach to overcoming the 
traditional resource inequalities between North and South. Capacity building 
arguably carries the assumption that Southern organisations need to be taught and 
trained. There are also inherent issues of the unevenness of partnerships between 
more powerful South African NGOs and their local partners that must be 
acknowledged in any 'export' of South African NGO capacity into the wider region. 
Whilst on the face of it this export model makes sense since civil SOCiety capacity is 
present in South Africa, it is also possible to argue that an older North-South power 
70 On NGO relations North-South, see Lewis (1998), Lister (2000). Mawdsley et al. (2002) and Brehm et 
al. (2004). 
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inequality between donor and beneficiary, or between INGO and local NGO, is 
merely replaced by a South-South hierarchy between professionalised South African 
NGOs and their less powerful regional partners. Crucially, it is donor pressure as 
opposed to, say, solidarity that has precipitated the capacity building activities of the 
case NGOs in neighbouring countries. South Africa is the region's only superpower 
and is often seen as 'new imperialist', for instance regarding its economic policy and 
military objectives. The foreign-funded civil society expansionism may well indicate 
that this super power status is reproduced in the sphere of development. 
Relations to social movements: from support to solidarity 
Moving on to how NGOs understood their relationships with social movements, their 
position in relation to them can be split into three categories: support! assistance, 
solidarity and detachment. My research is concerned primarily with how NGO staff 
discursively constructed their organisation's position with social movements. 
However, as far as I was able to observe organisational practices or had access to 
them via project documentation, individuals' positioning often contradicted these or 
responses were at the very least ambivalent. Perhaps most significantly, virtually all 
the people I interviewed rhetorically marginalised or dismissed movements and 
community struggles in one way or another. 
Some NGOs have in recent years played a supportive role to movements by 
providing financial or legal resources and through campaigning and publicity work.?1 
The director of one of these NGOs describes their role in the following way: 
What we spend a lot of time doing is, we want to move out of what we call fire 
fighter mode where we run around the country and we try to sort out people's 
freedom of expression issues. We rather want to build capacity for social 
movements to solve their own freedom of expression problems. So we 
developed paralegal committees within social movements for instance, where 
movements contest the banning of gatherings themselves or can source 
lawyers in other parts of the country. Or they can fight with the police in order 
to prevent gatherings from happening in the first place, because they'll know 
exactly what the Banning of Gatherings Act says. So movements can handle 
claims against the police, restrictive bail conditions, all these kinds of things 
(J. Duncan, FX/, 30 Mar 07). 
71 Some Northern NGOs such as War on Want also support some the more established social 
movements such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum. This research is not explicitly concerned with INGO-
social movement relations but a shift in terms of how such organisations conceived of popular 
movements has arguably taken place in recent years. 
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This then relates to NGOs' capacity building role. As I described above, the WeAR 
and WSSD and the increasing repression of protest by the state constituted a 
decisive moment in NGOs' positioning towards social and community movements. 
This is arguably not least because freedom of expression issues, concerned with 
political rights, are close to the key concerns of liberal NGOs. There are also those 
organisations that have traditionally been aligned with organised labour and 
therefore characterise themselves as close to the newly emergent movements in the 
country: 
Many things have changed [since the end of Apartheid]. But at heart we 
would still see ourselves as a facilitator as a means to ensure that activists in 
South Africa today, whether they are in the labour movement or community 
based social movements, have somehow the political tools to form 
campaigns, to debate, to contest political power even today. [ ... ] What has 
changed is that our focus is both with the labour movement but also to work 
with the newer social movements (L. Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). 
Whilst NGOs may see themselves as aligned with the values of social movements, 
the extent to which NGOs are able to support movements materially is clearly 
dependent on their own funding modalities. Staff of progressive NGOs told me that 
their donors had expressed concerns about support of social movements and had 
indicated that funding could be withdrawn: 'we have found it extremely difficult to sell 
that shift [towards working with social movements] to a number of funders [ ... ] there 
have been a number of our donors who have raised questions around our work with 
social movements' (J. Duncan, FXI, 30 Mar 07). The kinds of relationships that 
developed in the last six or so years have been between movements and a small set 
of NGOs and academic institutions that have managed to secure what may be called 
solidarity funding. Accordingly, they have made up only a very small proportion of 
organisations sampled for this research. 
A second category of NGOs comprised those who felt that the appropriate 
relationship between the two should be one of 'solidarity' and 'mutual respect', yet 
were not actively supporting movements. As with the above set of organisations, 
these NGOs understood the contribution of social movements to democracy as 
positive: social activism and protest are signs of the 'maturity' of Post-Apartheid 
democracy. This position draws on an understanding of civil society as plural, 
collectively fulfilling diverse roles that 'sometimes assist and other times compel the 
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state to meet its obligations and responsibilities to its citizenry' (Habib 2003: 239-
240). Some informants similarly pointed out that civil society is large enough to 
accommodate everyone: 
It's plural, civil society. Some parts of civil society would have a good collegial 
relationship with the state, and others would have a confrontational 
relationship. Sut, ya, that's a good thing. You can't have this homogeneous 
construction of what civil society is (I. Succus, CPP, 26 Jun 07). 
Going further than this, Rama portrayed social movements as a vanguard that 
demonstrates the failures of NGOs in challenging the status quo: 'In Durban you 
shouldn't have people living in such squalor [ ... ] [Social movements] have become 
that critical voice to say that's the role you should have been playing' (R. Naidu, 
DDP, 25 Jun 07). This position is quite illustrative of NGO professionals in South 
Africa. It offers the ability to advance a critique of one's own position as working for a 
formalised NGO and the missed opportunity to take a stand for poverty reduction or 
failures in service delivery: 
The trouble with us, we academise everything and we try to rationalise 
everything. They just went and they did it. They just marched. They felt 
strongly about doing something, they went and they did it. They got beaten 
up, they went back and they did it again (ibid.). 
Several points can be drawn out from these statements. Firstly, informants 
tended to emphasise the 'marching' aspect of social movements. This is appropriate 
in the sense that one characteristic of new social movements can be seen as their 
high degree of popular participation. Nonetheless, they cannot be reduced to it. 
Secondly, NGOs are aware of and have internalised the critiques that are brought 
forward against them. Imraan characterised his organisation as having 'fancy funding 
from Ford', which meant that they needed to 'construct a sort of ideological 
orientation about where you locate yourself (I. Succus, CPP, 26 Jun 07). The above 
self-criticism of 'always academising everything' also echoes common criticisms by 
movements of NGOs. For example, it invokes the critique by Abahlali baseMjondolo 
that academics and NGOs as outside intellectuals speak for, rather than to, the poor. 
S'bu Zikode, the elected President of the shackdweller movement: 
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It is all about numbers, it's all about masses; that's where our strength lies. 
But our masses are not just bodies without land and houses and bodies 
marching on the street. We can be poor materially, but we are not poor in 
mind [ ... J Some of the intellectuals understand that we think our own struggle. 
Others still don't understand this (Zikode 2008: 122). 
If, as I said above, marching looms large in NGO accounts of movements, Zikode's 
refusal of being reduced to being 'bodies' is particularly noteworthy. This refusal 
seems to me to speak directly to NGOs who have a tendency to essentialise 
movements either romantically as spontaneous grassroots uprisings or as 
disorganised masses who are unable to articulate their demands themselves. This 
construction as being unable to 'think their own struggle' then activates NGOs' role 
as intermediary and bridge-builder. As such, it can translate the physicality of 
marching into a set of well-articulated and well-presented advocacy and lobbying 
demands. 
Relations to social movements II: from solidarity to distancing 
The following account by an NGO leader of a meeting of the Durban shackdwellers 
movement with a group of NGOs is worth citing at length, as it again evokes the 
sense of refusal I just discussed: 
The movements almost took us by surprise. In KZN we have Abahlali 
BaseMjondolo, and we've been working with them a little bit - trying to work 
with them. And it was a very good learning curve for us because we were told 
"we will come to you if we need help, but right now we are okay". Which was 
very interesting in itself. There was a movement that had a very clear issue. 
They had a force mobilised behind them. And they were telling us; you do not 
summon us to a meeting; do not give us an agenda and make us come here 
like beggars. You know - what can we do to help you? I mean we had about 
89 big NGOs, and we called Abahlali BaseMjondolo, and the people who 
convened was a church organisation. I won't mention the name. And they 
really planned it very badly, and we just turned up because we were invited to 
come along. And here was this guy from Abahlali BaseMjondolo, 
unemployed, homeless, taking on this church organisation; saying this is not 
acceptable. And if you do not put it right we'll walk out of this meeting. And 
these big guys with their collars, this has not happened to us before. I mean 
they came, they wanted to give them blankets and everything else. They said 
no, no it's not about that. We're very proud of what we're doing and we'll do 
this thing our way. If you can contribute to that, that is better, if you can't we'll 
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say thank you and just move on. And to me, anyway, that was a great 
personal learning (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). 
NGOs' decision not to support social movements despite pronouncements of 
solidarity may be motivated by concerns about their own funding: 'quite a few NGOs 
[ ... ] have shunned working with social movements because they don't want to be 
tainted with the aura of radicalism', as Jane put it (J. Duncan, FX/, 30 Mar 07). Even 
progressive donors have shied away from outwardly supporting social movements 
via their NGO funding because they also give to the South African government. 
Some NGOs have already felt the consequences of aligning themselves too explicitly 
with movements that are seen as anti-Government. Moreover, participation in public-
community partnerships and tendered-for government projects as I have described it 
in chapter 5, also gives little incentive to contest government policies - after all, it is 
usually neoliberal policies that have given rise to these partnerships in the first place. 
So the rhetorical marginalisation of social movements that I turn to now is certainly in 
part motivated by sustainability concerns. It is also indicative of the intermediary 
position of many formalised NGOs that want to be able to partner with anyone and 
everyone. 
The third category comprises the perhaps surprisingly large - given their own 
positioning as progressive - number of NGO staff that distanced themselves from 
social movements. There were a few instances of straightforward criticism, such as 
in this interview with Agenda's Michelle: 
I think we all need to have a bit more of a check in. What exactly do we want 
to achieve? Because I think the whole purpose of moving towards social 
change is everybody's business. It's not just a business of the social 
movements. [ ... ] I think there needs to be some critical reflection on how 
some of the structural elements within the social movements in KZN or 
wherever, how are some of those personalities advancing it or limiting [social 
change] (M. Oyedan, 26 Jun 07). 
But in most instances, distancing worked in more complex ways. No one dismissed 
social movements outright and competing discursive strategies were employed to 
describe how their organisation understood the contemporary role of social 
movements. Interviewees praised the contribution of social movements to 
democratic practice in the abstract, but then criticised the strategies and tactics they 
employ. They stressed an inherent connection or communality with movements, for 
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instance by evoking the 'we' of civil society, but also distanced themselves from 
them. This mirrors somewhat what I described in chapter 5 as NGOs' 'schizophrenic' 
relations with Government. 
Imraan's account shows some of the complexities of NGO positioning in civil 
society: 
A large number of social movements have disowned official spaces of 
engagement. With this Gramscian idea of, this is about social control, why 
should we engage with the state on the state's terms? Engaging with the 
state, have you seen any sort of meaningful change in policy? This is about 
funding, and US agenda, World Sank agenda etc., in World Sank-
appropriated language. So against that backdrop of the critique of official 
spaces, yes I mean I am very critical of this whole thing of public 
participation, and how it has emerged in the world. In some ways it is highly 
problematic. So I would, at CPP always say that we should work with social 
movements. And maybe say to social movements: is it strategic for you to 
totally disown these processes of engagement? At the same time I will fully 
support, from the background that we come from in this country, of burning 
the tyres and protesting outside. If social movements choose to do that I 
would support it personally (I. Succus, CPP, 26 Jun 07). 
Informants also often alluded to their personal credentials as activists by way of 
introduction, and then led into a critique of social movements. Imraan pointed out 
that some of his 'closest buddies are from hard core social movement backgrounds' 
(I. Succus, CPP, 26 Jun 07). Michelle similarly drew attention to her biography: 
You know I have always worked at a grassroots level. So for me social 
movements are critical. And I think we as civil society organisations, as 
NGOs that might give you a different flavour from a social movement, I think 
there is a need for civil society organisations to put its weight and put its 
resources and thoughtfully move social movements to a place where it is 
much more credible. I think it's too disparate in KZN (M. Oyedan, Agenda, 26 
Jun 07). 
The notion of the grassroots is evoked here, again lending authenticity and 
groundedness to her subsequent criticism of social movement practice. I already 
discussed how biographical authenticity is employed to emphasise NGO's 
organisational independence in a previous chapter. Here, it appears to necessarily 
preface and thereby legitimate criticism of community activism. The above 
ambivalent positioning of respondents speaks to the progression of a career activist 
that feels at home with the practices and vocabularies of movements, NGOs, donors 
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and government alike, and sees his or her role as translating uncivilised protest into 
orderly lobbying. 
This is evident in the sentiment of wanting to move social movements to a 
'more credible' place. Imraan displays a similar attitude when he wants to work with 
movements but ask them whether 'it is strategic for you to totally disown these 
processes of engagement' (I. Succus, CPP, 25 Jun 07). These statements indicate a 
will to change practices of movements. Such a pedagogical drive, or 'reformism', is a 
central aspect of NGOs' relations to social movements. In order to be able to 
articulate a reformist project, social movements must first be diagnosed as outside, 
problematic or otherwise in need of being 'thoughtfully moved'. 
Moreover, whilst such a position initially seems to be contradictory, I believe 
that it is in fact indicative of the habitus of being a NGO professional in South Africa 
(and beyond). If I were, for analytical purposes, to imagine a composite figure made 
up of the NGO professionals I encountered during my fieldwork, this NGO worker is 
as comfortable in a suit, writing reports and meeting with international funding 
agencies as she is aligning with protesters against the commodification of services. 
The NGO worker can adapt to the changing environments, languages and practices 
like a chameleon. How the apparent contradiction of this positioning is negotiated 
and how it remains productive is by keeping these two identities separate from one 
another, but being able to move comfortably between both worlds. 
Constructing an outside 
In order to establish the need to change, NGOs often pitted 'constructive' 
engagement with the state against 'marching on the street'. Mass mobilisation was 
portrayed as out-dated, making what was framed as Apartheid-era struggle tactics 
no longer appropriate in post-Apartheid liberal democracy. Social movements thus 
appeared backward, their methods archaic. Conversely, institutionalised politics, the 
media and the courts were constructed as the proper and legitimate ways in which 
protest can be registered and policy impacted on in the democratic era. If 
interviewees considered any movements as effective, it was usually the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) for its 'mixture of strategies'. In contrast, township-based 
movements like Abahlali or the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign were 
characterised in terms of 'burning the tyres and protesting outside'. In contrast to 
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whatever stance of opposition or engagement was attributed to movements by my 
interviewees, a study of a wide range of organisations in fact concluded that they all 
'tended to practice an ill-defined mix of in-system and extra-institutional strategies' 
(Ballard et al. 2006b: 406). The stigmatisation and criminalisation of protest by the 
state has clearly shifted the terrain of legality for many movements in that they did 
not set out to operate illegally. But it has seemingly also informed the rhetoric of 
some NGOs, as I show in this chapter by highlighting how they distanced 
themselves from movement activity. 
The distinction between being on the inside or the outside is already coupled 
with a notion of backwardness or progress, with being crude or being refined in one's 
approach. The distinction speaks about being civilised or being uncivilised - having 
to remain on the outside, being raw, uneducated and so on. In other words, to be 
civilised is to be in civil society. The inside/ outside binary also speaks to the dualism 
of good and sane that is constituted by that which is other and dangerous. This ties 
in with the observations made earlier about protesters being reduced to being 
marching bodies, 'the poor' or the mob. These masses are on the one hand 
patronised because they are unable to articulate their demands in any other way but 
marching. On the other hand, they still pose a danger because of being potentially 
unruly, explosive and uncontrollable. Conversely, what is allowed 'inside' are the 
polite and 'well-mannered activists who play by the rules, settle conflicts peacefully, 
and do not break any windows' (Carothers, cited in Howell and Pearce 2001: 42). 
Furthermore, a spatial analogy concerning the geographies of Apartheid and 
Post-Apartheid is invoked through the inside/ outside binary. Townships emerged to 
house a constant supply of cheap labour for the Apartheid cities whilst avoiding a 
mixing of the different racial groups. Today still physically located away from city 
centres they very much represent Mbeki's 'second economy', their visibility and 
continued existence a constant reminder of South Africa's huge inequalities.72 
Townships played a huge role in the Anti-Apartheid struggle, but are now 'the 
eyesore that prevents the South African cities from becoming "world class"'. (Gibson 
2008: 9). An example of this has been the Government's gearing up to the FIFA 
72 Since 'the poor' have come to the city centres, new city 'centres' have sprung up in suburbia. 
Johannesburg's far-northern middle-class residential suburbs like Morningside or Sunninghill that serve 
the new 'centre' of Sandton are as example for this organisation of space in Post-Apartheid. At the 
same time, inner-city evictions have occurred for a long time and have intensified in preparation for the 
2010 World Cup. 
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World Cup by mass evicting informal settlements near newly-built stadia (as well as 
moving communities due to the building of new infrastructure itself). 
Alongside a judgement about which means are more appropriate and 
advanced, NGO accounts of social movement activity demarcate how a modern, 
liberal democratic civil society organisation ought to be and to behave: 
It then comes down to something about being effective and the impact that 
you are able to have. If you look at some of the protests that are going on 
now in South Africa about lack of service delivery; these poor people go mad 
and they protest and whatever - in whatever way they are able to. But the 
impact they are having on the national Government is, I mean, they do not 
have an impact on national Government. So if you are gonna engage with the 
major policy issues and try to shift the way your society operates, you are 
gonna have to have organised forms of civil society. But the best model 
would appear to be at this stage some kind of sensitive NGO, that this is how 
we operate and this is where we get our resources from (W. Bird, MMP, 13 
Jun 07). 
Besides the fact that Will's assessment may simply be incorrect - many people told 
me during the course of my fieldwork that the only language the ANC supposedly 
understands is people marching on the streets - it serves to identify as most 
effective civil society organisation the sensitive NGO. Conversely, there is the 
assumption that community-based movements are not part of civil society proper. 
NGOs' construction of movements therefore resonates strongly with a 'mainstream' 
understanding of civil society as a consensual arena for formal and modern 
organisations suited to a liberal-democratic model of society (Howell and Pearce 
2001). The liberal tenet requires more civil society as a guarantor for a stable 
democracy, but it is not the kind of 'raw' civil society that social movements 
represent. 
Protests against corruption, for example, are in principle tolerated and even 
encouraged - provided they are carried out in a responsible manner and directed at 
the appropriate authorities - because they link up with accountability and good 
governance demands and represent the targeted empowerment of civil society. 
Conversely, challenges of a socio-economic nature are not well received. This is 
also where protest clashes with other forms of authority such as that of the state, and 
where ruling through consent co-exists with other forms of power, in this case violent 
repression. Given that Apartheid was defined by such a sovereign form of power, it 
becomes paramount for the authorities to continuously emphasise how they differ 
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from this Apartheid mode, for instance through the discursive marginalisation of 
protest as betrayal. Movements face two sets of pressures: perpetually sought to be 
represented by NGO and academic elites and being criminalised and repressed by 
the state. 
7.4. Learning how things operate: reformism and refusal 
NGO-isation and Reformism 
Once the appropriate civil society organisation is identified, other actors can be 
reformed and governed in line with their understanding of how civil society should 
operate in a newly-democratised system. As we have seen, the kind of organisation 
supposedly best suited to Post-Apartheid liberalism is an efficient and formalised 
NGO, staffed with middle-class activists capable of monitoring and accounting. Such 
NGO staff - whether they fell into the second or third categories identified above -
expressed the need to change social movements' practices. Civil society relations 
are thus also characterised by a pedagogical drive of NGOs wanting to shape social 
movements 'in their image' - a process I refer to as reformism. Reformism is linked 
to, but different from what has been described elsewhere as the NGO-isation of 
movements (Lang 2000, Smith 2007, Richter 2006), given that I conceive of the 
former as concerned with changing behaviours and mindsets.73 Arundhati Roy 
writes: 
Eventually - on a smaller scale but more insidiously - the capital available to 
NGOs plays the same role in alternative politics as the speculative capital 
that flows in and out of the economies of poor countries [ ... ]The NGO-ization 
of politics threatens to turn resistance into a well-mannered, reasonable, 
salaried, 9-to-5 job (2005: para. 4). 
In this thesis, NGO-isation is understood as the processes of formalisation 
that occur when CSOs obtain funding resources (often, but not always, from formal 
73 Concerns about the NGO-isation of social movements have been expressed in a variety of settings, 
such as Palestine (Smith 2007), Latin America (Alvarez 1999) and India (Krishnaraj 2003). each of 
which attribute a slightly different meaning to the term. Also see Sangtin Writers and Nagar (2006). 
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NGOs). To enter funding arrangements necessarily entails the professionalisation of 
a CSO, for instance by having to comply with a variety of auditing procedures arising 
from the need for accountability. This is a result of the quantitative-analytical 
expertise needed for the reporting, monitoring and evaluation practices that I 
examined as a central aspect of NGOs' organisational form in chapter 6. Movements 
and CBOs begin to resemble NGOs in character and organisational structure. 
The streamlining of the NGO sector that was charted in chapter 4 is therefore 
shown to spread to civil society more broadly: 
The trouble with [wanting to have impact] is that the moment you do that, you 
immediately need a clustering of skills because you can have a group of 
people going and marching, saying these and these things suck, and we are 
not prepared to accept the lack of delivery. If you are gonna do it again, you 
need someone to organise the meeting, you need someone to do this, you 
need someone with organisational skills, the next thing you are gonna need 
someone with financial skills, you need someone with management skills, 
one of these things have to come together. So you can't, it's almost an 
inevitable kind of thing that you have to lead towards that kind of a model (W. 
Bird, MMP, 13 Jun 07). 
This extract highlights the range of skills and expertise that NGO-isation produces: 
organisational, financial and managerial. The channels through which an NGO-
isation of movements is circulated are organisational practices and procedures that 
fall under the banner of accountability and are linked to the responsibilisation of civil 
society organisations. Such institutionalised expertise in civil society can serve as 
conduit for governing practices. 
The character of the movement begins to reflect the character of the NGO 
when movements begin to direct more and more of their resources towards their 
relationships with the funder: The struggle on the ground gets replaced by meetings 
and workshops, reports, meetings and workshops, meetings and workshops' (D. 
McKinley, APF, 11 Jul 07) There is then a clear parallel to the processes of 
homogenisation that occur in partnerships of NGOs with public and private sector. 
Partnerships operate as channels for technologies of government, for example 
auditing, vocabulary, physical technologies and infrastructure. The notion of an 
ideological co-option of the struggle, as is often put forward by activists, arguably 
does not fully capture the insidious and complex practices of alignment in terms of 
organisational structures. 
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The following extract points to the power relations inherent in NGO 
relationships with community movements and NGOs' reformist inclination: 
And I mean we've offered them, listen, if you want to use our training 
manuals here, if you want capacity building, having a workshop and 
sandwiches and stuff, we can provide that. And we have materials and 
manuals that you want to use, that's fine. Or send a fax, you can come and 
do that. But we also, one of them came to me and said they'd smashed their 
car. And they came to us; you know what, can we get a car? I said no I can't 
do that. And in the second meeting when they brought this issue up, I said 
but that's bullshit! They said we asked you for help and you couldn't help. I 
said that is where we differ. I have to be completely accountable for how I 
spend the money of the organisation. You cannot just come to me and say 
take my car or grab this R15,000 It does not work like that. I said you also 
have to learn how these things operate (R. Naidu, DDP, 25 Jun 07). 
NGOs clearly see themselves as having a capacity building role towards 
movements, which includes sharing financial resources with movements. However, 
the above extract also betrays a sense of a parent-child relationship, in which a 
wayward movement needs to be made responsible and 'learn how it works' from the 
more mature NGO. As with the interviewees cited earlier who spoke about wanting 
to move social movements to a more credible place or wondering whether their 
actions where strategic, there is a teleology to Rama's narrative of the meeting with 
Abahlali: wanting the workshops and the constructive engagement is portrayed as 
essentially inevitable in an organisation's path. Eventually, one is led to believe, 
every movement will become an NGO or perish. 
Whereas the concept of NGO-isation describes the formalisation of 
movements in line with funders' demands, auditing techniques and global 
development discourses, reformism is a process I attribute to a specific NGO 
agency. It encapSUlates the attempts by NGOs to make movements more like 
themselves in terms of values and mindset as well as in their organisational form. 
Whilst this inclination to reform movements may be purely discursive, they 
nevertheless serve to marginalise public protest, thereby contributing to a shrinking 
of political society or the public sphere. It can then be argued that the narrowing of 
perspectives on Post-Apartheid democracy that results from the partnership logic is 
mirrored by relations within civil society, the later being effectively subsumed by 
formal elite NGOs. At the level of individuals within a movement, this process is 
apparent too. In what one activist described as 'commodification of the struggle', the 
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activities of movement activists may become oriented towards accessing financial 
resources: 
The base constituency of most movements and organisations is not 
employed. So oftentimes the contact point with the funding and the 
relationship with the NGO is one not just of accessing money for struggles 
and everything else. But of accessing a potential job personally. So it 
becomes an individual thing as well for some of the activists. And they might 
have a self-interest in following an NGO line, in order to be able to sustain a 
longer term relationship that might lead to their betterment or to them getting 
a job, or to them hooking up. And this has happened on numerous occasions 
[ ... ] during the process of carrying out a project or a campaign or whatever it 
is; some of the people are more interested in establishing relations directly 
with the NGO (D. McKinley, APF, 11 Jul 07). 
NGO-isation and NGO reformism together have the effect of institutionalising 
community struggles over the meaning of development and democracy, thereby 
containing and civilising them. Nonetheless, the governance of movements and of 
civil society more generally is never a secure accomplishment or actual 
achievement, as some govern mentality literature would have it. Governing is always 
only a project, and there are constantly challenges to NGO's discourses and 
practices within civil society. As has already been addressed earlier, movements are 
acutely aware of, and sometimes actively refuse, endeavours of reform or 
representation. 
Social movements: refusing to be represented 
It is important to clarify that far from seeking relationships with NGOs, many 
movements come from a strong autonomist tradition and would reject funding from 
international donors outright.l4 This is based on an understanding of movements as 
non-hierarchical and radically independent spaces with no formal relations to the 
state, institutions or NGOs. Others distance themselves rhetorically, with the 
74 I am not concerned with social movements' understandings of NGOs, which would yield rather 
different arguments. Where I have included interview extracts by movement activists, this is intended to 
further clarify central issues underlying NGOs' positioning in relation to movements. Again, it is worth 
underlining how heterogeneous the social movement terrain in South Africa is. Movements such as 
those under the umbrella of the APF are often explicitly socialist, using traditional left mobilization and 
organisation in reference to state power for instance by competing in elections, whereas others are 
influenced by autonomist values and a rejection of the formal political framework. 
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following quote being just one example of a movement's rejection of NGOs as 
neoliberal agents that contain and co-opt popular protest: 
Since its inception the [Social Movement Indaba] has degenerated into a 
vehicle controlled by NGOs. Now it merely poses as a forum for bringing 
together social movements. In reality the SMI has become an obstacle to the 
linking up of real social movements around the country and is a source of 
division [ ... ]The Western Cape Anti Eviction Campaign will not allow some 
NGO's [sic] and academics to further their careers with the blood, sweat and 
tears of communities. We despise the way they act as Trojan horses and the 
way they co-opt activists because of the resources they enjoy (Western Cape 
Anti Eviction Campaign 2007). 
The issue of funding and co-option is an important factor in accounting for 
differences in movement building and movements' longevity. A principled decision on 
the part of movements not to engage with institutions that have money meant that 
many movements disappeared again quickly. This is especially true given the 
resources that would have been needed to deal with the consequences of state 
repression, such as legal fees or bail. Other movements such as the APF receive 
some funding from NGOs and work with them on a number of clearly specified 
projects, but likewise do not see a natural connection or political alliance with them -
their relationship is at best a 'tactical temporary alliance' (D. McKinley, APF, 11 Jul 
07). Many contemporary movements in South Africa theorise their ideas of 
development and democracy in contradistinction to NGOs, including left NGOs, for 
instance regarding the democratic culture of movement structures: 
Abahlali's movement structures are much more advanced in terms of gender 
with regard to both composition and orientation than any of the left NGOs that 
assume a natural (and often racialized) right to teach movements how to be 
progressive (Pithouse 2008: 79). 
As I have indicated above, a reformist drive is not limited to NGOs that are 
critical of social movements; the progressive NGOs who see their task as building 
movements can potentially have this impact too. Here, Lenny speaks about adopting 
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standard leftist principles of workers' education to the context of emerging 
movements: 
With some of the newer formations, it's not just a straight forward case of a 
workshop on what is happening in Brazil. When people often do not even 
have experiences of a workshop and the conventions of popular education 
and so on. So we've got to reassess all those things, so in some ways it's an 
enormous challenge (l. Gentle, ILRIG, 24 Apr 07). 
ILRIG was very aware of the possibility of institutionalising the struggles of emerging 
movements: as Lenny told me, there is a danger that left NGO 'in their own name 
pack up a campaign against Whatever, have a website and produce articles and 
speak in the name of communities [ ... ] They're placed like that' (ibid.). As a provider 
of resources to movements, there is thus a potential for NGO-isation. However, in 
their role as capacity-builder for movements, specific models of organising, 
educating or campaigning are also likely to feature prominently, as Jane's account 
illustrates: 
In relation to the movement work, we are in the process of networking all the 
social movements in the country together which is a big job, and establishing 
a nation-wide freedom of expression and anti-repression network. So there is 
a lot of organising work that is going on in the provinces, we have a co-
ordinating committee that has been set up bringing all the movements 
together which often fight with one another but co-operate through us on 
these issues, its quite strange. So we work with the Western Cape Anti-
Eviction campaign for instance, which is allergic to NGOs. We work with 
Abahlali baseMjondo whilst working with social movements in Durban, all 
three are fighting with one another. But we managed to somehow bridge 
those conflicts (J. Duncan, FXI, 30 Mar 07). 
Their support may eventually become governmental, in that it instructs people in the 
'proper' practice of politics, or seeks to speak for movements. These arguments also 
draw attention to the complicated relationships between the traditional left and the 
new left in South Africa, which provides a further explanation for tensions between 
progressive NGOs and movements and their fundamentally different reference 
points. 
Conversely, Abahlali and other movements have consistently challenged 
NGOs' and others' attempts to speak for them. This may be the case in terms of how 
ideas of development or democracy are discursively framed; one example is 
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AbahlalFs rejection of a discourse of 'service delivery' that NGOs employ, instead 
insisting their demands are about 'being human': 
It is not only about physical infrastructure', says Zikode, 'we have shifted our 
thinking [ ... J the struggle is the human being, the conditions that we live in 
which translates into demands for housing and land. [Through AbahlaIJ1 
people are starting to remember that they are human beings (Gibson 2008: 
8). 
I claimed -above that refusal is central to the internal dynamics of civil society. The 
refusal of being reduced by middle-class NGOs to marching bodies, for instance, 
and the insistence on thinking one's own struggle seem to me to sum up well the 
tensions characterising NGO-movement relations. 
But I think they also speak to the shifting fault lines of difference and 
inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Many movements are also class 
movements, and class has, if not replaced race, then at least supplemented and 
sometimes deepened the inequalities inherited from racial Apartheid. The refusal to 
be essentialised is coupled with a refusal to be represented. The patronising 
assumption by political elites that poor people, shackdwellers or the unemployed 
themselves could not possibly organise or mobilise on their own - therefore 
necessarily having been agitated by some leader - is matched by the unconscious 
assumption by many NGOs that movements cannot articulate their demands. Both of 
these assumptions constitute real attempts to shift potential power away from the 
poor. 
7.5. Conclusions 
As I showed in this chapter, the kind of organisation portrayed as best suited to 
neoliberal forms of organising society is effective, efficient and formal, staffed by 
cultivated individuals who play by the rules of liberal democracy. The difference 
between this kind of NGO worker and a social movement activist can be captured by 
the juxtaposition of writing reports with burning tyres. I have argued that NGOs may 
come to substitute for civil society in a number of ways, for instance as a result of 
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movements entering funding arrangements with NGOs and other donors. 
Formalisation in terms of shared organisational practices potentially leads to an 
institutionalisation of community struggles. There is continuity between an NGO-
isation of movements and the practices by which NGOs themselves become more 
strategically and structurally embedded in the neoliberal order, as I described them 
in earlier chapters. The expert knowledge that NGO-isation relies on is 
organisational, financial and managerial and provides governmental access to 
communities and their networks and associations. 
NGOs' conscious or unconscious drive to reform has the potential of 
institutionalising community struggles, thereby containing and civilising them. Whilst 
some NGO accounts celebrate the pluralism of civil society, the capacity building 
activities of NGOs may ultimately construct less professionalised components of civil 
society as something to be reformed and drawn into a circle of consensus. NGOs 
here act as experts which transfer how effective politics are to be done. Importantly, 
such expertise does not flow unidirectionally: although I have argued here that NGOs 
become the conduit for preferred modes of operation from donors to movements, 
activists are also the obvious domain of expertise in civil society which can be 
institutionalised to govern communities. The need for reform is ascertained by 
discursive practices. The NGO constructions of movement practices that I cited 
throughout this chapter mapped interestingly onto established development binaries 
such as tradition/ modernity and backwardness/ progress. They also mobilised 'new 
South African' tropes of liberal democracy by opposing the marching masses of the 
Apartheid era with Post-Apartheid in which there are proper channels through which 
politics can be impacted on. 
The fact that the constituencies of movements are rhetorically marginalised 
as marching bodies, uncivil or dangerous is not contradictory to this argument at all, 
for it is by portraying them as unable to articulate their demands in a proper 
democratic system that the need to speak for them and represent them can be 
established. Where Government has reacted to mass mobilisation with violent 
repression, NGOs merely rhetorically marginalise them. NGOs' discursive 
constructions are nonetheless significant because they narrow the range of what is 
considered appropriate in civil society, which in turn has important consequences for 
the shape of Post-Apartheid democracy. Representations are, as Escobar (1995) 
has noted, places of violence. Much of the reformism that I have outlined in this 
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chapter operates through the class relations that are embedded in civil society. 
Marginalisation seems to come into play more with movements of the poor that are 
perhaps, from the point of view of NGOs, beyond reform. On their part, such 
movements very clearly reject NGOs, demarcating themselves constantly from NGO 
practices and goals. 
In an alternative reading, loosely inspired by Ferguson (2006a), one might re-
interpret what were portrayed as archaic modes of resistance by unorganised 
masses that lack the means and education to use the proper democratic channels 
available in the new configuration as tactically producing powerful images that 
consciously resonate with previous mass mobilisations in the country under 
Apartheid. Social movement activism has appropriated practices used by old 
movements against Apartheid, for instance direct action, but they also consciously 
evoke specific cultural repertoires from these movements (Barchiesi 2006). This is 
not to imply that every South African is able to register dissent in myriad ways but 
chooses not to. Nonetheless, the notion of South African social movements as 
unorganised and primordial needs to be rejected. Instead, they can be understood 
as contemporary and effective forces that struggle in ways appropriate to current 
forms of governmental power in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Although class-based 
discourses and practices retain a crucial relevance for them, South African 
movements against neoliberalisation tend to emphasise plurality and horizontality 
and call into question traditional left organisation, leadership and ontology. 
There is not enough space here to discuss the complex relationships of 
movements with organised labour and the traditional left, but it is important to note 
that the ANC's alliance partners, despite their continued rhetoric, seem to have 
accepted the party's brand of national developmentalism at the expense of, in 
McKinley's words, 
whatever confidence they did have in the 'leading role' of the broad working 
class [ ... J all rationalised by reference to historic liberation movement/Alliance 
loyalties, the necessities of completing an ill-defined 'national democratic 
revolution' and the 'realities' of global capitalism (McKinley Unpublished Book 
Chapter: 10). 
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There is always the danger of seeing any struggles against dispossession as 
progressive (Harvey 2005b), and I do not want to fall into this trap. Yet, the 
marginalisation of segments of civil SOCiety by NGOs runs the danger of hindering 
the effectiveness of interest groups that can challenge the state and its vision of 
democracy and development, especially in the South African context of an actual 
one-party system. The democratic deficit that results from such marginalisation lies 
precisely in the gap between a typical NGO critique of the state and that of a social 
movement. Whereas the former is often procedural or instrumental, for instance 
addressing lack of speed of delivery, the latter entails a more substantial critique of 
exclusion and the meaning of liberation. 
It therefore seems apt to conclude this chapter by re-iterating that social 
movements have been born out of the deeply felt betrayal of the liberation and of 
freedom's promises, and are directly faCing the disastrous consequences of the 
peculiar Post-Apartheid mix of neoliberal ideology and marketisation programme and 
its exclusionary nation-building discourse. The material reality that protesting 
communities face constitute a truth about Post-Apartheid that many elites, whether in 
government, NGOs or academia, do not want to acknowledge. This truth is 
fundamentally irreconcilable with the promises of the ANC of a 'better future for all' 
and makes clearly visible the cracks in the Post-Apartheid neoliberal order. 
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Chapter 8: 
Conclusions 
8.1. Introduction 
Gillian Hart writes that one of the reasons that neoliberalism could take hold so 
quickly in the new South Africa was because of how a 'dichotomous set of meanings 
could be articulated [ ... J in a way that appealed powerfully to "common sense'" 
(2002a: 25). This is most obviously in the contrast of Apartheid's strong 
interventionist state model with Post-Apartheid's embracing of free markets. Using 
the development sector as a case study, this thesis has charted another set of 
transformations, exploring how the very anatomy of South African NGOs has 
changed in the Post-Apartheid era. It has done so through a combination of methods 
- in-depth interviews with NGO staff, observation research and various ethnographic 
strategies - and by focusing particularly on partnerships and impact assessment as 
two important elements that characterise intermediary NGOs. I have argued that 
such NGOs have to be highly flexible, professionalised, able to maintain a wide 
range of partnerships, fluent in M&E and other auditing procedures and, by 
ostensibly representing civil society, seen as close to the 'grassroots'. 
By investigating partnerships as an essential characteristic of a new NGO 
model, I showed that the partnership mode constitutes a particular logic of governing 
development and a technology for exercising and legitimising authority (see chapter 
4). Although partnerships may have been borne out of a desire to reform the power 
dynamics inherent in development, the partnership mode does not spell out the end 
of international donor power - donors continue to dominate development agendas, 
discourses and techniques. International donor funding for NGO activities in areas 
such as capacity building and civil society-strengthening necessarily allocates a key 
role for donors in South Africa's 'domestic' policy - especially intermediary NGOs 
can be a conduit for donor values, discourses and practices. What is new about the 
partnership mode is that it involves an increasing entanglement of a wide range of 
issues, responsibilities and spaces of the development domain under the banner of 
integration and collaboration. 
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Secondly, besides transferring legitimacy, partnerships were also shown to 
provide access to specific communities and their associated organisations. 
Historically the state has always relied on philanthropic or charitable structures, but 
this research NGOs were also shown to provide international and! or corporate 
access, thereby making individuals, communities or organisations governable (see 
chapters 5 and 7 in particular). Thirdly, partnerships fulfil a consensus-building 
function that allows for the harmonisation of development objectives, techniques and 
vocabulary. Here, they most clearly encapsulate the essence of the Post-
Washington Consensus by forging inclusion whilst making NGOs responsible for the 
outcomes of the projects they are involved in. But consensus-building also resonates 
with the nation-building project of the new South Africa, where criticism of national 
development policy is sometimes brand marked as unpatriotic. Fourthly, partnerships 
operate as channels for the circulation of particular managerial practices, impact 
measurement technologies and neoliberal values (see chapters 2 and 6). The ethical 
norm of accountability and its associated audit chains therefore link NGOs with the 
state, donors, corporations, INGOs and various community-based or grassroots 
organisations they rely on for delivery. 
This thesis has thus sought to analyse NGOs in terms of their essential form. 
This differs considerably from the majority of studies on NGOs in South Africa and 
elsewhere, which tend to focus on how to make NGOs more effective. I have instead 
explored what kinds of development organisations are being produced in Post-
Apartheid and through which channels, practices and technologies this occurs, 
emphasising that development relations provide a context for governmental practices 
across different levels. Theoretically, I have contended that the ideas of 
governmentality studies can be extended to analyse modes of governance in civil 
society and development by investigating which types of organisations are 
appropriate to the technologies of M&E that partnerships require. 
My usage of this theoretical framework (see chapters 1 and 2) extends 
beyond the effect of development projects on populations, as I argue that it is also 
states and organisations that are to be made efficient, entrepreneurial and 
responsible for their development. Government in the development domain 
encompasses a whole continuum of power relations between donors, NGOs, the 
state and civil society and is concerned with the constitution of appropriate 
development organisations. Whilst NGO programmes are governmental in that they 
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target the mindsets, attitudes and capacities of individuals and the communities in 
which they operate, the partnership model was itself shown to facilitate government 
in shaping NGOs' activities, structure and values. The governmentality of civil society 
produces - or attempts to produce - organisations in line with a particular 
understanding of democracy and of the appropriate means for social change: highly 
formalised and bureaucratised, but accountable and intersectorally connected. 
Importantly, NGOs are themselves agents of government: they perform 
governmental tasks by circulating norms and technologies of government and seek 
to reform other elements of civil society to become more like themselves -
entrepreneurial and professionalised. 
My research contributes new knowledge to critical political sociology and 
development studies by examining governmental technologies that shape NGOs' 
organisational behaviour, values and types of activities and has aimed to contribute 
to theoretical debates on governance by exploring practices of govern mentality in 
South African NGOs and in civil society at large. This concluding chapter proceeds 
with a discussion of the main overarching and interconnected themes that have 
emerged from the analysis presented in chapters 4 to 7. I will then move on to 
outline implications and recommendations for further research and end with some 
final reflections. 
8.2. Discussion of main themes 
Spatialities and sovereignties 
Encapsulated in the image of having one foot in the shanty town shack and the other 
in the boardroom, I have characterised the NGOs in this research as middle men, 
bridge-builders and brokers. They act as intermediaries between government or 
corporates and local communities; they provide links between the national, 
transnational and the local and connect a variety of geographical scales. However, 
such descriptions still carry echoes of a vertical topography of power (Ferguson 
2006a). Rather, with this research I have sought to advance an understanding of 
NGOs as connected to, and connecting, different spaces of sovereignty that often 
work against each other. The role of the South African state as a key donor to the 
NGO sector renders these topographies of power ever more complex. Also, although 
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my focus on national NGOs has meant that the activities of the organisations in this 
research have particular national referents, they are linked with what is a globalised 
development realm. As Ferguson (2006) and other have argued, apparatuses of 
governmentality co-exist with systems of nation-states in governing Africa. My 
research has sought to contribute to these debates about political power's operation 
across different scales. The study of NGOs such as those in my research exceeded 
a singular scalar imagination, thus providing insights into contemporary forms of 
power and governance in African development. 
Contradictorily, whereas the state - by effectively allowing its citizenry to be 
governed by such transnational powers - has partly absolved itself from the 
responsibility of governing, the harmonisation of development seeks to relegate the 
role of civil society to ensuring that the state is formally accountable, and 
occasionally to fill the gaps left by the market. The development domain in Post-
Apartheid South Africa thus consists of intermeshing and interweaved authorities 
and sovereignties, where para statal and extrastatal forms and new modalities of 
governance co-exist with traditional forms of state power. NGOs' entanglement in 
intersectoral spaces is not only heightened by the prevalence of the partnership 
agenda in global development policy and in the South African reconciliation project 
but NGO activity very much produces these kinds of intermeshing spaces. 
The currency of partnerships 
Most significantly then, NGO activity has been identified as strengthening the 
intersectoral linkages in the development sector, providing and enhancing 
connections between the state, corporate power, foreign governments and so on. 
Legitimacy is revealed to be the currency that is transferred in these partnerships. 
Biographical authenticity is often measured in terms of a purity of struggle and 
comes to define organisational authenticity. Individual and organisational planes are 
particularly intertwined in the South African NGO sector, although I suggest that this 
is characteristic of the particular location of NGO professionals more generally. The 
asserting of authenticity necessitates claims about the roles, functions and 
advantages of NGOs, such as their proximity to the grassroots. Whilst my research 
did not find such claims to be accurate, they serve to attribute legitimacy to state- or 
donor-run development projects. In fact, it is far from clear whether NGO 
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participation in multisectoral projects actually lends more credibility to development 
activities. 
There are two other problems with this evoking of authenticity in order to 
establish legitimacy. Firstly, in order to sustain the specific claim of being close to 
communities, NGOs - and their donors - often (albeit sometimes involuntarily) draw 
on a homogenous notion of civil sOciety which assumes that they, and the eBOs 
they work with, have the same goals. The problem here is NGOs' claims to providing 
emancipatory and genuinely democratic alternatives to neoliberal development. The 
processes of civil society reformism and NGO-isation are intimately linked to these 
claims. NGO reformism speCifically refers to NGOs' activity as governmental, 
attempting to 'civilise' organisations by trying to integrate them into formal civil 
society. Both practices run the danger of marginalising the voices and interests of 
other actors in civil society and ultimately of reducing the spaces available for critical 
debate and engagement. 
Regarding donors, their purporting on the one hand to support a civil society 
that is critical, and on the other hand to exclude all but the most formalised elements 
of it, is only one of the many contradictions that typify neoliberal development policy. 
Their uncritical portrayal of civil society as authentically representing the grassroots 
and! or as limiting the power of the state is politically dangerous. It may serve to 
legitimise what are often undemocratic transnational politics and the penetration of 
national development arenas by foreign-funded NGOs. 
Secondly though, such homogenisation processes are never complete. To 
make a claim for authenticity also involves opening oneself up to charges against 
authenticity and credibility. In this research, such challenges have become most 
apparent in NGOs' relationships to social movements. In this respect, social 
movement activity demonstrates the limits of neoliberalism in successfully managing 
and dividing the power of communities. Beyond it and in the extreme through, claims 
to authenticity and purity can create fundamentalisms and violent conflict, for 
instance along ethnic or religious lines. 
The very idea of 'grassroots' is a central element of the discursive regime 
characterising the government of civil society. It serves to evoke a particular 
understanding of authenticity that emanates from poor or marginalised communities 
- with the language of community itself indicative of a neoliberal mode of governing 
development. The term is almost exclusively employed by NGOs rather than by the 
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constituencies, movements or groups it is used to describe. The grassroots have to 
be produced in order to be governed and to be allocated a particular place in the 
vertical hierarchy of local! global or CBOI NGOI state. Thus, by labelling as 
grassroots what are in fact variously spatialised and sometimes transnational forces 
and movements, they can be constituted as localised and arguably less efficient. 
There is also a connotation of the term with the most basic level of activity, implying 
a lack of sophistication of means and techniques. This construction of being 
necessarily limited in terms of reach is a concrete way of managing popular 
democracy and belittling the material experiences of people and their struggles. 
Audit and accountability 
The originality and innovation of this thesis lies in its development of an analysis of 
transnational South African NGOs through issues of audit culture. I have shown that 
partnerships also function as channels for the circulation of auditing practices. 
Demands for greater accountability have been the main impetus for extending such 
impact measurement. This push for better governance of NGOs has been connected 
to the neoliberal public sector reform agenda, which assumes that public services 
will be more effective if organised according to free market principles. Impact 
assessment, M&E and quality assurance mechanisms - what Dean (1999) 
summarises under the heading of 'technologies of performance' - are clearly not 
limited to South African NGOs but constitute a large part of funded NGO activity 
globally. Indeed, this research serves to highlight more broadly the universal roles of 
auditing practices and target-setting in constituting particular economic domains and 
in linking them to global economic spaces. What is more, my arguments about 
accountability as a technology in the development domain clearly resonate with other 
areas and sectors, such as education (for example Strathern 2000). 
Whilst stressing that monitoring and evaluation is negotiated in different ways 
by individual NGOs, measurement and reporting were shown to be core activities for 
all of the NGOs in this research. Fluency in the language and practices of impact 
assessment demonstrates accountability, but it crucially requires specific skills and 
capacities. Certain types of expertise, for instance in quantitative and analytical skills 
or in 'EU-ese', are at once required and produced in organisations. Because target-
oriented development favours particular ways of measuring the success of a project, 
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modifies organisational structures and impacts on the types of activities or services 
provided, NGOs are transformed in line with neoliberal regimes of government. 
Moreover, NGOs' role as a broker of techniques such as log frames to their 
community-based counterparts, and their resultant status as experts, establishes 
hierarchies within civil society that serve to exclude certain types of organisations 
altogether. What are described as NGOs' capacity building activities then seem to 
specifically build capacity for better audit or reporting. M&E becomes a technology 
that reconfigures NGOs and by extension the community organisations they rely on 
for the delivery of services. Here, the interface between partnerships and auditing is 
revealed: they are mutually dependent in that auditing practices are attached to the 
funding flows and intersectoral networks that connect actors in development 
partnerships. Furthermore, as I have shown, the partnership discourse works in 
positioning NGOs in relation to CBOs, social movements and popular struggles. 
Conversely, activists are also the obvious domain of expertise in civil society which 
can be harnessed by NGOs or the public sector in order to govern communities. 
Although there have recently been attempts to reduce the transaction costs 
arising from M&E procedures by harmonising bi- and multilateral aid, these initiatives 
have not translated (yet?) into practical benefits for the NGOs in this study. More 
research is needed to explore exactly if and how the emerging standards for the 
harmonisation and alignment of aid are affecting the realities of intermediary NGOs 
in South Africa. It does however seem as though donors' monitoring and evaluation 
practices become more sophisticated all the time. This does not so much contradict 
the above arguments, but rather raises the question of what expertise these more 
sophisticated impact measurements will necessitate. 
It has been a central theme of my analysis that NGO professionals were 
more often than not aware and critical of the consequences of this kind of impact 
measurement on their organisations and on the sector as a whole. For instance they 
voiced concern about only blue-chip NGOs being able to cope with the bureaucratic 
demands of monitoring and of accessing donor funding. This was also evident in 
their ambivalent positioning towards social movement activity - on one hand 
celebrating the pluralism of civil society and criticising the lack of action on the part of 
NGOs, on the other strongly distancing themselves from such activism. This ability to 
have one foot in the shanty town shack and the other in the corporate boardroom is 
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emblematic of the scope of the new NGO and is essentially how a neoliberal mode 
of development works through the figure of the NGO professional. 
Moreover, showing awareness of the ambivalent nature of one's role is part 
and parcel of this professional location and maintains and produces relations of 
power within civil society. To articulate this contradiction, as many of my informants 
did, is an essential requirement of their position within a neoliberal rationality of 
government which relies on self-reflection. To reflect on the workings of power in the 
development domain is integral to (self-) governance through accountability. 
I have argued throughout this thesis that auditing techniques and the 
language and funding policy of partnerships are likely to produce NGOs that are 
characteristic of and proper to contemporary neoliberal forms of governing 
development. In detail, this means organisations who spend much of their time 
complying with auditing procedures, monitoring particular aspects of their work, 
evaluating and designing projects in accordance with targets set by donors and 
partners and so on. By necessity and in order to remain sustainable, they end up just 
as preoccupied with targets and accountability technologies as they are with the 
aims and actual outcomes of development projects. 
I referred to Power (1997) in chapter 6 who argues that audit culture may 
. replace the monitoring of quality with the monitoring of systems to monitor quality. 
Going further than this, I contend that these processes supposedly making 
development more efficient and effective actually make NGO-Ied development less 
so. The vast amounts of time and resources that are required by auditing put such 
strain on organisational capacity that they actually slow down or indeed prohibit 
genuine NGO activity. What impact measurement then ultimately produces is NGOs 
that are effective in terms of management, governance and audit, but not effective at 
their core mission. This consequence is only enhanced by the longer-term structural 
impact of auditing on staffing structures by institutionalising expertise. 
Homogenisation and democratic deficit 
Following on from the themes discussed above and from my analysis overall, there 
is clearly a tendency towards homogenisation for NGOs in South Africa. This is the 
case in terms of both how they are organised and structured, and how they speak 
about what they do. Development discourses and systems for reporting were shown 
236 
to have a potentially homogenising effect on NGOs. The language of partnerships 
plays an important part in this process, rendering the NGO sector as a whole more 
IikE;l other sectors. Clearly, despite the prevalence of a ubiquitous partnership 
vocabulary, NGO professionals' statements encompassed many different and often 
contradictory policies and discourses which do not always determine the practices of 
an NGO. Nonetheless, the deployment of certain discourses has real material and 
ideological effects, even if these tended to be downplayed by NGO staff through the 
employment of neo-Marxist terminology or references to the struggle. 
Moreover, the necessary import of techniques and vocabularies from the 
business sector is already resulting in an apolitical managerialism, effectively 
reducing NGOs' abilities to provide critical development alternatives to public and 
private sector. Clearly, the multisectoral model - and the legitimacy NGOs can 
confer - is an attractive proposition for international donors, corporations, 
foundations and agencies of the state, tying in as it does ideas of social capital and 
ethical corporatism. Yet, there are serious issues of accountability (here referring to 
non-procedural responsibility), where potentially no single actor is responsible for 
development outcomes. 
One way of reading the Post-Apartheid civil society terrain is as plural (cf. 
Habib 2003), an assessment with which I concur. One may then ask why the above 
arguments should matter. Is it not simply the case that some NGOs deliver services 
or carry out lobbying, whereas others are more 'radical'; that some social 
movements formulate substantive critiques of the state and the goals of 
development, whereas other community-based organisations are disconnected from 
the state and actively support communities? My argument in this thesis has been 
that it does matter if NGOs employ uniform reporting systems and a uniform 
vocabulary, and that it matters if they begin to increasingly resemble other sectors. 
NGOs - in all their diversity - have different development roles to play than state and 
corporates, particularly given their own emancipatory claims. The marketisation of 
NGOs and NGO-Ied development is dangerous because it reduces the very role of 
the NGO sector as a counterbalance to other actors in society. The harmonisation of 
public, private and voluntary sectors leads to a damaging of the public sphere, and a 
shrinking of the space for dissent where alternatives to the dominant development 
paradigm can be considered. 
237 
Beyond the effects of audit and the partnership agenda on NGOs 
themselves, it is through processes of NGO-isation and reformism that this 
homogenisation of NGOs is translated into the sphere of civil society at large. The 
marginalisation of segments of civil society by NGOs runs the danger of hindering 
the effectiveness of groups that can challenge the state and its vision of democracy 
and development. This is particularly acute in the South African context of an actual 
one-party system. As I illustrated through the example of NGOs' positioning to social 
movements, the democratic deficit that results from such marginalisation lies in the 
gap between their respective critiques of the forms that development and democracy 
take. The danger of this overall harmonisation - of the practices, technologies, 
languages and ultimately the goals of development - is the stifling of public debate 
about the future of the country and an institutionalisation of community grievances 
into procedural forms of democracy. NGOs are one conduit in this institutionalisation 
of expertise and activism and are often aware of this positioning. 
Pluralist accounts of civil society have a tendency to celebrate its diversity as 
positive for democracy. In practice, this often entails a rather narrow understanding 
of civil society and democracy as liberal. This is mirrored by what I have shown in 
relation to donor funding policy: contrary to their claims, the organisations who 
actually get funding are a very specific set staffed by the 'well-mannered' activists I 
have referred to throughout this thesis. The problem is not only that intermediary 
NGOs may be structurally unable to progressively engage with the grievances of the 
majority population, but that they often try to reform and speak for those 
organisations that may be able to. The danger to democracy lies in professionalised 
NGOs taking over civil society and excluding those that represent the interest of 
other groups in society. Again, the critical issue is what NGOs claim they do and how 
these emancipatory claims have already been incorporated into the neoliberal order. 
Future(s) for South African NGOs: alternatives to depoliticisation? 
Observing the processes described in this thesis has led me to argue that 
harmonisation and an inclusion approach in development policy are negatively 
impacting on NGOs and that this is dangerous for the health of Post-Apartheid 
democracy. However, I have emphasised throughout that processes of 
governmentality are never complete. The focus of my research of political 
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technologies pays less attention to the reworkings of such technologies in practice, 
how they are resisted or what their unintended consequences may be. Whilst there 
are continuous attempts to produce NGOs that are accommodating of neoliberal 
policies and techniques, some NGOs in South Africa remain, despite the partial 
adoption of a particular mode of operation, fiercely opposed to such a logic. The 
great heterogeneity of the organisations considered in this research means that 
there have been variations in terms of how the impact of particular technologies has 
been understood and negotiated. There are also alternative readings to my 
arguments about homogenisation, not least from some practioners themselves. 
For instance, NGOs may try to retain their relevance and consistency by 
choosing to concentrate on a few key activities. They may opt to become pure 
advocacy and lobbying organisations, thus developing specific expertise that is not 
likely to be provided by another sector or that will lead them to spread their expertise 
too thinly. Most of the time, the pluralism of civil society and of the NGO sector was 
seen as the best guarantor for the continued survival of the sector, although some 
informants called for greater leadership in the sector and for NGOs to speak with one 
voice. This may be a reflection of the uncomfortable relationship of many NGOs to 
popular movements and the destitute living conditions their constituencies face. It 
was certainly noteworthy that NGO professionals often seemed to advocate greater 
organisational reflexivity to once again find their identity as NGO. One such possible 
identity may develop through a rebirth of activism in the sector that would have to 
address the gap between the promises of development and the failures of delivery, 
but critical NGO voices would need to make themselves heard at the levels of 
political economy and national policy and of local economic development. 
More generally, in some ways the prevalence of a partnership agenda 
allowed NGOs increased autonomy and gains, especially in terms of the information 
they generated and how they may employ this for the own strategic purposes. As 
Chapter 6 has shown, Mindsefs complex multiple-partnership model resulted in 
conflicts between different partners. Such conflicts led to restrictions in content 
provision, but also allowed the effective modification of auditing regimes that were in 
place. Although partnering seems to have contributed to the depoliticisation of the 
organisation, the constant requirement for auditing and data collection also provided 
it with resources to be used for its own autonomous purposes. 
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Informants were more often than not aware of the potentially dire 
consequences of auditing on their organisational capacity and orientation, for some 
prompting a range fatalistic pragmatism about the impact of the neoliberal order but 
in other cases giving rise to alternative constructions. Resistance to the regimes and 
technologies I have described in this thesis was mainly visible in little everyday 
refusals, for instance in terms of individuals not quite following the rules for reporting 
or for negotiation with funders, allowing for a degree of 'organisational slack'. While 
auditing has emerged in this thesis as one of the chief mechanisms by which 
external influence is exerted over NGOs and by which NGOs exert influence over 
other actors, it also offers the potential for resistance, such as through selective 
sharing or strategic usage of information (cf. Ebrahim 2003). Ethnographic research 
is necessary to explore such resistance in more detail. 
Perhaps most surprising to me were the reactions to my questions about 
whether NGOs should still exist in 30 years' time. Clearly, it is not realistic to assume 
that South Africa's developmental challenges will all be 'solved' in a few decades, 
but I felt that this was not the only reason for why people answered the way they did. 
NGOs spend much of their time seeking funding to maintain themselves and 
demonstrating how they have done so. Their own political vision does not 
necessarily envisage a world without NGOs, without bridge builder or broker. Given 
their donor-partners' preference for 'well-mannered activism', what keeps many of 
these NGOs sustainable is arguably partly their disengagement with mass struggles 
or the grievances of the majority population. Although the silence of NGO voices on 
abuses of human rights and state repression in Post-Apartheid South Africa is clearly 
connected to an increasing commodification and corporatisation of NGOs and their 
drive to sustainability, it is also linked to the particular demographic and class 
position of NGO professionals. This observation resonates strongly with the idea that 
in the democratic and neoliberal South Africa, race Apartheid has been replaced with 
class Apartheid. 
From this perspective, the awareness of critiques of their role and NGO 
professionals' reflexivity did allow for alternative constructions and readings of 
transnational development. However, I have argued that to employ a fairly uniform 
vocabularies and technologies (as required by their diverse partners), though not 
necessarily internally coherent, is a necessity for organisational survival. This 
working within a particular discursive formation has had real material and ideological 
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effects as I have demonstrated in my discussion of NGOs' positioning to popular 
movements. 
8.3. Suggestions for future research 
I have eschewed questions of how to make organisations more efficient for issues of 
structure and organisational form. Essentially, for things to be different would require 
wide-ranging social, political and economic change. It is precisely such a wide-
reaching political and social vision that NGOs are in danger of losing sight of. 
Therefore I believe that to put forward policy recommendations for NGOs or donors 
would fall into the trap I have sought to criticise - seeking to improve the way in 
which systems are assessed or partnerships are conducted, but neglecting what 
they may reveal about forms of power and governance in development. A number of 
recommendations for research have however arisen from my project and this section 
addresses what the implications of my analysis for future work are. 
This research has taken a discursive approach to the governmentality of 
South African NGOs and has explored the impact of auditing technologies and the 
partnership discourse primarily through interview data. I have maintained throughout 
this thesis that this does imply that such technologies and discourses are always 
successful or that their effects can be read off in a deterministic fashion. I have 
shown some of the ways in which partner or funder attempts to structure NGOs have 
been contested or unsuccessful but the nature of my research design does not allow 
a full exploration of these issues. Most importantly then, future research of an in-
depth ethnographic nature should expand on the themes analysed here, attending to 
the struggles over projects of rule and charting the successes and failures of audit 
culture and associated technologies in practice. 
Despite its rhetorical importance during the later Mbeki years, the 
developmental state discourse had not really impacted on the way the NGOs in this 
research carried out their activities and what they saw as their main challenges. 
Future research may look at whether and in what ways this will impact on the sector 
under the Zuma Presidency, and in the context of a crisis of global capitalism which 
has gravely affected the South African economy (also see section 8.4. below). What 
is more, the Mbeki era was characterised by an odd mixture of radical critique of 
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global institutions and the neoliberal mantra of there being no alternative to 
globalisation. Future discursive research might examine how the Zuma presidency 
will negotiate the present crisis and how it will impact on development discourses 
and practices in the coming years, for instance. 
Further exploration is clearly needed to understand the relationships between 
NGOs and wider civil society in South Africa. I have raised this issue but more 
research, including case study research, could be done that would look at how 
NGOs' positioning in the sector affects the effectiveness of civil society at large. In 
addition, the theoretical framework I have applied here could be relevant to further 
research into the governance and governmentality of movements. I have discussed 
legitimacy as the capital of development partnerships in this thesis. Building on my 
research, what needs to be examined in greater detail is in how far such NGO 
legitimacy is accepted by the 'communities' identified by NGOs and their partners. In 
other words, do NGOs, taken from within the logic of participatory development, 
present a 'value-added' in terms of communities' grievances? Moreover, new 
challenges continue to emerge in South Africa alongside longer-standing grievances 
- environmental politics for example are likely to provide a site for alliances against 
neoliberal policies. The processes and relationships that will characterise such 
alliances, and the role national and transnational NGOs will play in them, would 
make an important object of research. 
Future research also needs to look at the impact on NGOs of two trends in 
development policy: the aid harmonisation and alignment agenda and the overall 
trend towards entrepreneurialism. Whilst the former seems to not immediately 
concern civil society funding, research is needed to explore how the targets and 
instruments of the Paris Declaration and the intense interest in aid effectiveness 
through budget support impact on the way development can be thought and talked 
about by NGOs in the Majority World. Given that the global development policy trend 
towards supporting entrepreneurship shows no sign of abating, further research 
could employ the theoretical framework I have proposed here to analyse the 
technologies, discourses and forms of expertise that are mobilised in a specific NGO 
programme or multisectoral project. 
Given the scope of a Ph.D. project, it has not been possible to include a 
comparative dimension in my research design. However, I believe that such work 
would be extremely valuable in shedding light on the sovereignties and spatialities 
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forged by transnational development, and how they map differently onto national 
policies. This would certainly constitute an important enquiry in relation to South 
Africa's neighbouring countries in Southern Africa. How have national NGOs 
developed differently in Zambia, Tanzania or Namibia for example, and how are they 
differently affected by auditing, partnerships and donors' other agendas and 
requirements? 
Nonetheless, I have maintained throughout this work that South Africa 
occupies a unique position in the Southern African region. In many ways, the 
processes of transnational govern mentality are more readily evident in some of 
South Africa's neighbouring countries, where states are weaker and it has been 
argued that INGOs have taken over functions of government (Gould 2005b). South 
Africa presents a different case in terms of state capacity, with the state constituting 
the largest donor to the development community. National NGOs potentially have a 
much larger bargaining power than ordinarily attributed to SNGOs. 
I therefore think that future research might fruitfully be directed at a 
comparison of the South African NGO sector with that of Brazil, India or Mexico. 
There are many similarities between these countries: they are all middle-income 
economies with often similar developmental challenges (high levels of inequality and 
crime, for instance) and possess a similar status in their respective regions. More 
generally, I believe that my research allows tentative lessons to be drawn for the 
challenges facing NGOs in these other countries too. Future comparative research 
on the role of NGOs in middle-income economies may also tie in well with the 
trilateralist agenda that has emerged in recent years between India, Brazil and South 
Africa. For example, IBSA is a development partnership that seeks to coordinate 
South-to-South cooperation on a number of issues, including areas that are 
important for NGO activity such as health and education. 
Another comparative angle that could be pursued by future researchers 
would be between the national NGOs of this research and INGOs operative in South 
Africa. Many of my informants strongly criticised the role of INGOs in Southern 
African development, noting in particular that they contributed to a brain drain from 
the sector. The uneven power relations between the two were also highlighted by 
many of the NGO staff I interviewed. It would be very interesting to compare directly 
how agendas of nation-building and global development impact on the INGOs 
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working in the country, and to investigate how far location plays a role in South 
Africa's development spaces. 
Beyond such comparable countries, NGOs almost everywhere have been 
forced to commercialise and to adopt set M&E practices due to the global reach of 
an audit culture. From my understanding of the NGO literature and from speaking to 
activists and NGO staff in the UK and elsewhere, it would seem that such 
technologies of performance are essentially universal and affect organisations 
elsewhere too - although how they connect to specific national and local contexts 
differs, of course. This is an important implication of this research, shedding light not 
only on the impact of auditing on South African NGOs, but far beyond. Here, this 
work may contribute to a bigger research programme that assesses the impact of 
various types of impacf measurement in development across different contexts. 
Alternatively, future case study research may specifically examine the requirements 
of one large global donor and how they are negotiated by its beneficiary NGOs in 
different countries. 
If given the time and resources to carry out a larger research project, I would 
like to build on the experiences and knowledge gained during this Ph.D. and carry 
out a multi-sited ethnography of the carbon trading domain through the lens of an 
offsetting NGO. Carbon trading connects interestingly to existing concepts and 
practices of development and engages a transnational community, creating both new 
alliances and conflicts between companies, NGOs, governing bodies and Southern 
communities and ecological movements. Research in this field has so far not 
attended to the political and social consequences of the creation of a carbon market, 
and specifically to its trans-scalar character and the resource flows, power relations 
and technologies it gives rise to. This proposed ethnographic research may trace 
such flows across different localities and follow the diverse actors that are implicated 
in a specific offsetting programme. 
8.4. Final reflections 
It is characteristic of multi-method qualitative work to explore questions in-depth, 
showing the complex and often contradictory ways in which power operates. Indeed, 
the very setting for this research project is a place of contradictions where extreme 
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wealth and extreme poverty sit uncomfortably side by side and the boundaries 
between inside and outside continue to be redrawn and challenged. Despite my 
critique of NGOs' positioning in civil society, the conclusions I have drawn are far 
from unambiguous. Post-Apartheid development has been shown to be neoliberal 
and governmental, but it is also structured by a field of complex trans-scalar power 
relations, in which movements are neither local nor always radical-democratic and 
where, given a sometimes developmental state, it is far from clear whether being 
pro- or anti-Government is the more progressive stance. 
South African NGOs have served as a case study for charting what I have 
suggested is a new mode of development governance. This mode of governing 
through integration is not limited to the South African Post-Apartheid context, 
although it maps onto its specificities in interesting and complex ways. However, 
there are also continuities with older forms of governance, as witnessed for instance 
by displays of state sovereignty in relation to development and to popular 
mobilisation. 
I have certainly not wanted to conclude that NGO activities in the sphere of 
civil society strengthening or capacity building are entirely futile. My arguments do 
not imply that NGOs never carry out any progressive and worthwhile work, but rather 
that the space for them to do so is small and becoming progressively smaller. The 
processes I have charted ultimately produce ineffective organisations. Still, all NGOs 
I came in contact with did work that seeks to reduce poverty and inequality, and most 
of the NGO staff I interviewed regarded their work not as a job but as a vocation, 
often working long hours and being absolutely committed to bettering the lives of 
South Africans. Indeed, it is NGO professionals who are at the front line of the 
practices documented here and who most readily feel their space for action curtailed. 
In the new dispensation of participatory neoliberal development, it is they who are 
supposed to bridge the vast gulf between a shack in Alexandra and a global mining 
corporation's boardroom in Sandton City. I remain deeply ambiguous about the 
tension between my own commitment to a critical sociology of NGOs in 
development, and my personal relationships with people who more often than not 
were themselves critical of the processes I have charted in this thesis. I hope that, by 
having contextualised their voices and situated my analysis in the Post-Apartheid 
environment as I read it, I have done justice to both. 
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The conclusions and suggestions brought forward in this research will 
ultimately have to be re-assessed in the context of South Africa's changing political 
landscape. This research began in earnest in 2006 and was mainly written up in 
2008 and early 2009. The 'Zumafication' (McKinley 2007) of leftist politics in South 
Africa was already showing itself when I was doing fieldwork in 2007 and I returned 
to South Africa around the time of the Polokwane conference. Since then, the victory 
of the Zuma over the Mbeki camp has seen some nods towards the left and the 
developmental state framework, but mainly there has been continuity with the 
macroeconomic framework of Zuma's predecessor. There are no signs that social 
movement and protest activity are diminishing. On the contrary, the impact of the 
world-wide economic crisis will most likely involve massive job losses in South 
Africa, as well as a further upsurge of challenges against capitalist and neoliberal 
modes of governing. However, the shifting alliances of Post-Polokwane politics are 
likely to impact on how popular struggles are framed and expressed. Zuma and his 
supporters have moreover employed their own intimidation tactics using a somewhat 
different but no less paranoid rhetoric of revolution or betrayal. 
Not least, it remains to be seen how the 2010 FIFA World Cup will impact on 
the country. Evictions and the 'cleaning up' of poor neighbourhoods over the past 
years seem to suggest that rather than providing trickle-down development for all, 
the gap between the 'first' and 'second' economies will be further amplified, and 'the 
poors' further pushed from the 'world class cities' of the new South Africa. How 
NGOs position themselves in relation to these challenges and opportunities is at the 
very core of their future politics, identity and credibility. The fact that the liberalisation 
and privatisation of the economy after the transition has caused living conditions to 
be worse than under Apartheid for millions of South Africans makes this a task of 
utmost urgency. The strengths and partial successes of grassroots activism and 
social movements in South Africa have led many to be hopeful about the 
construction of a postneoliberal world - which renders the above-traced NGO 
reformism ever more problematic. Still, as with NGOs' claims, the identification of 
these forms of struggle against neoliberalism as genuinely democratic and 
progressive is not self-evident. 
This thesis started with the view over Johannesburg from Constitution Hill. 
Like many of the metaphors and concepts I have employed, that view is dominated 
by opposites and contradictions: the wealth of Sandton and the destitution of 
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Hillbrow; the old prison tracts that symbolise the inhumanity of the Apartheid regime 
and the airy court building proudly displaying the constitutional rights. The images I 
kept encountering in Johannesburg are binaries: wealth and poverty, first and 
second economy, shanty town and board room, death and birth. The ultimate 
neoliberal dystopia has succeeded the utopian hope that was bestowed upon the 
new South Africa and the promises of freedom that so many South Africans feel 
have been betrayed. But these binaries cannot encapsulate the realities of life in 
South Africa. 
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Appendix 1: Details of Participants 
Date Organisation Contact Nature of meeting (and position) and comments 
Keren Ben-Zeev Expert Interview 
21.02.07 Heinrich B611 (Project Co- - Providing access to NGOs Foundation Ordinator) - Overview of funding issues 
and the donor landscape in 
South Africa 
CEPD (Centre for John Pampallis Interview 
23.02.07 Education Policy 
Development) (Director) 
Clare Doube Expert interview 
02.03.07 CIVICUS (Manager, - Gain access to partner Civil Watch organisations 
Programme) - Gain international NGO 
perspective 
Dr Gerd Stephan Expert interview 
Rosa Luxemburg (Head of Regional - Access to NGOs 07.03.07 Office for Southern - Access to social Foundation Africa) movements 
- Solidarity funder 
perspective 
Ahmed Motala Interview 
CSVR (Executive - Provided lots of 
(The Centre for the Director) documentary materials 14.03.07 Study of Violence I will do a follow-up interview 
and Reconciliation) in a few weeks and there is a 
possibility for a short 
observation. 
The Institute for ProfWilna Expert interview 
15.03.07 Sustainable Oldewage Theron 
- Access to the NGOs the Livelihoods (Director) institute works with 
Dion Jerling Interview 
(Director, Founder) - Provided grant applications 
and budgets 
16.03.07 Connect Africa Dion offered to take me 
along to one of the 
communities in Limpopo 
where they work. 
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Dominick Marshall- Interview. 
Smith 
23.03.07 Starfish (Relationship - Provided reports and Manager- proposals 
Business 
Development) 
Melanie Malema Second meeting with 
Connect Africa. 
26.03.07 Connect Africa (Head of 
Operations) - Provided funding proposals 
and log frames 
Michael Roll Expert interview 
(Project Manager) - Gain perspective on 
cooperation with ANC and 
other partners 
27.03.07 Friedrich Ebert Foundation SA Michael is a fellow 
development sociologist so 
the chat helped focus on 
some issue areas in my 
work. 
Dr Werner Bohler Expert Interview 
29.03.07 Konrad Adenauer Foundation SA (Head of South 
African Bureau) 
Jane Duncan Interview 
30.03.07 Freedom of Expression Institute (Executive 
Director) 
Shafika Issacs Interview 
02.04.07 Mindset (Director, I will be interviewing other 
Schooling Sector) people from the organisation 
in weeks to come. 
Richard Calland Interview 
23.04.07 fDA SA (Director, [Cape Town] Governance 
Programme) 
Leonard Gentle Interview 
ILRIG (Director) 24.04.07 [Cape Town] - Provided funding proposals, evaluations and 
other documentary sources 
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Tracy Bailey Interviews with both 
(National 
The Harold Wolpe Coordinator, - Provided proposals and 
Memorial Trust outgoing); evaluation reports 
25.04.07 [Cape Town] Vanja Karth 
(National Co-
ordinator) 
Vis Naidoo (CEO) Interview 
09.05.07 Mindset Vis agreed for me to shadow 
someone and also to have 
insight into all their reports, 
assessments and bids. 
Stephen Gelb Interview 
(Executive Also discussed wider 
Director) political-economic issues 
such as BEE, the new 
discourse of the 
10.05.07 The EDGE Institute developmental state within 
the ANC's economic policy 
etc. 
He recommended some 
useful contacts to speak to 
on economic empowerment. 
Lusanda Jiya Interview 
(Head of Since she is the fund raiser 
15.05.07 Mindset Development) and responsible for 
relationships with donors I 
interviewed her specifically 
about those areas of her 
work. 
James Currie Interview 
25.05.07 The Africa Foundation (Managing - Provided proposals and 
Director) evaluations 
Judy Interview 
Gun Free South Bassingthwaighte 
30.05.07 Africa (National Director) 
The Media William Bird Interview 
13.06.07 Monitoring Project [now: Media (Director) - Provided reports and 
Monitoring Africa] proposals 
NANGOSA Eric Ntshiqela Interview 
18.06.07 (National Alliance (Director) For Non- He will forward membership 
Goverment application. Also wants to 
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Organisations) stay in touch for 'networkin~:( 
Raymond Mofolo Interview 
19.06.07 Workers Education (Education - Gain perspective on Project Programme sustainability crisis 
Manager) 
Jose Bright Interview 
19.06.07 Teboho (Founder and 
CEO) 
Valued Citizens Carole Podetti Interview 21.06.07 Initiative (Director) 
Democratic Dr Rama Naidu Interview 
25.06.07 Development Programme (DDP) (Director) 
[Durban] 
Imraan Buccus Interview 
(Researcher) I will meet with him again 
Centre for Public and possibly with Janine 
26.06.07 Participation Hicks, one of the founding 
[Durban] members who I was in touch 
with and who last week 
started working for the 
Gender Commission. 
AGENDA Michelle Oyedan Interview 27.06.07 [Durban] (Director) 
Jane Zimmermann Interview 
04.07.07 Siyazisika Trust (Director) 
Felicity Gibbs Interview 
04.07.07 Operation Hunger (National 
Manager) 
Dale McKinley Expert interview 
11.07.07 Anti-Privatisation (Treasurer) Forum - Gain social movement 
activist perspective 
Kirston Greenop Interview during observation 
01.02.08 Mindset (Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
Manager) 
TukiSenne Interview during observation 
06.02.08 Mindset (Health Channel 
Executive) 
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Claire Stevens Interview during observation 
06.02.08 Mindset 
(Content Manaqer) 
Vis Naidoo Interview during observation 
07.02.08 Mindset 
(CEO) 
Sam Mpherwane Interview during observation 
08.02.08 Mindset (Project Manager, 
Mindset Learn) 
Fazila Farouk Expert interview 
South African Civil (Founder) - Gain activist perspective 
12.02.08 Society Information 
Service The SACISS is to launch in 
April. Fazila used to work for 
SanqoNet. 
Lauren Graham Interview 
13.02.08 CASE 
(Researcher) 
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Appendix 2: Details of Participating NGOs 
Organisation About the organisation Further comments 
CEPD Policy and Research NGO, - Established in 
(The Centre for sometimes acting as grant manager transition period 
Education Policy - Initially close to ANC 
Development) 
CSVR NGO working in human rights and - Established during 
(The Centre for with victims of violence Apartheid 
the Study of - Partnerships with 
Violence and Advocacy, lobbying and counselling range of actors 
Reconciliation) work 
'Social enterprise' but registered as - OSSA-funded 
Section 21 non-profit organisation - Partnerships with 
Connect Africa provincial governments 
and technology 
providers 
NGO supporting Aids orphans - Funded by private 
through grants to CSOs for donors and 
community care, feeding and corporations 
Starfish capacity building programmes - Has established 
partner organisations 
for fundraising in the 
UKand US 
Lobbying, litigation and research - Works with social 
Freedom of NGO dealing with issues of freedom movements on 
Expression of expression censorship issues 
Institute - Evolved during 
transition 
Large-scale NGO, providing health - Strong and complex 
and school education through partnership model (with 
information and communication Government, NGOs 
Mindset technologies and corporates) 
- Has dedicated 
research department 
for M&E 
Research and advocacy NGO and - 'Critical ally' to 
IDASA public policy think tank Government with good relationships at all 
levels 
Research NGO supporting social - Strong links to labour 
movements organisations and new 
ILRIG social movements 
- Evolved out of 
Apartheid-era service 
organisation 
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NGO that organises public debates, - Partnerships with 
wanting to contribute to critical academic centres and 
The Harold Wolpe debate on social, political, economic research institutes 
Memorial Trust and cultural issues and a widening 
of the public sphere 
Research NGO and policy institute - Specialises in 
The EDGE economic policy 
Institute - Also carries out public 
events and lectures 
NGO working with communities - Working with state 
surrounding conservation areas in agencies, private 
the areas of education, health and donations and 
income generation corporates 
The Africa - Seeks to forge 
Foundation partnerships between 
conservation initiatives 
and communities 
surrounding national 
parks 
Lobbying and advocacy NGO - Campaigns for a gun 
free society 
Gun Free South - Receives funding 
Africa from private foundations and 
European donor 
agencies 
The Media NGO monitoring the media and - In partnerships with 
Monitoring working with human rights issues other NGOs 
Project - Receives funding 
[now: Media from private foundations and Monitoring European donor Africa] 
agencies 
NANGOSA CSO/ NGO umbrella organisation. - Seeks to form 
(National Alliance partnerships with 
For Non- Government and lobby 
Goverment for policy change 
Organisationsl 
Education and training NGO - Closely affiliated with 
Workers and seeing itself as 
Education Project serving the labour 
movement 
- Trains trade unions. 
NGO working with vulnerable - Resembles a social 
Teboho teenagers in Soweto. enterprise model 
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Education NGO, dealing with values - Strong partnerships 
Valued Citizens and citizenship with provincial 
Initiative Governments and 
cOlJ2orates 
NGO working primarily in civic - Part of a number of 
Democratic participation and voter education in NGO networks and 
Development KZN and towards capacity building collaborations 
Programme ofCBOs - Works with provincial 
(DDP) Government and has 
also been supported by 
corporations 
Centre for Public Research and advocacy NGO - Researches and 
Participation educates on public participation in 
_governance 
AGENDA Media and capacity building NGO - Publishes a journal for academics and 
activists 
Training NGO, educating and - Partnerships with 
mentoring in rural communities provincial Government 
Siyazisika Trust - Some corporate 
funding through CSI 
~~rammes 
NBO carrying out more traditional - Evolved from 
developmental work in marginalised Apartheid-era service 
Operation Hunger communities, dealing with Aids, organisation 
malnutrition and poverty - Now working with 
Government but also 
international funders 
Research NGO - Specialises in socio-
CASE economic and policy 
research 
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Appendix 3: Standard E-mail to NGO Directors 
Dear ____________ _ 
Natascha Mueller-Hirth 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Sociology 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
e: n.mueller-hirth@gold.ac.uk 
I am a doctoral researcher in the Sociology Department at Goldsmiths 
College, University of London (UK). I am currently based at WISER (the Wits 
Institute for Social and Economic Research) as a visiting researcher. My work 
is funded by the UK's Economic and Social Research Council. I am writing to 
you as I am very interested in the work yo~r organisation does and I would 
like to speak to you about your experiences and views on issues central to 
my research. 
I will be based in Johannesburg until the end of July and am hoping to gather 
extensive data both from interviews and through observation. Interviews take 
about one and a half hours and have a semi-structured format. However I 
would also be interested in observing the day-to-day working practices and 
activities within your organisation. If I can in turn be useful to your 
organisation in terms of volunteering my skills and time, I would welcome this 
opportunity. 
My research deals with transformations in the role of South African NGOs in 
social development. I am particularly interested in what values, organisational 
models and strategies characterise non-profit organisations and how their 
work and vision is in turn shaped by broader processes such as 
neoliberalism. I am situating this in the context of partnerships, both between 
different sectors in South Africa and between NGOs themselves. I have 
already carried out quite a number of expert interviews with NGO staff in 
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South Africa and London, and have also undertaken some previous research 
with a public-private partnership for development in South Africa. 
I am enclosing a brief outline of research aims. However, should you prefer, I 
am happy to provide you with samples of my work or with an extensive 
research statement detailing fully my research questions and methods. 
Likewise, my PhD supervisors can be contacted for references. I would also 
welcome the chance to explain to you in person what my research involves. 
It would be fantastic if you could find the time to share your expertise with me. 
I shall be trying to contact you again in the next few days, or alternatively you 
can reach me via email. 
Thank you very much for your time. 
Kind regards 
Natascha Mueller-Hirth 
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Appendix 4: Illustrations 
4.1. The NGO domain and funding flows 
Provincial 
and Local 
National 
Government +--f----+---1f--------1.--
~ 
CBOs 
/ 
Social 
Movements 
-+ Funding! Contracting 
.--... ~ Funding in exceptional cases 
-+ Non-financial support! Endorsement 
International 
Donor 
Agencies 
South African 
Corporations 
Northern 
NGOs 
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4.2. Timeline 
Year Founding of Historical events and changes in funding modalities 
case NGO 
1983 ILRIG Establishment of UDF 
1985 CASE State of Emergency 
1986 Idasa 
1987 Agenda Dakar Meeting 
Siyazisika 
1989 CSVR 
1990 ANC unbanned 
Start of (official) negotiations 
1992 CEPD 
Africa Foundation 
1993 DDP 
MMP 
1994 FXI 1 sl democratic elections 
GFSA 
Inti funding increasingly into bilateral aid 
1996 GEAR 
1997 Wolpe Trust Start of global trend towards SWAP & budget 
support] 
CPP (out of Idasa) 
1999 Start of Mbeki Presidency 
Formation of APF ('00) and LPM ('01) 
2001 Teboho Trust 
VCI 
2002 Starfish King II Report and increase in CSI 
2003 Mindset Social movement activity at WSSD and WCAR 
Edge Institute 
2004 'Second wave' of protest movements 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
2006 Connect Africa Launch of AsgiSA 
NANGOSA 
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4.3. Sustainability strategies of NGOs in this research 
• Partnerships 
• Diversification of funds and funders 
• Expansion into the Southern African region 
• Developing profitable activities 
• Grant management 
• Creating endowment funds 
• Developing a for-profit arm 
• Social entrepreneurship model 
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Appendix 5: Two Log Frame Formats 
5.1. A typical logical framework format 
Narrative summary Objectively Means of Assumptions 
verifiable verification 
indicators 
Goal- the overall Measures (direct or Sources of Important events, 
aim to which the indirect) to show the information and conditions or 
project is expected to project's contribution methods used to decisions beyond the 
contribute show fulfilment of project's 
to the goal goal control necessary for 
maintaining 
the progress towards 
the goal 
Outcomes (or Measures (direct or Sources of Important events, 
objectives) - the new indirect) to show information and conditions or 
situation which the what methods used to decisions beyond the 
projects is aiming to progress is being show progress project's 
bring about made against objectives control, which are 
towards reaching the necessary if achieving the 
objectives objectives is going to 
contribute towards the 
overall goal 
Outputs - the results Measures (direct or Sources of Important events, 
which should be indirect) to show if information and conditions or 
within the control of project methods used to decisions beyond the 
the project outputs are being show delivery of project's 
management delivered outputs control, which are 
necessary if 
producing the outputs 
is going to 
help achieve the 
objectives 
Activities - the things Measures (direct or Sources of Important events, 
which have to be indirect) to show if information and conditions or 
done by the project project methods used to decisions beyond the 
to produce the outputs are being show that activities project's 
outputs delivered have been control completed 
Inputs Resources - type and level of resources needed for the project 
Finance - overall budget 
Time - Planned start and end date 
Adopted from Bakewell & Garbutt (2005: 3) 
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5.2. Gun Free South Africa's Log Frame as part of a grant application for a 3-
day multi-stakeholder conference 
Intervention Objectively Means of Assumptions and 
Logic verifiable Verification Risks 
indicators of 
success 
Overall Enhanced Reduction in the SAPS crime The economic situation 
Objectives safety and number of firearms statistics in South 
security of in NIMSS Africa will 
South crime and violence surveys improve/employment 
African levels will increase, 
communities addressing one of 
by reducing the underlying causes 
gun of violence. 
violence and 
the number 
of guns in 
circulation 
Immediate Increase Reduced incidence Police The economic situation 
Objective capacity in of youth reports, will not 
Government involvement victim decline such as to 
and civil in gun violence in surveys aggravate the 
society to South Africa 
develop 
programmes 
dealing with 
gun violence 
Expected 1) Improved 1. 20 - 30 experts Conference Government 
results evidence from a variety of report, departments may 
(Outputs) base on the fields present publication of refuse 
impact papers on the resource to take part in the 
of gun impact of guns on guide and process 
violence on youth. booklet for 
youth 2. Major youth 
2) Greater stakeholders from 
public government and 
awareness civil society identify 
particularly policy and 
amongst programme gaps 
youth and commit to 
addressing these 
3. Public access to 
this findings is 
promoted as a 
result of various 
publications 
4. Resources are 
available to youth, 
youth workers and 
schools on youth 
and guns 
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Means of Costs 
Implementation 
Activities - Three day 1. GFSAwili See budget 
conference provide template 
held management and 
-Conference administrative 
papers will support. An 
be published advisory committee 
-A directory will be set up. 
of services 2. A conference 
will be organiser will be 
compiled employed 
-A popular 3. Office and travel 
booklet for expenses will be 
youth will be covered 
produced 4. A conference 
venue will be hired 
and will supply 
catering 
5. 100 participants 
will attend the 
conference, air fare 
and accommodation 
will be paid for 
6. The conference 
organiser will edit 
and publish the 
conference papers 
7. The conference 
organiser will 
compile and publish 
a database on 
resources 
8. GFSAwili 
compile and 
produce a popular 
booklet 
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Appendix 6: Photographs 
6.1. The doors at Constitutional Court (detail) 
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6.2. I heart Jozi 
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Appendix 7: Pilot Study Interviews 
Date Organisation Contact About the organisation (and position) 
Sophie Wilcox Oxford-based organisation that 
has country offices in Kenya and 
(Programme Officer) Zimbabwe, but also works in 
other African countries in co-
14.08. Africa Now operation with local partner 
2006 organisations, businesses and 
state ministries. 
Focus on enterprise 
development, fair and ethical 
trade and microfinance. 
Onyekachi Wambu African development through the 
diaspora. 
(Information Officer/ 
Temporary Executive Primary focus has shifted in the 
21.08. Director past few years from capacity 
2006 AFFORD building, awareness-raising and policy-centred activities in the 
UK to now directly supporting 
small- to medium-sized 
businesses in Africa to stimulate 
job Qrowth. 
Charles Kazibwe Member network of eight 
training, research and advocacy 
(Director) organisations based in the UK, 
22.08. Transform Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
2006 Africa Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Gambia. 
Mainly focused on training and 
capacity building of NGOs. 
Firoze Manji Harnessing of Information and 
Communication Technologies to 
(Director) support movements for 
05.09. emancipation and social justice 
2006 Fahamu in Africa. 
Publishes Pambazuka News, a 
website that receives 2 million 
hits per month. 
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